--- /dev/null
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
+
+#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
+
+#include <vector>
+
+#include <gtest/gtest.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/ec.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/nid.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+#include "../ec/internal.h"
+#include "../../test/file_test.h"
+
+
+enum API {
+ kEncodedAPI,
+ kRawAPI,
+};
+
+// VerifyECDSASig checks that verifying |ecdsa_sig| gives |expected_result|.
+static void VerifyECDSASig(API api, const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len,
+ const ECDSA_SIG *ecdsa_sig, EC_KEY *eckey,
+ int expected_result) {
+ switch (api) {
+ case kEncodedAPI: {
+ uint8_t *der;
+ size_t der_len;
+ ASSERT_TRUE(ECDSA_SIG_to_bytes(&der, &der_len, ecdsa_sig));
+ bssl::UniquePtr<uint8_t> delete_der(der);
+ EXPECT_EQ(expected_result,
+ ECDSA_verify(0, digest, digest_len, der, der_len, eckey));
+ break;
+ }
+
+ case kRawAPI:
+ EXPECT_EQ(expected_result,
+ ECDSA_do_verify(digest, digest_len, ecdsa_sig, eckey));
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ FAIL() << "Unknown API type.";
+ }
+}
+
+// TestTamperedSig verifies that signature verification fails when a valid
+// signature is tampered with. |ecdsa_sig| must be a valid signature, which will
+// be modified.
+static void TestTamperedSig(API api, const uint8_t *digest,
+ size_t digest_len, ECDSA_SIG *ecdsa_sig,
+ EC_KEY *eckey, const BIGNUM *order) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE(api);
+ // Modify a single byte of the signature: to ensure we don't
+ // garble the ASN1 structure, we read the raw signature and
+ // modify a byte in one of the bignums directly.
+
+ // Store the two BIGNUMs in raw_buf.
+ size_t r_len = BN_num_bytes(ecdsa_sig->r);
+ size_t s_len = BN_num_bytes(ecdsa_sig->s);
+ size_t bn_len = BN_num_bytes(order);
+ ASSERT_LE(r_len, bn_len);
+ ASSERT_LE(s_len, bn_len);
+ size_t buf_len = 2 * bn_len;
+ std::vector<uint8_t> raw_buf(buf_len);
+ // Pad the bignums with leading zeroes.
+ ASSERT_TRUE(BN_bn2bin_padded(raw_buf.data(), bn_len, ecdsa_sig->r));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(BN_bn2bin_padded(raw_buf.data() + bn_len, bn_len, ecdsa_sig->s));
+
+ // Modify a single byte in the buffer.
+ size_t offset = raw_buf[10] % buf_len;
+ uint8_t dirt = raw_buf[11] ? raw_buf[11] : 1;
+ raw_buf[offset] ^= dirt;
+ // Now read the BIGNUMs back in from raw_buf.
+ ASSERT_TRUE(BN_bin2bn(raw_buf.data(), bn_len, ecdsa_sig->r));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(BN_bin2bn(raw_buf.data() + bn_len, bn_len, ecdsa_sig->s));
+ VerifyECDSASig(api, digest, digest_len, ecdsa_sig, eckey, 0);
+
+ // Sanity check: Undo the modification and verify signature.
+ raw_buf[offset] ^= dirt;
+ ASSERT_TRUE(BN_bin2bn(raw_buf.data(), bn_len, ecdsa_sig->r));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(BN_bin2bn(raw_buf.data() + bn_len, bn_len, ecdsa_sig->s));
+ VerifyECDSASig(api, digest, digest_len, ecdsa_sig, eckey, 1);
+}
+
+TEST(ECDSATest, BuiltinCurves) {
+ // Fill digest values with some random data.
+ uint8_t digest[20], wrong_digest[20];
+ ASSERT_TRUE(RAND_bytes(digest, 20));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(RAND_bytes(wrong_digest, 20));
+
+ static const struct {
+ int nid;
+ const char *name;
+ } kCurves[] = {
+ { NID_secp224r1, "secp224r1" },
+ { NID_X9_62_prime256v1, "secp256r1" },
+ { NID_secp384r1, "secp384r1" },
+ { NID_secp521r1, "secp521r1" },
+ };
+
+ for (const auto &curve : kCurves) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE(curve.name);
+
+ int nid = curve.nid;
+ bssl::UniquePtr<EC_GROUP> group(EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(nid));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(group);
+ const BIGNUM *order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(group.get());
+
+ // Create a new ECDSA key.
+ bssl::UniquePtr<EC_KEY> eckey(EC_KEY_new());
+ ASSERT_TRUE(eckey);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EC_KEY_set_group(eckey.get(), group.get()));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EC_KEY_generate_key(eckey.get()));
+
+ // Create a second key.
+ bssl::UniquePtr<EC_KEY> wrong_eckey(EC_KEY_new());
+ ASSERT_TRUE(wrong_eckey);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EC_KEY_set_group(wrong_eckey.get(), group.get()));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EC_KEY_generate_key(wrong_eckey.get()));
+
+ // Check the key.
+ EXPECT_TRUE(EC_KEY_check_key(eckey.get()));
+
+ // Test ASN.1-encoded signatures.
+ // Create a signature.
+ unsigned sig_len = ECDSA_size(eckey.get());
+ std::vector<uint8_t> signature(sig_len);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(
+ ECDSA_sign(0, digest, 20, signature.data(), &sig_len, eckey.get()));
+ signature.resize(sig_len);
+
+ // Verify the signature.
+ EXPECT_TRUE(ECDSA_verify(0, digest, 20, signature.data(), signature.size(),
+ eckey.get()));
+
+ // Verify the signature with the wrong key.
+ EXPECT_FALSE(ECDSA_verify(0, digest, 20, signature.data(), signature.size(),
+ wrong_eckey.get()));
+ ERR_clear_error();
+
+ // Verify the signature using the wrong digest.
+ EXPECT_FALSE(ECDSA_verify(0, wrong_digest, 20, signature.data(),
+ signature.size(), eckey.get()));
+ ERR_clear_error();
+
+ // Verify a truncated signature.
+ EXPECT_FALSE(ECDSA_verify(0, digest, 20, signature.data(),
+ signature.size() - 1, eckey.get()));
+ ERR_clear_error();
+
+ // Verify a tampered signature.
+ bssl::UniquePtr<ECDSA_SIG> ecdsa_sig(
+ ECDSA_SIG_from_bytes(signature.data(), signature.size()));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(ecdsa_sig);
+ TestTamperedSig(kEncodedAPI, digest, 20, ecdsa_sig.get(), eckey.get(),
+ order);
+
+ // Test ECDSA_SIG signing and verification.
+ // Create a signature.
+ ecdsa_sig.reset(ECDSA_do_sign(digest, 20, eckey.get()));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(ecdsa_sig);
+
+ // Verify the signature using the correct key.
+ EXPECT_TRUE(ECDSA_do_verify(digest, 20, ecdsa_sig.get(), eckey.get()));
+
+ // Verify the signature with the wrong key.
+ EXPECT_FALSE(
+ ECDSA_do_verify(digest, 20, ecdsa_sig.get(), wrong_eckey.get()));
+ ERR_clear_error();
+
+ // Verify the signature using the wrong digest.
+ EXPECT_FALSE(
+ ECDSA_do_verify(wrong_digest, 20, ecdsa_sig.get(), eckey.get()));
+ ERR_clear_error();
+
+ // Verify a tampered signature.
+ TestTamperedSig(kRawAPI, digest, 20, ecdsa_sig.get(), eckey.get(), order);
+ }
+}
+
+static size_t BitsToBytes(size_t bits) {
+ return (bits / 8) + (7 + (bits % 8)) / 8;
+}
+
+TEST(ECDSATest, MaxSigLen) {
+ static const size_t kBits[] = {224, 256, 384, 521, 10000};
+ for (size_t bits : kBits) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE(bits);
+ size_t order_len = BitsToBytes(bits);
+
+ // Create the largest possible |ECDSA_SIG| of the given constraints.
+ bssl::UniquePtr<ECDSA_SIG> sig(ECDSA_SIG_new());
+ ASSERT_TRUE(sig);
+ std::vector<uint8_t> bytes(order_len, 0xff);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(BN_bin2bn(bytes.data(), bytes.size(), sig->r));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(BN_bin2bn(bytes.data(), bytes.size(), sig->s));
+ // Serialize it.
+ uint8_t *der;
+ size_t der_len;
+ ASSERT_TRUE(ECDSA_SIG_to_bytes(&der, &der_len, sig.get()));
+ OPENSSL_free(der);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(der_len, ECDSA_SIG_max_len(order_len));
+ }
+}
+
+static bssl::UniquePtr<EC_GROUP> GetCurve(FileTest *t, const char *key) {
+ std::string curve_name;
+ if (!t->GetAttribute(&curve_name, key)) {
+ return nullptr;
+ }
+
+ if (curve_name == "P-224") {
+ return bssl::UniquePtr<EC_GROUP>(EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp224r1));
+ }
+ if (curve_name == "P-256") {
+ return bssl::UniquePtr<EC_GROUP>(
+ EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1));
+ }
+ if (curve_name == "P-384") {
+ return bssl::UniquePtr<EC_GROUP>(EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp384r1));
+ }
+ if (curve_name == "P-521") {
+ return bssl::UniquePtr<EC_GROUP>(EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp521r1));
+ }
+
+ ADD_FAILURE() << "Unknown curve: " << curve_name;
+ return nullptr;
+}
+
+static bssl::UniquePtr<EC_GROUP> MakeCustomClone(const EC_GROUP *group) {
+ bssl::UniquePtr<BN_CTX> ctx(BN_CTX_new());
+ bssl::UniquePtr<BIGNUM> p(BN_new()), a(BN_new()), b(BN_new()), x(BN_new()),
+ y(BN_new());
+ if (!ctx || !p || !a || !b || !x || !y ||
+ !EC_GROUP_get_curve_GFp(group, p.get(), a.get(), b.get(), ctx.get()) ||
+ !EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(
+ group, EC_GROUP_get0_generator(group), x.get(), y.get(), ctx.get())) {
+ return nullptr;
+ }
+ bssl::UniquePtr<EC_GROUP> ret(
+ EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp(p.get(), a.get(), b.get(), ctx.get()));
+ if (!ret) {
+ return nullptr;
+ }
+ bssl::UniquePtr<EC_POINT> g(EC_POINT_new(ret.get()));
+ if (!g ||
+ !EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(ret.get(), g.get(), x.get(), y.get(),
+ ctx.get()) ||
+ !EC_GROUP_set_generator(ret.get(), g.get(), EC_GROUP_get0_order(group),
+ BN_value_one())) {
+ return nullptr;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static bssl::UniquePtr<BIGNUM> GetBIGNUM(FileTest *t, const char *key) {
+ std::vector<uint8_t> bytes;
+ if (!t->GetBytes(&bytes, key)) {
+ return nullptr;
+ }
+
+ return bssl::UniquePtr<BIGNUM>(BN_bin2bn(bytes.data(), bytes.size(), nullptr));
+}
+
+TEST(ECDSATest, VerifyTestVectors) {
+ FileTestGTest("crypto/fipsmodule/ecdsa/ecdsa_verify_tests.txt",
+ [](FileTest *t) {
+ for (bool custom_group : {false, true}) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE(custom_group);
+ bssl::UniquePtr<EC_GROUP> group = GetCurve(t, "Curve");
+ ASSERT_TRUE(group);
+ if (custom_group) {
+ group = MakeCustomClone(group.get());
+ ASSERT_TRUE(group);
+ }
+ bssl::UniquePtr<BIGNUM> x = GetBIGNUM(t, "X");
+ ASSERT_TRUE(x);
+ bssl::UniquePtr<BIGNUM> y = GetBIGNUM(t, "Y");
+ ASSERT_TRUE(y);
+ bssl::UniquePtr<BIGNUM> r = GetBIGNUM(t, "R");
+ ASSERT_TRUE(r);
+ bssl::UniquePtr<BIGNUM> s = GetBIGNUM(t, "S");
+ ASSERT_TRUE(s);
+ std::vector<uint8_t> digest;
+ ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&digest, "Digest"));
+
+ bssl::UniquePtr<EC_KEY> key(EC_KEY_new());
+ ASSERT_TRUE(key);
+ bssl::UniquePtr<EC_POINT> pub_key(EC_POINT_new(group.get()));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(pub_key);
+ bssl::UniquePtr<ECDSA_SIG> sig(ECDSA_SIG_new());
+ ASSERT_TRUE(sig);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EC_KEY_set_group(key.get(), group.get()));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(
+ group.get(), pub_key.get(), x.get(), y.get(), nullptr));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EC_KEY_set_public_key(key.get(), pub_key.get()));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(BN_copy(sig->r, r.get()));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(BN_copy(sig->s, s.get()));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(
+ t->HasAttribute("Invalid") ? 0 : 1,
+ ECDSA_do_verify(digest.data(), digest.size(), sig.get(), key.get()));
+ }
+ });
+}
+
+TEST(ECDSATest, SignTestVectors) {
+ FileTestGTest("crypto/fipsmodule/ecdsa/ecdsa_sign_tests.txt",
+ [](FileTest *t) {
+ for (bool custom_group : {false, true}) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE(custom_group);
+ bssl::UniquePtr<EC_GROUP> group = GetCurve(t, "Curve");
+ ASSERT_TRUE(group);
+ if (custom_group) {
+ group = MakeCustomClone(group.get());
+ ASSERT_TRUE(group);
+ }
+ bssl::UniquePtr<BIGNUM> priv_key = GetBIGNUM(t, "Private");
+ ASSERT_TRUE(priv_key);
+ bssl::UniquePtr<BIGNUM> x = GetBIGNUM(t, "X");
+ ASSERT_TRUE(x);
+ bssl::UniquePtr<BIGNUM> y = GetBIGNUM(t, "Y");
+ ASSERT_TRUE(y);
+ bssl::UniquePtr<BIGNUM> k = GetBIGNUM(t, "K");
+ ASSERT_TRUE(k);
+ bssl::UniquePtr<BIGNUM> r = GetBIGNUM(t, "R");
+ ASSERT_TRUE(r);
+ bssl::UniquePtr<BIGNUM> s = GetBIGNUM(t, "S");
+ ASSERT_TRUE(s);
+ std::vector<uint8_t> digest;
+ ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&digest, "Digest"));
+
+ bssl::UniquePtr<EC_KEY> key(EC_KEY_new());
+ ASSERT_TRUE(key);
+ bssl::UniquePtr<EC_POINT> pub_key(EC_POINT_new(group.get()));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(pub_key);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EC_KEY_set_group(key.get(), group.get()));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EC_KEY_set_private_key(key.get(), priv_key.get()));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(
+ group.get(), pub_key.get(), x.get(), y.get(), nullptr));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EC_KEY_set_public_key(key.get(), pub_key.get()));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EC_KEY_check_key(key.get()));
+
+ // Set the fixed k for testing purposes.
+ key->fixed_k = k.release();
+ bssl::UniquePtr<ECDSA_SIG> sig(
+ ECDSA_do_sign(digest.data(), digest.size(), key.get()));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(sig);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, BN_cmp(r.get(), sig->r));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, BN_cmp(s.get(), sig->s));
+ }
+ });
+}
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