--- /dev/null
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */
+
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+
+#include <utility>
+
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+#include "../crypto/internal.h"
+#include "internal.h"
+
+
+namespace bssl {
+
+SSL_HANDSHAKE::SSL_HANDSHAKE(SSL *ssl_arg)
+ : ssl(ssl_arg),
+ scts_requested(false),
+ needs_psk_binder(false),
+ received_hello_retry_request(false),
+ sent_hello_retry_request(false),
+ received_custom_extension(false),
+ handshake_finalized(false),
+ accept_psk_mode(false),
+ cert_request(false),
+ certificate_status_expected(false),
+ ocsp_stapling_requested(false),
+ should_ack_sni(false),
+ in_false_start(false),
+ in_early_data(false),
+ early_data_offered(false),
+ can_early_read(false),
+ can_early_write(false),
+ next_proto_neg_seen(false),
+ ticket_expected(false),
+ extended_master_secret(false),
+ pending_private_key_op(false),
+ grease_seeded(false) {
+}
+
+SSL_HANDSHAKE::~SSL_HANDSHAKE() {
+ ssl->ctx->x509_method->hs_flush_cached_ca_names(this);
+}
+
+UniquePtr<SSL_HANDSHAKE> ssl_handshake_new(SSL *ssl) {
+ UniquePtr<SSL_HANDSHAKE> hs = MakeUnique<SSL_HANDSHAKE>(ssl);
+ if (!hs ||
+ !hs->transcript.Init()) {
+ return nullptr;
+ }
+ return hs;
+}
+
+bool ssl_check_message_type(SSL *ssl, const SSLMessage &msg, int type) {
+ if (msg.type != type) {
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ ERR_add_error_dataf("got type %d, wanted type %d", msg.type, type);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+bool ssl_add_message_cbb(SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb) {
+ Array<uint8_t> msg;
+ if (!ssl->method->finish_message(ssl, cbb, &msg) ||
+ !ssl->method->add_message(ssl, std::move(msg))) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+size_t ssl_max_handshake_message_len(const SSL *ssl) {
+ // kMaxMessageLen is the default maximum message size for handshakes which do
+ // not accept peer certificate chains.
+ static const size_t kMaxMessageLen = 16384;
+
+ if (SSL_in_init(ssl)) {
+ if ((!ssl->server || (ssl->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) &&
+ kMaxMessageLen < ssl->max_cert_list) {
+ return ssl->max_cert_list;
+ }
+ return kMaxMessageLen;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+ // In TLS 1.2 and below, the largest acceptable post-handshake message is
+ // a HelloRequest.
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl->server) {
+ // The largest acceptable post-handshake message for a server is a
+ // KeyUpdate. We will never initiate post-handshake auth.
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ // Clients must accept NewSessionTicket, so allow the default size.
+ return kMaxMessageLen;
+}
+
+bool ssl_hash_message(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, const SSLMessage &msg) {
+ // V2ClientHello messages are pre-hashed.
+ if (msg.is_v2_hello) {
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ return hs->transcript.Update(msg.raw);
+}
+
+int ssl_parse_extensions(const CBS *cbs, uint8_t *out_alert,
+ const SSL_EXTENSION_TYPE *ext_types,
+ size_t num_ext_types, int ignore_unknown) {
+ // Reset everything.
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < num_ext_types; i++) {
+ *ext_types[i].out_present = 0;
+ CBS_init(ext_types[i].out_data, NULL, 0);
+ }
+
+ CBS copy = *cbs;
+ while (CBS_len(©) != 0) {
+ uint16_t type;
+ CBS data;
+ if (!CBS_get_u16(©, &type) ||
+ !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(©, &data)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ const SSL_EXTENSION_TYPE *ext_type = NULL;
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < num_ext_types; i++) {
+ if (type == ext_types[i].type) {
+ ext_type = &ext_types[i];
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ext_type == NULL) {
+ if (ignore_unknown) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_EXTENSION);
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ // Duplicate ext_types are forbidden.
+ if (*ext_type->out_present) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DUPLICATE_EXTENSION);
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ *ext_type->out_present = 1;
+ *ext_type->out_data = data;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static void set_crypto_buffer(CRYPTO_BUFFER **dest, CRYPTO_BUFFER *src) {
+ // TODO(davidben): Remove this helper once |SSL_SESSION| can use |UniquePtr|
+ // and |UniquePtr| has up_ref helpers.
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(*dest);
+ *dest = src;
+ if (src != nullptr) {
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER_up_ref(src);
+ }
+}
+
+enum ssl_verify_result_t ssl_verify_peer_cert(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+ const SSL_SESSION *prev_session = ssl->s3->established_session.get();
+ if (prev_session != NULL) {
+ // If renegotiating, the server must not change the server certificate. See
+ // https://mitls.org/pages/attacks/3SHAKE. We never resume on renegotiation,
+ // so this check is sufficient to ensure the reported peer certificate never
+ // changes on renegotiation.
+ assert(!ssl->server);
+ if (sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(prev_session->certs) !=
+ sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(hs->new_session->certs)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SERVER_CERT_CHANGED);
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+ return ssl_verify_invalid;
+ }
+
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(hs->new_session->certs); i++) {
+ const CRYPTO_BUFFER *old_cert =
+ sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(prev_session->certs, i);
+ const CRYPTO_BUFFER *new_cert =
+ sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(hs->new_session->certs, i);
+ if (CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(old_cert) != CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(new_cert) ||
+ OPENSSL_memcmp(CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(old_cert),
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(new_cert),
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(old_cert)) != 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SERVER_CERT_CHANGED);
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+ return ssl_verify_invalid;
+ }
+ }
+
+ // The certificate is identical, so we may skip re-verifying the
+ // certificate. Since we only authenticated the previous one, copy other
+ // authentication from the established session and ignore what was newly
+ // received.
+ set_crypto_buffer(&hs->new_session->ocsp_response,
+ prev_session->ocsp_response);
+ set_crypto_buffer(&hs->new_session->signed_cert_timestamp_list,
+ prev_session->signed_cert_timestamp_list);
+ hs->new_session->verify_result = prev_session->verify_result;
+ return ssl_verify_ok;
+ }
+
+ uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN;
+ enum ssl_verify_result_t ret;
+ if (ssl->custom_verify_callback != nullptr) {
+ ret = ssl->custom_verify_callback(ssl, &alert);
+ switch (ret) {
+ case ssl_verify_ok:
+ hs->new_session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
+ break;
+ case ssl_verify_invalid:
+ // If |SSL_VERIFY_NONE|, the error is non-fatal, but we keep the result.
+ if (ssl->verify_mode == SSL_VERIFY_NONE) {
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ ret = ssl_verify_ok;
+ }
+ hs->new_session->verify_result = X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION;
+ break;
+ case ssl_verify_retry:
+ break;
+ }
+ } else {
+ ret = ssl->ctx->x509_method->session_verify_cert_chain(
+ hs->new_session.get(), ssl, &alert)
+ ? ssl_verify_ok
+ : ssl_verify_invalid;
+ }
+
+ if (ret == ssl_verify_invalid) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+uint16_t ssl_get_grease_value(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+ enum ssl_grease_index_t index) {
+ // Draw entropy for all GREASE values at once. This avoids calling
+ // |RAND_bytes| repeatedly and makes the values consistent within a
+ // connection. The latter is so the second ClientHello matches after
+ // HelloRetryRequest and so supported_groups and key_shares are consistent.
+ if (!hs->grease_seeded) {
+ RAND_bytes(hs->grease_seed, sizeof(hs->grease_seed));
+ hs->grease_seeded = true;
+ }
+
+ // This generates a random value of the form 0xωaωa, for all 0 ≤ ω < 16.
+ uint16_t ret = hs->grease_seed[index];
+ ret = (ret & 0xf0) | 0x0a;
+ ret |= ret << 8;
+ return ret;
+}
+
+enum ssl_hs_wait_t ssl_get_finished(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+ SSLMessage msg;
+ if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
+ return ssl_hs_read_message;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, msg, SSL3_MT_FINISHED)) {
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+ // Snapshot the finished hash before incorporating the new message.
+ uint8_t finished[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ size_t finished_len;
+ if (!hs->transcript.GetFinishedMAC(finished, &finished_len,
+ SSL_get_session(ssl), !ssl->server) ||
+ !ssl_hash_message(hs, msg)) {
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+ int finished_ok = CBS_mem_equal(&msg.body, finished, finished_len);
+#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
+ finished_ok = 1;
+#endif
+ if (!finished_ok) {
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+ // Copy the Finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks.
+ if (ssl->version != SSL3_VERSION) {
+ if (finished_len > sizeof(ssl->s3->previous_client_finished) ||
+ finished_len > sizeof(ssl->s3->previous_server_finished)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl->server) {
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(ssl->s3->previous_client_finished, finished, finished_len);
+ ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len = finished_len;
+ } else {
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(ssl->s3->previous_server_finished, finished, finished_len);
+ ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len = finished_len;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
+ return ssl_hs_ok;
+}
+
+bool ssl_send_finished(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+ const SSL_SESSION *session = SSL_get_session(ssl);
+
+ uint8_t finished[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ size_t finished_len;
+ if (!hs->transcript.GetFinishedMAC(finished, &finished_len, session,
+ ssl->server)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ // Log the master secret, if logging is enabled.
+ if (!ssl_log_secret(ssl, "CLIENT_RANDOM",
+ session->master_key,
+ session->master_key_length)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ // Copy the Finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks.
+ if (ssl->version != SSL3_VERSION) {
+ if (finished_len > sizeof(ssl->s3->previous_client_finished) ||
+ finished_len > sizeof(ssl->s3->previous_server_finished)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl->server) {
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(ssl->s3->previous_server_finished, finished, finished_len);
+ ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len = finished_len;
+ } else {
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(ssl->s3->previous_client_finished, finished, finished_len);
+ ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len = finished_len;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ScopedCBB cbb;
+ CBB body;
+ if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body, SSL3_MT_FINISHED) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(&body, finished, finished_len) ||
+ !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get())) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+bool ssl_output_cert_chain(SSL *ssl) {
+ ScopedCBB cbb;
+ CBB body;
+ if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) ||
+ !ssl_add_cert_chain(ssl, &body) ||
+ !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get())) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+int ssl_run_handshake(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, bool *out_early_return) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+ for (;;) {
+ // Resolve the operation the handshake was waiting on.
+ switch (hs->wait) {
+ case ssl_hs_error:
+ ERR_restore_state(hs->error.get());
+ return -1;
+
+ case ssl_hs_flush: {
+ int ret = ssl->method->flush_flight(ssl);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+
+ case ssl_hs_read_server_hello:
+ case ssl_hs_read_message:
+ case ssl_hs_read_change_cipher_spec: {
+ uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ size_t consumed = 0;
+ ssl_open_record_t ret;
+ if (hs->wait == ssl_hs_read_change_cipher_spec) {
+ ret = ssl_open_change_cipher_spec(ssl, &consumed, &alert,
+ ssl->s3->read_buffer.span());
+ } else {
+ ret = ssl_open_handshake(ssl, &consumed, &alert,
+ ssl->s3->read_buffer.span());
+ }
+ if (ret == ssl_open_record_error &&
+ hs->wait == ssl_hs_read_server_hello) {
+ uint32_t err = ERR_peek_error();
+ if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_SSL &&
+ ERR_GET_REASON(err) == SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE) {
+ // Add a dedicated error code to the queue for a handshake_failure
+ // alert in response to ClientHello. This matches NSS's client
+ // behavior and gives a better error on a (probable) failure to
+ // negotiate initial parameters. Note: this error code comes after
+ // the original one.
+ //
+ // See https://crbug.com/446505.
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE_ON_CLIENT_HELLO);
+ }
+ }
+ bool retry;
+ int bio_ret = ssl_handle_open_record(ssl, &retry, ret, consumed, alert);
+ if (bio_ret <= 0) {
+ return bio_ret;
+ }
+ if (retry) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ ssl->s3->read_buffer.DiscardConsumed();
+ break;
+ }
+
+ case ssl_hs_read_end_of_early_data: {
+ if (ssl->s3->hs->can_early_read) {
+ // While we are processing early data, the handshake returns early.
+ *out_early_return = true;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ case ssl_hs_certificate_selection_pending:
+ ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_CERTIFICATE_SELECTION_PENDING;
+ hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
+ return -1;
+
+ case ssl_hs_handoff:
+ ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_HANDOFF;
+ hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
+ return -1;
+
+ case ssl_hs_x509_lookup:
+ ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
+ hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
+ return -1;
+
+ case ssl_hs_channel_id_lookup:
+ ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_CHANNEL_ID_LOOKUP;
+ hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
+ return -1;
+
+ case ssl_hs_private_key_operation:
+ ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_OPERATION;
+ hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
+ return -1;
+
+ case ssl_hs_pending_session:
+ ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_PENDING_SESSION;
+ hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
+ return -1;
+
+ case ssl_hs_pending_ticket:
+ ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_PENDING_TICKET;
+ hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
+ return -1;
+
+ case ssl_hs_certificate_verify:
+ ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
+ hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
+ return -1;
+
+ case ssl_hs_early_data_rejected:
+ ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED;
+ // Cause |SSL_write| to start failing immediately.
+ hs->can_early_write = false;
+ return -1;
+
+ case ssl_hs_early_return:
+ *out_early_return = true;
+ hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
+ return 1;
+
+ case ssl_hs_ok:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ // Run the state machine again.
+ hs->wait = ssl->do_handshake(hs);
+ if (hs->wait == ssl_hs_error) {
+ hs->error.reset(ERR_save_state());
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (hs->wait == ssl_hs_ok) {
+ // The handshake has completed.
+ *out_early_return = false;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ // Otherwise, loop to the beginning and resolve what was blocking the
+ // handshake.
+ }
+}
+
+} // namespace bssl
git://repos.xcallymotion.com / motion2.git / blobdiff