--- /dev/null
+/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
+ * project 2006.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
+
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/buf.h>
+#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
+#include <openssl/digest.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/nid.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+
+#include "../internal.h"
+#include "../fipsmodule/rsa/internal.h"
+#include "internal.h"
+
+
+typedef struct {
+ // Key gen parameters
+ int nbits;
+ BIGNUM *pub_exp;
+ // RSA padding mode
+ int pad_mode;
+ // message digest
+ const EVP_MD *md;
+ // message digest for MGF1
+ const EVP_MD *mgf1md;
+ // PSS salt length
+ int saltlen;
+ // tbuf is a buffer which is either NULL, or is the size of the RSA modulus.
+ // It's used to store the output of RSA operations.
+ uint8_t *tbuf;
+ // OAEP label
+ uint8_t *oaep_label;
+ size_t oaep_labellen;
+} RSA_PKEY_CTX;
+
+typedef struct {
+ uint8_t *data;
+ size_t len;
+} RSA_OAEP_LABEL_PARAMS;
+
+static int pkey_rsa_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) {
+ RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx;
+ rctx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(RSA_PKEY_CTX));
+ if (!rctx) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ OPENSSL_memset(rctx, 0, sizeof(RSA_PKEY_CTX));
+
+ rctx->nbits = 2048;
+ rctx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
+ rctx->saltlen = -2;
+
+ ctx->data = rctx;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int pkey_rsa_copy(EVP_PKEY_CTX *dst, EVP_PKEY_CTX *src) {
+ RSA_PKEY_CTX *dctx, *sctx;
+ if (!pkey_rsa_init(dst)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ sctx = src->data;
+ dctx = dst->data;
+ dctx->nbits = sctx->nbits;
+ if (sctx->pub_exp) {
+ dctx->pub_exp = BN_dup(sctx->pub_exp);
+ if (!dctx->pub_exp) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ dctx->pad_mode = sctx->pad_mode;
+ dctx->md = sctx->md;
+ dctx->mgf1md = sctx->mgf1md;
+ if (sctx->oaep_label) {
+ OPENSSL_free(dctx->oaep_label);
+ dctx->oaep_label = BUF_memdup(sctx->oaep_label, sctx->oaep_labellen);
+ if (!dctx->oaep_label) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ dctx->oaep_labellen = sctx->oaep_labellen;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static void pkey_rsa_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) {
+ RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
+
+ if (rctx == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ BN_free(rctx->pub_exp);
+ OPENSSL_free(rctx->tbuf);
+ OPENSSL_free(rctx->oaep_label);
+ OPENSSL_free(rctx);
+}
+
+static int setup_tbuf(RSA_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX *pk) {
+ if (ctx->tbuf) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+ ctx->tbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(EVP_PKEY_size(pk->pkey));
+ if (!ctx->tbuf) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int pkey_rsa_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *sig, size_t *siglen,
+ const uint8_t *tbs, size_t tbslen) {
+ RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
+ RSA *rsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa;
+ const size_t key_len = EVP_PKEY_size(ctx->pkey);
+
+ if (!sig) {
+ *siglen = key_len;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (*siglen < key_len) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (rctx->md) {
+ unsigned out_len;
+ switch (rctx->pad_mode) {
+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+ if (!RSA_sign(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md), tbs, tbslen, sig, &out_len, rsa)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ *siglen = out_len;
+ return 1;
+
+ case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING:
+ return RSA_sign_pss_mgf1(rsa, siglen, sig, *siglen, tbs, tbslen,
+ rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md, rctx->saltlen);
+
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return RSA_sign_raw(rsa, siglen, sig, *siglen, tbs, tbslen, rctx->pad_mode);
+}
+
+static int pkey_rsa_verify(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *sig,
+ size_t siglen, const uint8_t *tbs,
+ size_t tbslen) {
+ RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
+ RSA *rsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa;
+
+ if (rctx->md) {
+ switch (rctx->pad_mode) {
+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+ return RSA_verify(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md), tbs, tbslen, sig, siglen, rsa);
+
+ case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING:
+ return RSA_verify_pss_mgf1(rsa, tbs, tbslen, rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md,
+ rctx->saltlen, sig, siglen);
+
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ size_t rslen;
+ const size_t key_len = EVP_PKEY_size(ctx->pkey);
+ if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx) ||
+ !RSA_verify_raw(rsa, &rslen, rctx->tbuf, key_len, sig, siglen,
+ rctx->pad_mode) ||
+ rslen != tbslen ||
+ CRYPTO_memcmp(tbs, rctx->tbuf, rslen) != 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int pkey_rsa_verify_recover(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
+ size_t *out_len, const uint8_t *sig,
+ size_t sig_len) {
+ RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
+ RSA *rsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa;
+ const size_t key_len = EVP_PKEY_size(ctx->pkey);
+
+ if (out == NULL) {
+ *out_len = key_len;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (*out_len < key_len) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (rctx->md == NULL) {
+ return RSA_verify_raw(rsa, out_len, out, *out_len, sig, sig_len,
+ rctx->pad_mode);
+ }
+
+ if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ // Assemble the encoded hash, using a placeholder hash value.
+ static const uint8_t kDummyHash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE] = {0};
+ const size_t hash_len = EVP_MD_size(rctx->md);
+ uint8_t *asn1_prefix;
+ size_t asn1_prefix_len;
+ int asn1_prefix_allocated;
+ if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx) ||
+ !RSA_add_pkcs1_prefix(&asn1_prefix, &asn1_prefix_len,
+ &asn1_prefix_allocated, EVP_MD_type(rctx->md),
+ kDummyHash, hash_len)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ size_t rslen;
+ int ok = 1;
+ if (!RSA_verify_raw(rsa, &rslen, rctx->tbuf, key_len, sig, sig_len,
+ RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) ||
+ rslen != asn1_prefix_len ||
+ // Compare all but the hash suffix.
+ CRYPTO_memcmp(rctx->tbuf, asn1_prefix, asn1_prefix_len - hash_len) != 0) {
+ ok = 0;
+ }
+
+ if (asn1_prefix_allocated) {
+ OPENSSL_free(asn1_prefix);
+ }
+
+ if (!ok) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (out != NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(out, rctx->tbuf + rslen - hash_len, hash_len);
+ }
+ *out_len = hash_len;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int pkey_rsa_encrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, size_t *outlen,
+ const uint8_t *in, size_t inlen) {
+ RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
+ RSA *rsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa;
+ const size_t key_len = EVP_PKEY_size(ctx->pkey);
+
+ if (!out) {
+ *outlen = key_len;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (*outlen < key_len) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
+ if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx) ||
+ !RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(rctx->tbuf, key_len, in, inlen,
+ rctx->oaep_label, rctx->oaep_labellen,
+ rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md) ||
+ !RSA_encrypt(rsa, outlen, out, *outlen, rctx->tbuf, key_len,
+ RSA_NO_PADDING)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ return RSA_encrypt(rsa, outlen, out, *outlen, in, inlen, rctx->pad_mode);
+}
+
+static int pkey_rsa_decrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
+ size_t *outlen, const uint8_t *in,
+ size_t inlen) {
+ RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
+ RSA *rsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa;
+ const size_t key_len = EVP_PKEY_size(ctx->pkey);
+
+ if (!out) {
+ *outlen = key_len;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (*outlen < key_len) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
+ size_t padded_len;
+ if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx) ||
+ !RSA_decrypt(rsa, &padded_len, rctx->tbuf, key_len, in, inlen,
+ RSA_NO_PADDING) ||
+ !RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(
+ out, outlen, key_len, rctx->tbuf, padded_len, rctx->oaep_label,
+ rctx->oaep_labellen, rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ return RSA_decrypt(rsa, outlen, out, key_len, in, inlen, rctx->pad_mode);
+}
+
+static int check_padding_md(const EVP_MD *md, int padding) {
+ if (!md) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (padding == RSA_NO_PADDING) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int is_known_padding(int padding_mode) {
+ switch (padding_mode) {
+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+ case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+ case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
+ case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING:
+ return 1;
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+
+static int pkey_rsa_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2) {
+ RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
+ switch (type) {
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PADDING:
+ if (!is_known_padding(p1) || !check_padding_md(rctx->md, p1) ||
+ (p1 == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING &&
+ 0 == (ctx->operation & (EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN | EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY))) ||
+ (p1 == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING &&
+ 0 == (ctx->operation & EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT))) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if ((p1 == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING || p1 == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) &&
+ rctx->md == NULL) {
+ rctx->md = EVP_sha1();
+ }
+ rctx->pad_mode = p1;
+ return 1;
+
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PADDING:
+ *(int *)p2 = rctx->pad_mode;
+ return 1;
+
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN:
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN:
+ if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (type == EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN) {
+ *(int *)p2 = rctx->saltlen;
+ } else {
+ if (p1 < -2) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ rctx->saltlen = p1;
+ }
+ return 1;
+
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_BITS:
+ if (p1 < 256) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_KEYBITS);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ rctx->nbits = p1;
+ return 1;
+
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PUBEXP:
+ if (!p2) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ BN_free(rctx->pub_exp);
+ rctx->pub_exp = p2;
+ return 1;
+
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_MD:
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_MD:
+ if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (type == EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_MD) {
+ *(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->md;
+ } else {
+ rctx->md = p2;
+ }
+ return 1;
+
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD:
+ if (!check_padding_md(p2, rctx->pad_mode)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ rctx->md = p2;
+ return 1;
+
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_MD:
+ *(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->md;
+ return 1;
+
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD:
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_MGF1_MD:
+ if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING &&
+ rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_MGF1_MD);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (type == EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_MGF1_MD) {
+ if (rctx->mgf1md) {
+ *(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->mgf1md;
+ } else {
+ *(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->md;
+ }
+ } else {
+ rctx->mgf1md = p2;
+ }
+ return 1;
+
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_LABEL: {
+ if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ OPENSSL_free(rctx->oaep_label);
+ RSA_OAEP_LABEL_PARAMS *params = p2;
+ rctx->oaep_label = params->data;
+ rctx->oaep_labellen = params->len;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_LABEL:
+ if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ CBS_init((CBS *)p2, rctx->oaep_label, rctx->oaep_labellen);
+ return 1;
+
+ default:
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+
+static int pkey_rsa_keygen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
+ RSA *rsa = NULL;
+ RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
+
+ if (!rctx->pub_exp) {
+ rctx->pub_exp = BN_new();
+ if (!rctx->pub_exp || !BN_set_word(rctx->pub_exp, RSA_F4)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ rsa = RSA_new();
+ if (!rsa) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!RSA_generate_key_ex(rsa, rctx->nbits, rctx->pub_exp, NULL)) {
+ RSA_free(rsa);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+const EVP_PKEY_METHOD rsa_pkey_meth = {
+ EVP_PKEY_RSA,
+ pkey_rsa_init,
+ pkey_rsa_copy,
+ pkey_rsa_cleanup,
+ pkey_rsa_keygen,
+ pkey_rsa_sign,
+ NULL /* sign_message */,
+ pkey_rsa_verify,
+ NULL /* verify_message */,
+ pkey_rsa_verify_recover,
+ pkey_rsa_encrypt,
+ pkey_rsa_decrypt,
+ 0 /* derive */,
+ pkey_rsa_ctrl,
+};
+
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int padding) {
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PADDING,
+ padding, NULL);
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_padding(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int *out_padding) {
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PADDING,
+ 0, out_padding);
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int salt_len) {
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA,
+ (EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN | EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY),
+ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN, salt_len, NULL);
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_pss_saltlen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int *out_salt_len) {
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA,
+ (EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN | EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY),
+ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN, 0, out_salt_len);
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_bits(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int bits) {
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN,
+ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_BITS, bits, NULL);
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_pubexp(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, BIGNUM *e) {
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN,
+ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PUBEXP, 0, e);
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_oaep_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md) {
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
+ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_MD, 0, (void *)md);
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_oaep_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD **out_md) {
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
+ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_MD, 0, (void*) out_md);
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md) {
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA,
+ EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
+ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD, 0, (void*) md);
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_mgf1_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD **out_md) {
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA,
+ EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
+ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_MGF1_MD, 0, (void*) out_md);
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_rsa_oaep_label(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *label,
+ size_t label_len) {
+ RSA_OAEP_LABEL_PARAMS params = {label, label_len};
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
+ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_LABEL, 0, ¶ms);
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_rsa_oaep_label(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+ const uint8_t **out_label) {
+ CBS label;
+ if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
+ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_LABEL, 0, &label)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (CBS_len(&label) > INT_MAX) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ *out_label = CBS_data(&label);
+ return (int)CBS_len(&label);
+}
git://repos.xcallymotion.com / motion2.git / blobdiff