--- /dev/null
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
+
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/buf.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/ex_data.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/thread.h>
+
+#include "../internal.h"
+
+
+#define OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 10000
+
+static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS g_ex_data_class = CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS_INIT;
+
+DH *DH_new(void) {
+ DH *dh = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DH));
+ if (dh == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ OPENSSL_memset(dh, 0, sizeof(DH));
+
+ CRYPTO_MUTEX_init(&dh->method_mont_p_lock);
+
+ dh->references = 1;
+ CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&dh->ex_data);
+
+ return dh;
+}
+
+void DH_free(DH *dh) {
+ if (dh == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (!CRYPTO_refcount_dec_and_test_zero(&dh->references)) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, dh, &dh->ex_data);
+
+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(dh->method_mont_p);
+ BN_clear_free(dh->p);
+ BN_clear_free(dh->g);
+ BN_clear_free(dh->q);
+ BN_clear_free(dh->j);
+ OPENSSL_free(dh->seed);
+ BN_clear_free(dh->counter);
+ BN_clear_free(dh->pub_key);
+ BN_clear_free(dh->priv_key);
+ CRYPTO_MUTEX_cleanup(&dh->method_mont_p_lock);
+
+ OPENSSL_free(dh);
+}
+
+void DH_get0_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM **out_pub_key,
+ const BIGNUM **out_priv_key) {
+ if (out_pub_key != NULL) {
+ *out_pub_key = dh->pub_key;
+ }
+ if (out_priv_key != NULL) {
+ *out_priv_key = dh->priv_key;
+ }
+}
+
+int DH_set0_key(DH *dh, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *priv_key) {
+ if (pub_key != NULL) {
+ BN_free(dh->pub_key);
+ dh->pub_key = pub_key;
+ }
+
+ if (priv_key != NULL) {
+ BN_free(dh->priv_key);
+ dh->priv_key = priv_key;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+void DH_get0_pqg(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM **out_p, const BIGNUM **out_q,
+ const BIGNUM **out_g) {
+ if (out_p != NULL) {
+ *out_p = dh->p;
+ }
+ if (out_q != NULL) {
+ *out_q = dh->q;
+ }
+ if (out_g != NULL) {
+ *out_g = dh->g;
+ }
+}
+
+int DH_set0_pqg(DH *dh, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g) {
+ if ((dh->p == NULL && p == NULL) ||
+ (dh->g == NULL && g == NULL)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (p != NULL) {
+ BN_free(dh->p);
+ dh->p = p;
+ }
+
+ if (q != NULL) {
+ BN_free(dh->q);
+ dh->q = q;
+ }
+
+ if (g != NULL) {
+ BN_free(dh->g);
+ dh->g = g;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int DH_generate_parameters_ex(DH *dh, int prime_bits, int generator, BN_GENCB *cb) {
+ // We generate DH parameters as follows
+ // find a prime q which is prime_bits/2 bits long.
+ // p=(2*q)+1 or (p-1)/2 = q
+ // For this case, g is a generator if
+ // g^((p-1)/q) mod p != 1 for values of q which are the factors of p-1.
+ // Since the factors of p-1 are q and 2, we just need to check
+ // g^2 mod p != 1 and g^q mod p != 1.
+ //
+ // Having said all that,
+ // there is another special case method for the generators 2, 3 and 5.
+ // for 2, p mod 24 == 11
+ // for 3, p mod 12 == 5 <<<<< does not work for safe primes.
+ // for 5, p mod 10 == 3 or 7
+ //
+ // Thanks to Phil Karn <karn@qualcomm.com> for the pointers about the
+ // special generators and for answering some of my questions.
+ //
+ // I've implemented the second simple method :-).
+ // Since DH should be using a safe prime (both p and q are prime),
+ // this generator function can take a very very long time to run.
+
+ // Actually there is no reason to insist that 'generator' be a generator.
+ // It's just as OK (and in some sense better) to use a generator of the
+ // order-q subgroup.
+
+ BIGNUM *t1, *t2;
+ int g, ok = 0;
+ BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+
+ ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ t1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ t2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ if (t1 == NULL || t2 == NULL) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ // Make sure |dh| has the necessary elements
+ if (dh->p == NULL) {
+ dh->p = BN_new();
+ if (dh->p == NULL) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ if (dh->g == NULL) {
+ dh->g = BN_new();
+ if (dh->g == NULL) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (generator <= 1) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, DH_R_BAD_GENERATOR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (generator == DH_GENERATOR_2) {
+ if (!BN_set_word(t1, 24)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!BN_set_word(t2, 11)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ g = 2;
+ } else if (generator == DH_GENERATOR_5) {
+ if (!BN_set_word(t1, 10)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!BN_set_word(t2, 3)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ // BN_set_word(t3,7); just have to miss
+ // out on these ones :-(
+ g = 5;
+ } else {
+ // in the general case, don't worry if 'generator' is a
+ // generator or not: since we are using safe primes,
+ // it will generate either an order-q or an order-2q group,
+ // which both is OK
+ if (!BN_set_word(t1, 2)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!BN_set_word(t2, 1)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ g = generator;
+ }
+
+ if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(dh->p, prime_bits, 1, t1, t2, cb)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!BN_set_word(dh->g, g)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ok = 1;
+
+err:
+ if (!ok) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ }
+
+ if (ctx != NULL) {
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ }
+ return ok;
+}
+
+int DH_generate_key(DH *dh) {
+ int ok = 0;
+ int generate_new_key = 0;
+ BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL;
+
+ if (BN_num_bits(dh->p) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (dh->priv_key == NULL) {
+ priv_key = BN_new();
+ if (priv_key == NULL) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ generate_new_key = 1;
+ } else {
+ priv_key = dh->priv_key;
+ }
+
+ if (dh->pub_key == NULL) {
+ pub_key = BN_new();
+ if (pub_key == NULL) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ pub_key = dh->pub_key;
+ }
+
+ if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dh->method_mont_p, &dh->method_mont_p_lock,
+ dh->p, ctx)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (generate_new_key) {
+ if (dh->q) {
+ if (!BN_rand_range_ex(priv_key, 2, dh->q)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ // secret exponent length
+ unsigned priv_bits = dh->priv_length;
+ if (priv_bits == 0) {
+ const unsigned p_bits = BN_num_bits(dh->p);
+ if (p_bits == 0) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ priv_bits = p_bits - 1;
+ }
+
+ if (!BN_rand(priv_key, priv_bits, BN_RAND_TOP_ONE, BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ANY)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(pub_key, dh->g, priv_key, dh->p, ctx,
+ dh->method_mont_p)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ dh->pub_key = pub_key;
+ dh->priv_key = priv_key;
+ ok = 1;
+
+err:
+ if (ok != 1) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ }
+
+ if (dh->pub_key == NULL) {
+ BN_free(pub_key);
+ }
+ if (dh->priv_key == NULL) {
+ BN_free(priv_key);
+ }
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ return ok;
+}
+
+int DH_compute_key(unsigned char *out, const BIGNUM *peers_key, DH *dh) {
+ BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *shared_key;
+ int ret = -1;
+ int check_result;
+
+ if (BN_num_bits(dh->p) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ shared_key = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ if (shared_key == NULL) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (dh->priv_key == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, DH_R_NO_PRIVATE_VALUE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dh->method_mont_p, &dh->method_mont_p_lock,
+ dh->p, ctx)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!DH_check_pub_key(dh, peers_key, &check_result) || check_result) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, DH_R_INVALID_PUBKEY);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(shared_key, peers_key, dh->priv_key, dh->p,
+ ctx, dh->method_mont_p)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ret = BN_bn2bin(shared_key, out);
+
+err:
+ if (ctx != NULL) {
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int DH_size(const DH *dh) { return BN_num_bytes(dh->p); }
+
+unsigned DH_num_bits(const DH *dh) { return BN_num_bits(dh->p); }
+
+int DH_up_ref(DH *dh) {
+ CRYPTO_refcount_inc(&dh->references);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int int_dh_bn_cpy(BIGNUM **dst, const BIGNUM *src) {
+ BIGNUM *a = NULL;
+
+ if (src) {
+ a = BN_dup(src);
+ if (!a) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ BN_free(*dst);
+ *dst = a;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int int_dh_param_copy(DH *to, const DH *from, int is_x942) {
+ if (is_x942 == -1) {
+ is_x942 = !!from->q;
+ }
+ if (!int_dh_bn_cpy(&to->p, from->p) ||
+ !int_dh_bn_cpy(&to->g, from->g)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!is_x942) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (!int_dh_bn_cpy(&to->q, from->q) ||
+ !int_dh_bn_cpy(&to->j, from->j)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ OPENSSL_free(to->seed);
+ to->seed = NULL;
+ to->seedlen = 0;
+
+ if (from->seed) {
+ to->seed = BUF_memdup(from->seed, from->seedlen);
+ if (!to->seed) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ to->seedlen = from->seedlen;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+DH *DHparams_dup(const DH *dh) {
+ DH *ret = DH_new();
+ if (!ret) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (!int_dh_param_copy(ret, dh, -1)) {
+ DH_free(ret);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int DH_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_unused *unused,
+ CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_unused, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) {
+ int index;
+ if (!CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(&g_ex_data_class, &index, argl, argp,
+ free_func)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return index;
+}
+
+int DH_set_ex_data(DH *d, int idx, void *arg) {
+ return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&d->ex_data, idx, arg);
+}
+
+void *DH_get_ex_data(DH *d, int idx) {
+ return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&d->ex_data, idx);
+}