--- /dev/null
+/* Copyright (c) 2014, Google Inc.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
+ * SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
+ * OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <vector>
+
+#include <gtest/gtest.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/ec_key.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/nid.h>
+#include <openssl/obj.h>
+
+#include "../../test/file_test.h"
+#include "../../test/test_util.h"
+#include "../bn/internal.h"
+#include "internal.h"
+
+
+// kECKeyWithoutPublic is an ECPrivateKey with the optional publicKey field
+// omitted.
+static const uint8_t kECKeyWithoutPublic[] = {
+ 0x30, 0x31, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x04, 0x20, 0xc6, 0xc1, 0xaa, 0xda, 0x15, 0xb0,
+ 0x76, 0x61, 0xf8, 0x14, 0x2c, 0x6c, 0xaf, 0x0f, 0xdb, 0x24, 0x1a, 0xff, 0x2e,
+ 0xfe, 0x46, 0xc0, 0x93, 0x8b, 0x74, 0xf2, 0xbc, 0xc5, 0x30, 0x52, 0xb0, 0x77,
+ 0xa0, 0x0a, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x03, 0x01, 0x07,
+};
+
+// kECKeySpecifiedCurve is the above key with P-256's parameters explicitly
+// spelled out rather than using a named curve.
+static const uint8_t kECKeySpecifiedCurve[] = {
+ 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0x22, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x04, 0x20, 0xc6, 0xc1, 0xaa,
+ 0xda, 0x15, 0xb0, 0x76, 0x61, 0xf8, 0x14, 0x2c, 0x6c, 0xaf, 0x0f, 0xdb,
+ 0x24, 0x1a, 0xff, 0x2e, 0xfe, 0x46, 0xc0, 0x93, 0x8b, 0x74, 0xf2, 0xbc,
+ 0xc5, 0x30, 0x52, 0xb0, 0x77, 0xa0, 0x81, 0xfa, 0x30, 0x81, 0xf7, 0x02,
+ 0x01, 0x01, 0x30, 0x2c, 0x06, 0x07, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x01,
+ 0x01, 0x02, 0x21, 0x00, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
+ 0x30, 0x5b, 0x04, 0x20, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfc,
+ 0x04, 0x20, 0x5a, 0xc6, 0x35, 0xd8, 0xaa, 0x3a, 0x93, 0xe7, 0xb3, 0xeb,
+ 0xbd, 0x55, 0x76, 0x98, 0x86, 0xbc, 0x65, 0x1d, 0x06, 0xb0, 0xcc, 0x53,
+ 0xb0, 0xf6, 0x3b, 0xce, 0x3c, 0x3e, 0x27, 0xd2, 0x60, 0x4b, 0x03, 0x15,
+ 0x00, 0xc4, 0x9d, 0x36, 0x08, 0x86, 0xe7, 0x04, 0x93, 0x6a, 0x66, 0x78,
+ 0xe1, 0x13, 0x9d, 0x26, 0xb7, 0x81, 0x9f, 0x7e, 0x90, 0x04, 0x41, 0x04,
+ 0x6b, 0x17, 0xd1, 0xf2, 0xe1, 0x2c, 0x42, 0x47, 0xf8, 0xbc, 0xe6, 0xe5,
+ 0x63, 0xa4, 0x40, 0xf2, 0x77, 0x03, 0x7d, 0x81, 0x2d, 0xeb, 0x33, 0xa0,
+ 0xf4, 0xa1, 0x39, 0x45, 0xd8, 0x98, 0xc2, 0x96, 0x4f, 0xe3, 0x42, 0xe2,
+ 0xfe, 0x1a, 0x7f, 0x9b, 0x8e, 0xe7, 0xeb, 0x4a, 0x7c, 0x0f, 0x9e, 0x16,
+ 0x2b, 0xce, 0x33, 0x57, 0x6b, 0x31, 0x5e, 0xce, 0xcb, 0xb6, 0x40, 0x68,
+ 0x37, 0xbf, 0x51, 0xf5, 0x02, 0x21, 0x00, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xbc,
+ 0xe6, 0xfa, 0xad, 0xa7, 0x17, 0x9e, 0x84, 0xf3, 0xb9, 0xca, 0xc2, 0xfc,
+ 0x63, 0x25, 0x51, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01,
+};
+
+// kECKeyMissingZeros is an ECPrivateKey containing a degenerate P-256 key where
+// the private key is one. The private key is incorrectly encoded without zero
+// padding.
+static const uint8_t kECKeyMissingZeros[] = {
+ 0x30, 0x58, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x04, 0x01, 0x01, 0xa0, 0x0a, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a,
+ 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x03, 0x01, 0x07, 0xa1, 0x44, 0x03, 0x42, 0x00, 0x04,
+ 0x6b, 0x17, 0xd1, 0xf2, 0xe1, 0x2c, 0x42, 0x47, 0xf8, 0xbc, 0xe6, 0xe5, 0x63,
+ 0xa4, 0x40, 0xf2, 0x77, 0x03, 0x7d, 0x81, 0x2d, 0xeb, 0x33, 0xa0, 0xf4, 0xa1,
+ 0x39, 0x45, 0xd8, 0x98, 0xc2, 0x96, 0x4f, 0xe3, 0x42, 0xe2, 0xfe, 0x1a, 0x7f,
+ 0x9b, 0x8e, 0xe7, 0xeb, 0x4a, 0x7c, 0x0f, 0x9e, 0x16, 0x2b, 0xce, 0x33, 0x57,
+ 0x6b, 0x31, 0x5e, 0xce, 0xcb, 0xb6, 0x40, 0x68, 0x37, 0xbf, 0x51, 0xf5,
+};
+
+// kECKeyMissingZeros is an ECPrivateKey containing a degenerate P-256 key where
+// the private key is one. The private key is encoded with the required zero
+// padding.
+static const uint8_t kECKeyWithZeros[] = {
+ 0x30, 0x77, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x04, 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ 0xa0, 0x0a, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x03, 0x01, 0x07, 0xa1,
+ 0x44, 0x03, 0x42, 0x00, 0x04, 0x6b, 0x17, 0xd1, 0xf2, 0xe1, 0x2c, 0x42, 0x47,
+ 0xf8, 0xbc, 0xe6, 0xe5, 0x63, 0xa4, 0x40, 0xf2, 0x77, 0x03, 0x7d, 0x81, 0x2d,
+ 0xeb, 0x33, 0xa0, 0xf4, 0xa1, 0x39, 0x45, 0xd8, 0x98, 0xc2, 0x96, 0x4f, 0xe3,
+ 0x42, 0xe2, 0xfe, 0x1a, 0x7f, 0x9b, 0x8e, 0xe7, 0xeb, 0x4a, 0x7c, 0x0f, 0x9e,
+ 0x16, 0x2b, 0xce, 0x33, 0x57, 0x6b, 0x31, 0x5e, 0xce, 0xcb, 0xb6, 0x40, 0x68,
+ 0x37, 0xbf, 0x51, 0xf5,
+};
+
+// DecodeECPrivateKey decodes |in| as an ECPrivateKey structure and returns the
+// result or nullptr on error.
+static bssl::UniquePtr<EC_KEY> DecodeECPrivateKey(const uint8_t *in,
+ size_t in_len) {
+ CBS cbs;
+ CBS_init(&cbs, in, in_len);
+ bssl::UniquePtr<EC_KEY> ret(EC_KEY_parse_private_key(&cbs, NULL));
+ if (!ret || CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) {
+ return nullptr;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+// EncodeECPrivateKey encodes |key| as an ECPrivateKey structure into |*out|. It
+// returns true on success or false on error.
+static bool EncodeECPrivateKey(std::vector<uint8_t> *out, const EC_KEY *key) {
+ bssl::ScopedCBB cbb;
+ uint8_t *der;
+ size_t der_len;
+ if (!CBB_init(cbb.get(), 0) ||
+ !EC_KEY_marshal_private_key(cbb.get(), key, EC_KEY_get_enc_flags(key)) ||
+ !CBB_finish(cbb.get(), &der, &der_len)) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ out->assign(der, der + der_len);
+ OPENSSL_free(der);
+ return true;
+}
+
+TEST(ECTest, Encoding) {
+ bssl::UniquePtr<EC_KEY> key =
+ DecodeECPrivateKey(kECKeyWithoutPublic, sizeof(kECKeyWithoutPublic));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(key);
+
+ // Test that the encoding round-trips.
+ std::vector<uint8_t> out;
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EncodeECPrivateKey(&out, key.get()));
+ EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(kECKeyWithoutPublic), Bytes(out.data(), out.size()));
+
+ const EC_POINT *pub_key = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(key.get());
+ ASSERT_TRUE(pub_key) << "Public key missing";
+
+ bssl::UniquePtr<BIGNUM> x(BN_new());
+ bssl::UniquePtr<BIGNUM> y(BN_new());
+ ASSERT_TRUE(x);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(y);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(
+ EC_KEY_get0_group(key.get()), pub_key, x.get(), y.get(), NULL));
+ bssl::UniquePtr<char> x_hex(BN_bn2hex(x.get()));
+ bssl::UniquePtr<char> y_hex(BN_bn2hex(y.get()));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(x_hex);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(y_hex);
+
+ EXPECT_STREQ(
+ "c81561ecf2e54edefe6617db1c7a34a70744ddb261f269b83dacfcd2ade5a681",
+ x_hex.get());
+ EXPECT_STREQ(
+ "e0e2afa3f9b6abe4c698ef6495f1be49a3196c5056acb3763fe4507eec596e88",
+ y_hex.get());
+}
+
+TEST(ECTest, ZeroPadding) {
+ // Check that the correct encoding round-trips.
+ bssl::UniquePtr<EC_KEY> key =
+ DecodeECPrivateKey(kECKeyWithZeros, sizeof(kECKeyWithZeros));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(key);
+ std::vector<uint8_t> out;
+ EXPECT_TRUE(EncodeECPrivateKey(&out, key.get()));
+ EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(kECKeyWithZeros), Bytes(out.data(), out.size()));
+
+ // Keys without leading zeros also parse, but they encode correctly.
+ key = DecodeECPrivateKey(kECKeyMissingZeros, sizeof(kECKeyMissingZeros));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(key);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(EncodeECPrivateKey(&out, key.get()));
+ EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(kECKeyWithZeros), Bytes(out.data(), out.size()));
+}
+
+TEST(ECTest, SpecifiedCurve) {
+ // Test keys with specified curves may be decoded.
+ bssl::UniquePtr<EC_KEY> key =
+ DecodeECPrivateKey(kECKeySpecifiedCurve, sizeof(kECKeySpecifiedCurve));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(key);
+
+ // The group should have been interpreted as P-256.
+ EXPECT_EQ(NID_X9_62_prime256v1,
+ EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(key.get())));
+
+ // Encoding the key should still use named form.
+ std::vector<uint8_t> out;
+ EXPECT_TRUE(EncodeECPrivateKey(&out, key.get()));
+ EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(kECKeyWithoutPublic), Bytes(out.data(), out.size()));
+}
+
+TEST(ECTest, ArbitraryCurve) {
+ // Make a P-256 key and extract the affine coordinates.
+ bssl::UniquePtr<EC_KEY> key(EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(key);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EC_KEY_generate_key(key.get()));
+
+ // Make an arbitrary curve which is identical to P-256.
+ static const uint8_t kP[] = {
+ 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0xff,
+ 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
+ };
+ static const uint8_t kA[] = {
+ 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0xff,
+ 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfc,
+ };
+ static const uint8_t kB[] = {
+ 0x5a, 0xc6, 0x35, 0xd8, 0xaa, 0x3a, 0x93, 0xe7, 0xb3, 0xeb, 0xbd,
+ 0x55, 0x76, 0x98, 0x86, 0xbc, 0x65, 0x1d, 0x06, 0xb0, 0xcc, 0x53,
+ 0xb0, 0xf6, 0x3b, 0xce, 0x3c, 0x3e, 0x27, 0xd2, 0x60, 0x4b,
+ };
+ static const uint8_t kX[] = {
+ 0x6b, 0x17, 0xd1, 0xf2, 0xe1, 0x2c, 0x42, 0x47, 0xf8, 0xbc, 0xe6,
+ 0xe5, 0x63, 0xa4, 0x40, 0xf2, 0x77, 0x03, 0x7d, 0x81, 0x2d, 0xeb,
+ 0x33, 0xa0, 0xf4, 0xa1, 0x39, 0x45, 0xd8, 0x98, 0xc2, 0x96,
+ };
+ static const uint8_t kY[] = {
+ 0x4f, 0xe3, 0x42, 0xe2, 0xfe, 0x1a, 0x7f, 0x9b, 0x8e, 0xe7, 0xeb,
+ 0x4a, 0x7c, 0x0f, 0x9e, 0x16, 0x2b, 0xce, 0x33, 0x57, 0x6b, 0x31,
+ 0x5e, 0xce, 0xcb, 0xb6, 0x40, 0x68, 0x37, 0xbf, 0x51, 0xf5,
+ };
+ static const uint8_t kOrder[] = {
+ 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
+ 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xbc, 0xe6, 0xfa, 0xad, 0xa7, 0x17,
+ 0x9e, 0x84, 0xf3, 0xb9, 0xca, 0xc2, 0xfc, 0x63, 0x25, 0x51,
+ };
+ bssl::UniquePtr<BN_CTX> ctx(BN_CTX_new());
+ ASSERT_TRUE(ctx);
+ bssl::UniquePtr<BIGNUM> p(BN_bin2bn(kP, sizeof(kP), nullptr));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(p);
+ bssl::UniquePtr<BIGNUM> a(BN_bin2bn(kA, sizeof(kA), nullptr));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(a);
+ bssl::UniquePtr<BIGNUM> b(BN_bin2bn(kB, sizeof(kB), nullptr));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(b);
+ bssl::UniquePtr<BIGNUM> gx(BN_bin2bn(kX, sizeof(kX), nullptr));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(gx);
+ bssl::UniquePtr<BIGNUM> gy(BN_bin2bn(kY, sizeof(kY), nullptr));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(gy);
+ bssl::UniquePtr<BIGNUM> order(BN_bin2bn(kOrder, sizeof(kOrder), nullptr));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(order);
+
+ bssl::UniquePtr<EC_GROUP> group(
+ EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp(p.get(), a.get(), b.get(), ctx.get()));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(group);
+ bssl::UniquePtr<EC_POINT> generator(EC_POINT_new(group.get()));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(generator);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(
+ group.get(), generator.get(), gx.get(), gy.get(), ctx.get()));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EC_GROUP_set_generator(group.get(), generator.get(), order.get(),
+ BN_value_one()));
+
+ // |group| should not have a curve name.
+ EXPECT_EQ(NID_undef, EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group.get()));
+
+ // Copy |key| to |key2| using |group|.
+ bssl::UniquePtr<EC_KEY> key2(EC_KEY_new());
+ ASSERT_TRUE(key2);
+ bssl::UniquePtr<EC_POINT> point(EC_POINT_new(group.get()));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(point);
+ bssl::UniquePtr<BIGNUM> x(BN_new()), y(BN_new());
+ ASSERT_TRUE(x);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EC_KEY_set_group(key2.get(), group.get()));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(
+ EC_KEY_set_private_key(key2.get(), EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key.get())));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(
+ EC_KEY_get0_group(key.get()), EC_KEY_get0_public_key(key.get()), x.get(),
+ y.get(), nullptr));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group.get(), point.get(),
+ x.get(), y.get(), nullptr));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EC_KEY_set_public_key(key2.get(), point.get()));
+
+ // The key must be valid according to the new group too.
+ EXPECT_TRUE(EC_KEY_check_key(key2.get()));
+
+ // Make a second instance of |group|.
+ bssl::UniquePtr<EC_GROUP> group2(
+ EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp(p.get(), a.get(), b.get(), ctx.get()));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(group2);
+ bssl::UniquePtr<EC_POINT> generator2(EC_POINT_new(group2.get()));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(generator2);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(
+ group2.get(), generator2.get(), gx.get(), gy.get(), ctx.get()));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EC_GROUP_set_generator(group2.get(), generator2.get(),
+ order.get(), BN_value_one()));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, EC_GROUP_cmp(group.get(), group.get(), NULL));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, EC_GROUP_cmp(group2.get(), group.get(), NULL));
+
+ // group3 uses the wrong generator.
+ bssl::UniquePtr<EC_GROUP> group3(
+ EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp(p.get(), a.get(), b.get(), ctx.get()));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(group3);
+ bssl::UniquePtr<EC_POINT> generator3(EC_POINT_new(group3.get()));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(generator3);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(
+ group3.get(), generator3.get(), x.get(), y.get(), ctx.get()));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EC_GROUP_set_generator(group3.get(), generator3.get(),
+ order.get(), BN_value_one()));
+
+ EXPECT_NE(0, EC_GROUP_cmp(group.get(), group3.get(), NULL));
+
+#if !defined(BORINGSSL_SHARED_LIBRARY)
+ // group4 has non-minimal components that do not fit in |EC_SCALAR| and the
+ // future |EC_FELEM|.
+ ASSERT_TRUE(bn_resize_words(p.get(), 32));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(bn_resize_words(a.get(), 32));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(bn_resize_words(b.get(), 32));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(bn_resize_words(gx.get(), 32));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(bn_resize_words(gy.get(), 32));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(bn_resize_words(order.get(), 32));
+
+ bssl::UniquePtr<EC_GROUP> group4(
+ EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp(p.get(), a.get(), b.get(), ctx.get()));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(group4);
+ bssl::UniquePtr<EC_POINT> generator4(EC_POINT_new(group4.get()));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(generator4);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(
+ group4.get(), generator4.get(), gx.get(), gy.get(), ctx.get()));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EC_GROUP_set_generator(group4.get(), generator4.get(),
+ order.get(), BN_value_one()));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, EC_GROUP_cmp(group.get(), group4.get(), NULL));
+#endif
+}
+
+TEST(ECTest, SetKeyWithoutGroup) {
+ bssl::UniquePtr<EC_KEY> key(EC_KEY_new());
+ ASSERT_TRUE(key);
+
+ // Private keys may not be configured without a group.
+ EXPECT_FALSE(EC_KEY_set_private_key(key.get(), BN_value_one()));
+
+ // Public keys may not be configured without a group.
+ bssl::UniquePtr<EC_GROUP> group(
+ EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(group);
+ EXPECT_FALSE(
+ EC_KEY_set_public_key(key.get(), EC_GROUP_get0_generator(group.get())));
+}
+
+TEST(ECTest, GroupMismatch) {
+ bssl::UniquePtr<EC_KEY> key(EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp384r1));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(key);
+ bssl::UniquePtr<EC_GROUP> p256(
+ EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(p256);
+
+ // Changing a key's group is invalid.
+ EXPECT_FALSE(EC_KEY_set_group(key.get(), p256.get()));
+
+ // Configuring a public key with the wrong group is invalid.
+ EXPECT_FALSE(
+ EC_KEY_set_public_key(key.get(), EC_GROUP_get0_generator(p256.get())));
+}
+
+TEST(ECTest, EmptyKey) {
+ bssl::UniquePtr<EC_KEY> key(EC_KEY_new());
+ ASSERT_TRUE(key);
+ EXPECT_FALSE(EC_KEY_get0_group(key.get()));
+ EXPECT_FALSE(EC_KEY_get0_public_key(key.get()));
+ EXPECT_FALSE(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key.get()));
+}
+
+class ECCurveTest : public testing::TestWithParam<EC_builtin_curve> {
+ public:
+ const EC_GROUP *group() const { return group_.get(); }
+
+ void SetUp() override {
+ group_.reset(EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(GetParam().nid));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(group_);
+ }
+
+ private:
+ bssl::UniquePtr<EC_GROUP> group_;
+};
+
+TEST_P(ECCurveTest, SetAffine) {
+ // Generate an EC_KEY.
+ bssl::UniquePtr<EC_KEY> key(EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(GetParam().nid));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(key);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EC_KEY_generate_key(key.get()));
+
+ EXPECT_TRUE(EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group(), EC_KEY_get0_public_key(key.get()),
+ nullptr));
+
+ // Get the public key's coordinates.
+ bssl::UniquePtr<BIGNUM> x(BN_new());
+ ASSERT_TRUE(x);
+ bssl::UniquePtr<BIGNUM> y(BN_new());
+ ASSERT_TRUE(y);
+ bssl::UniquePtr<BIGNUM> p(BN_new());
+ ASSERT_TRUE(p);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(
+ group(), EC_KEY_get0_public_key(key.get()), x.get(), y.get(), nullptr));
+ EXPECT_TRUE(
+ EC_GROUP_get_curve_GFp(group(), p.get(), nullptr, nullptr, nullptr));
+
+ // Points on the curve should be accepted.
+ auto point = bssl::UniquePtr<EC_POINT>(EC_POINT_new(group()));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(point);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group(), point.get(), x.get(),
+ y.get(), nullptr));
+
+ // Subtract one from |y| to make the point no longer on the curve.
+ EXPECT_TRUE(BN_sub(y.get(), y.get(), BN_value_one()));
+
+ // Points not on the curve should be rejected.
+ bssl::UniquePtr<EC_POINT> invalid_point(EC_POINT_new(group()));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(invalid_point);
+ EXPECT_FALSE(EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group(), invalid_point.get(),
+ x.get(), y.get(), nullptr));
+
+ // Coordinates out of range should be rejected.
+ EXPECT_TRUE(BN_add(y.get(), y.get(), BN_value_one()));
+ EXPECT_TRUE(BN_add(y.get(), y.get(), p.get()));
+
+ EXPECT_FALSE(EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group(), invalid_point.get(),
+ x.get(), y.get(), nullptr));
+ EXPECT_FALSE(
+ EC_KEY_set_public_key_affine_coordinates(key.get(), x.get(), y.get()));
+}
+
+TEST_P(ECCurveTest, GenerateFIPS) {
+ // Generate an EC_KEY.
+ bssl::UniquePtr<EC_KEY> key(EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(GetParam().nid));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(key);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EC_KEY_generate_key_fips(key.get()));
+}
+
+TEST_P(ECCurveTest, AddingEqualPoints) {
+ bssl::UniquePtr<EC_KEY> key(EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(GetParam().nid));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(key);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EC_KEY_generate_key(key.get()));
+
+ bssl::UniquePtr<EC_POINT> p1(EC_POINT_new(group()));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(p1);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EC_POINT_copy(p1.get(), EC_KEY_get0_public_key(key.get())));
+
+ bssl::UniquePtr<EC_POINT> p2(EC_POINT_new(group()));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(p2);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EC_POINT_copy(p2.get(), EC_KEY_get0_public_key(key.get())));
+
+ bssl::UniquePtr<EC_POINT> double_p1(EC_POINT_new(group()));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(double_p1);
+ bssl::UniquePtr<BN_CTX> ctx(BN_CTX_new());
+ ASSERT_TRUE(ctx);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EC_POINT_dbl(group(), double_p1.get(), p1.get(), ctx.get()));
+
+ bssl::UniquePtr<EC_POINT> p1_plus_p2(EC_POINT_new(group()));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(p1_plus_p2);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(
+ EC_POINT_add(group(), p1_plus_p2.get(), p1.get(), p2.get(), ctx.get()));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0,
+ EC_POINT_cmp(group(), double_p1.get(), p1_plus_p2.get(), ctx.get()))
+ << "A+A != 2A";
+}
+
+TEST_P(ECCurveTest, MulZero) {
+ bssl::UniquePtr<EC_POINT> point(EC_POINT_new(group()));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(point);
+ bssl::UniquePtr<BIGNUM> zero(BN_new());
+ ASSERT_TRUE(zero);
+ BN_zero(zero.get());
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EC_POINT_mul(group(), point.get(), zero.get(), nullptr, nullptr,
+ nullptr));
+
+ EXPECT_TRUE(EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group(), point.get()))
+ << "g * 0 did not return point at infinity.";
+
+ // Test that zero times an arbitrary point is also infinity. The generator is
+ // used as the arbitrary point.
+ bssl::UniquePtr<EC_POINT> generator(EC_POINT_new(group()));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(generator);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EC_POINT_mul(group(), generator.get(), BN_value_one(), nullptr,
+ nullptr, nullptr));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EC_POINT_mul(group(), point.get(), nullptr, generator.get(),
+ zero.get(), nullptr));
+
+ EXPECT_TRUE(EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group(), point.get()))
+ << "p * 0 did not return point at infinity.";
+}
+
+// Test that multiplying by the order produces ∞ and, moreover, that callers may
+// do so. |EC_POINT_mul| is almost exclusively used with reduced scalars, with
+// this exception. This comes from consumers following NIST SP 800-56A section
+// 5.6.2.3.2. (Though all our curves have cofactor one, so this check isn't
+// useful.)
+TEST_P(ECCurveTest, MulOrder) {
+ // Test that g × order = ∞.
+ bssl::UniquePtr<EC_POINT> point(EC_POINT_new(group()));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(point);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EC_POINT_mul(group(), point.get(), EC_GROUP_get0_order(group()),
+ nullptr, nullptr, nullptr));
+
+ EXPECT_TRUE(EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group(), point.get()))
+ << "g * order did not return point at infinity.";
+
+ // Test that p × order = ∞, for some arbitrary p.
+ bssl::UniquePtr<BIGNUM> forty_two(BN_new());
+ ASSERT_TRUE(forty_two);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(BN_set_word(forty_two.get(), 42));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EC_POINT_mul(group(), point.get(), forty_two.get(), nullptr,
+ nullptr, nullptr));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EC_POINT_mul(group(), point.get(), nullptr, point.get(),
+ EC_GROUP_get0_order(group()), nullptr));
+
+ EXPECT_TRUE(EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group(), point.get()))
+ << "p * order did not return point at infinity.";
+}
+
+// Test that |EC_POINT_mul| works with out-of-range scalars. The operation will
+// not be constant-time, but we'll compute the right answer.
+TEST_P(ECCurveTest, MulOutOfRange) {
+ bssl::UniquePtr<BIGNUM> n_minus_one(BN_dup(EC_GROUP_get0_order(group())));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(n_minus_one);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(BN_sub_word(n_minus_one.get(), 1));
+
+ bssl::UniquePtr<BIGNUM> minus_one(BN_new());
+ ASSERT_TRUE(minus_one);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(BN_one(minus_one.get()));
+ BN_set_negative(minus_one.get(), 1);
+
+ bssl::UniquePtr<BIGNUM> seven(BN_new());
+ ASSERT_TRUE(seven);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(BN_set_word(seven.get(), 7));
+
+ bssl::UniquePtr<BIGNUM> ten_n_plus_seven(
+ BN_dup(EC_GROUP_get0_order(group())));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(ten_n_plus_seven);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(BN_mul_word(ten_n_plus_seven.get(), 10));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(BN_add_word(ten_n_plus_seven.get(), 7));
+
+ bssl::UniquePtr<EC_POINT> point1(EC_POINT_new(group())),
+ point2(EC_POINT_new(group()));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(point1);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(point2);
+
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EC_POINT_mul(group(), point1.get(), n_minus_one.get(), nullptr,
+ nullptr, nullptr));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EC_POINT_mul(group(), point2.get(), minus_one.get(), nullptr,
+ nullptr, nullptr));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, EC_POINT_cmp(group(), point1.get(), point2.get(), nullptr))
+ << "-1 * G and (n-1) * G did not give the same result";
+
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EC_POINT_mul(group(), point1.get(), seven.get(), nullptr, nullptr,
+ nullptr));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EC_POINT_mul(group(), point2.get(), ten_n_plus_seven.get(),
+ nullptr, nullptr, nullptr));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, EC_POINT_cmp(group(), point1.get(), point2.get(), nullptr))
+ << "7 * G and (10n + 7) * G did not give the same result";
+}
+
+// Test that 10×∞ + G = G.
+TEST_P(ECCurveTest, Mul) {
+ bssl::UniquePtr<EC_POINT> p(EC_POINT_new(group()));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(p);
+ bssl::UniquePtr<EC_POINT> result(EC_POINT_new(group()));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(result);
+ bssl::UniquePtr<BIGNUM> n(BN_new());
+ ASSERT_TRUE(n);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group(), p.get()));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(BN_set_word(n.get(), 10));
+
+ // First check that 10×∞ = ∞.
+ ASSERT_TRUE(
+ EC_POINT_mul(group(), result.get(), nullptr, p.get(), n.get(), nullptr));
+ EXPECT_TRUE(EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group(), result.get()));
+
+ // Now check that 10×∞ + G = G.
+ const EC_POINT *generator = EC_GROUP_get0_generator(group());
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EC_POINT_mul(group(), result.get(), BN_value_one(), p.get(),
+ n.get(), nullptr));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, EC_POINT_cmp(group(), result.get(), generator, nullptr));
+}
+
+TEST_P(ECCurveTest, MulNonMinimal) {
+ bssl::UniquePtr<BIGNUM> forty_two(BN_new());
+ ASSERT_TRUE(forty_two);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(BN_set_word(forty_two.get(), 42));
+
+ // Compute g × 42.
+ bssl::UniquePtr<EC_POINT> point(EC_POINT_new(group()));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(point);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EC_POINT_mul(group(), point.get(), forty_two.get(), nullptr,
+ nullptr, nullptr));
+
+ // Compute it again with a non-minimal 42, much larger than the scalar.
+ ASSERT_TRUE(bn_resize_words(forty_two.get(), 64));
+
+ bssl::UniquePtr<EC_POINT> point2(EC_POINT_new(group()));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(point2);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EC_POINT_mul(group(), point2.get(), forty_two.get(), nullptr,
+ nullptr, nullptr));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, EC_POINT_cmp(group(), point.get(), point2.get(), nullptr));
+}
+
+// Test that EC_KEY_set_private_key rejects invalid values.
+TEST_P(ECCurveTest, SetInvalidPrivateKey) {
+ bssl::UniquePtr<EC_KEY> key(EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(GetParam().nid));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(key);
+
+ bssl::UniquePtr<BIGNUM> bn(BN_new());
+ ASSERT_TRUE(BN_one(bn.get()));
+ BN_set_negative(bn.get(), 1);
+ EXPECT_FALSE(EC_KEY_set_private_key(key.get(), bn.get()))
+ << "Unexpectedly set a key of -1";
+ ERR_clear_error();
+
+ ASSERT_TRUE(
+ BN_copy(bn.get(), EC_GROUP_get0_order(EC_KEY_get0_group(key.get()))));
+ EXPECT_FALSE(EC_KEY_set_private_key(key.get(), bn.get()))
+ << "Unexpectedly set a key of the group order.";
+ ERR_clear_error();
+}
+
+TEST_P(ECCurveTest, IgnoreOct2PointReturnValue) {
+ bssl::UniquePtr<BIGNUM> forty_two(BN_new());
+ ASSERT_TRUE(forty_two);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(BN_set_word(forty_two.get(), 42));
+
+ // Compute g × 42.
+ bssl::UniquePtr<EC_POINT> point(EC_POINT_new(group()));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(point);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EC_POINT_mul(group(), point.get(), forty_two.get(), nullptr,
+ nullptr, nullptr));
+
+ // Serialize the point.
+ size_t serialized_len = EC_POINT_point2oct(
+ group(), point.get(), POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, nullptr, 0, nullptr);
+ ASSERT_NE(0u, serialized_len);
+
+ std::vector<uint8_t> serialized(serialized_len);
+ ASSERT_EQ(
+ serialized_len,
+ EC_POINT_point2oct(group(), point.get(), POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
+ serialized.data(), serialized_len, nullptr));
+
+ // Create a serialized point that is not on the curve.
+ serialized[serialized_len - 1]++;
+
+ ASSERT_FALSE(EC_POINT_oct2point(group(), point.get(), serialized.data(),
+ serialized.size(), nullptr));
+ // After a failure, |point| should have been set to the generator to defend
+ // against code that doesn't check the return value.
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, EC_POINT_cmp(group(), point.get(),
+ EC_GROUP_get0_generator(group()), nullptr));
+}
+
+TEST_P(ECCurveTest, DoubleSpecialCase) {
+ const EC_POINT *g = EC_GROUP_get0_generator(group());
+
+ bssl::UniquePtr<EC_POINT> two_g(EC_POINT_new(group()));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(two_g);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EC_POINT_dbl(group(), two_g.get(), g, nullptr));
+
+ bssl::UniquePtr<EC_POINT> p(EC_POINT_new(group()));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(p);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EC_POINT_mul(group(), p.get(), BN_value_one(), g, BN_value_one(),
+ nullptr));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, EC_POINT_cmp(group(), p.get(), two_g.get(), nullptr));
+
+ EC_SCALAR one;
+ ASSERT_TRUE(ec_bignum_to_scalar(group(), &one, BN_value_one()));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(
+ ec_point_mul_scalar_public(group(), p.get(), &one, g, &one, nullptr));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, EC_POINT_cmp(group(), p.get(), two_g.get(), nullptr));
+}
+
+// This a regression test for a P-224 bug, but we may as well run it for all
+// curves.
+TEST_P(ECCurveTest, P224Bug) {
+ // P = -G
+ const EC_POINT *g = EC_GROUP_get0_generator(group());
+ bssl::UniquePtr<EC_POINT> p(EC_POINT_dup(g, group()));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(p);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EC_POINT_invert(group(), p.get(), nullptr));
+
+ // Compute 31 * P + 32 * G = G
+ bssl::UniquePtr<EC_POINT> ret(EC_POINT_new(group()));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(ret);
+ bssl::UniquePtr<BIGNUM> bn31(BN_new()), bn32(BN_new());
+ ASSERT_TRUE(bn31);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(bn32);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(BN_set_word(bn31.get(), 31));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(BN_set_word(bn32.get(), 32));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EC_POINT_mul(group(), ret.get(), bn32.get(), p.get(), bn31.get(),
+ nullptr));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, EC_POINT_cmp(group(), ret.get(), g, nullptr));
+}
+
+static std::vector<EC_builtin_curve> AllCurves() {
+ const size_t num_curves = EC_get_builtin_curves(nullptr, 0);
+ std::vector<EC_builtin_curve> curves(num_curves);
+ EC_get_builtin_curves(curves.data(), num_curves);
+ return curves;
+}
+
+static std::string CurveToString(
+ const testing::TestParamInfo<EC_builtin_curve> ¶ms) {
+ // The comment field contains characters GTest rejects, so use the OBJ name.
+ return OBJ_nid2sn(params.param.nid);
+}
+
+INSTANTIATE_TEST_CASE_P(, ECCurveTest, testing::ValuesIn(AllCurves()),
+ CurveToString);
+
+static bssl::UniquePtr<EC_GROUP> GetCurve(FileTest *t, const char *key) {
+ std::string curve_name;
+ if (!t->GetAttribute(&curve_name, key)) {
+ return nullptr;
+ }
+
+ if (curve_name == "P-224") {
+ return bssl::UniquePtr<EC_GROUP>(EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp224r1));
+ }
+ if (curve_name == "P-256") {
+ return bssl::UniquePtr<EC_GROUP>(EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(
+ NID_X9_62_prime256v1));
+ }
+ if (curve_name == "P-384") {
+ return bssl::UniquePtr<EC_GROUP>(EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp384r1));
+ }
+ if (curve_name == "P-521") {
+ return bssl::UniquePtr<EC_GROUP>(EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp521r1));
+ }
+
+ t->PrintLine("Unknown curve '%s'", curve_name.c_str());
+ return nullptr;
+}
+
+static bssl::UniquePtr<BIGNUM> GetBIGNUM(FileTest *t, const char *key) {
+ std::vector<uint8_t> bytes;
+ if (!t->GetBytes(&bytes, key)) {
+ return nullptr;
+ }
+
+ return bssl::UniquePtr<BIGNUM>(
+ BN_bin2bn(bytes.data(), bytes.size(), nullptr));
+}
+
+TEST(ECTest, ScalarBaseMultVectors) {
+ bssl::UniquePtr<BN_CTX> ctx(BN_CTX_new());
+ ASSERT_TRUE(ctx);
+
+ FileTestGTest("crypto/fipsmodule/ec/ec_scalar_base_mult_tests.txt",
+ [&](FileTest *t) {
+ bssl::UniquePtr<EC_GROUP> group = GetCurve(t, "Curve");
+ ASSERT_TRUE(group);
+ bssl::UniquePtr<BIGNUM> n = GetBIGNUM(t, "N");
+ ASSERT_TRUE(n);
+ bssl::UniquePtr<BIGNUM> x = GetBIGNUM(t, "X");
+ ASSERT_TRUE(x);
+ bssl::UniquePtr<BIGNUM> y = GetBIGNUM(t, "Y");
+ ASSERT_TRUE(y);
+ bool is_infinity = BN_is_zero(x.get()) && BN_is_zero(y.get());
+
+ bssl::UniquePtr<BIGNUM> px(BN_new());
+ ASSERT_TRUE(px);
+ bssl::UniquePtr<BIGNUM> py(BN_new());
+ ASSERT_TRUE(py);
+ auto check_point = [&](const EC_POINT *p) {
+ if (is_infinity) {
+ EXPECT_TRUE(EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group.get(), p));
+ } else {
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(
+ group.get(), p, px.get(), py.get(), ctx.get()));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, BN_cmp(x.get(), px.get()));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, BN_cmp(y.get(), py.get()));
+ }
+ };
+
+ const EC_POINT *g = EC_GROUP_get0_generator(group.get());
+ bssl::UniquePtr<EC_POINT> p(EC_POINT_new(group.get()));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(p);
+ // Test single-point multiplication.
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EC_POINT_mul(group.get(), p.get(), n.get(), nullptr, nullptr,
+ ctx.get()));
+ check_point(p.get());
+
+ ASSERT_TRUE(
+ EC_POINT_mul(group.get(), p.get(), nullptr, g, n.get(), ctx.get()));
+ check_point(p.get());
+
+ // These tests take a very long time, but are worth running when we make
+ // non-trivial changes to the EC code.
+#if 0
+ // Test two-point multiplication.
+ bssl::UniquePtr<BIGNUM> a(BN_new()), b(BN_new());
+ for (int i = -64; i < 64; i++) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE(i);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(BN_set_word(a.get(), abs(i)));
+ if (i < 0) {
+ ASSERT_TRUE(BN_sub(a.get(), EC_GROUP_get0_order(group.get()), a.get()));
+ }
+
+ ASSERT_TRUE(BN_copy(b.get(), n.get()));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(BN_sub(b.get(), b.get(), a.get()));
+ if (BN_is_negative(b.get())) {
+ ASSERT_TRUE(BN_add(b.get(), b.get(), EC_GROUP_get0_order(group.get())));
+ }
+
+ ASSERT_TRUE(
+ EC_POINT_mul(group.get(), p.get(), a.get(), g, b.get(), ctx.get()));
+ check_point(p.get());
+
+ EC_SCALAR a_scalar, b_scalar;
+ ASSERT_TRUE(ec_bignum_to_scalar(group.get(), &a_scalar, a.get()));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(ec_bignum_to_scalar(group.get(), &b_scalar, b.get()));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(ec_point_mul_scalar_public(group.get(), p.get(), &a_scalar, g,
+ &b_scalar, ctx.get()));
+ check_point(p.get());
+ }
+#endif
+ });
+}
git://repos.xcallymotion.com / motion2.git / blobdiff