--- /dev/null
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ *
+ * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ *
+ * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license provided above.
+ *
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
+ * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE.
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <utility>
+
+#include <openssl/aead.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/buf.h>
+#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
+#include <openssl/ec_key.h>
+#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+#include "../crypto/internal.h"
+#include "internal.h"
+
+
+namespace bssl {
+
+enum ssl_client_hs_state_t {
+ state_start_connect = 0,
+ state_enter_early_data,
+ state_read_hello_verify_request,
+ state_read_server_hello,
+ state_tls13,
+ state_read_server_certificate,
+ state_read_certificate_status,
+ state_verify_server_certificate,
+ state_read_server_key_exchange,
+ state_read_certificate_request,
+ state_read_server_hello_done,
+ state_send_client_certificate,
+ state_send_client_key_exchange,
+ state_send_client_certificate_verify,
+ state_send_client_finished,
+ state_finish_flight,
+ state_read_session_ticket,
+ state_process_change_cipher_spec,
+ state_read_server_finished,
+ state_finish_client_handshake,
+ state_done,
+};
+
+// ssl_get_client_disabled sets |*out_mask_a| and |*out_mask_k| to masks of
+// disabled algorithms.
+static void ssl_get_client_disabled(SSL *ssl, uint32_t *out_mask_a,
+ uint32_t *out_mask_k) {
+ *out_mask_a = 0;
+ *out_mask_k = 0;
+
+ // PSK requires a client callback.
+ if (ssl->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
+ *out_mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
+ *out_mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
+ }
+}
+
+static int ssl_write_client_cipher_list(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+ uint32_t mask_a, mask_k;
+ ssl_get_client_disabled(ssl, &mask_a, &mask_k);
+
+ CBB child;
+ if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &child)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ // Add a fake cipher suite. See draft-davidben-tls-grease-01.
+ if (ssl->ctx->grease_enabled &&
+ !CBB_add_u16(&child, ssl_get_grease_value(hs, ssl_grease_cipher))) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ // Add TLS 1.3 ciphers. Order ChaCha20-Poly1305 relative to AES-GCM based on
+ // hardware support.
+ if (hs->max_version >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+ if (!EVP_has_aes_hardware() &&
+ !CBB_add_u16(&child, TLS1_CK_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 & 0xffff)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!CBB_add_u16(&child, TLS1_CK_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 & 0xffff) ||
+ !CBB_add_u16(&child, TLS1_CK_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 & 0xffff)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (EVP_has_aes_hardware() &&
+ !CBB_add_u16(&child, TLS1_CK_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 & 0xffff)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (hs->min_version < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+ int any_enabled = 0;
+ for (const SSL_CIPHER *cipher : SSL_get_ciphers(ssl)) {
+ // Skip disabled ciphers
+ if ((cipher->algorithm_mkey & mask_k) ||
+ (cipher->algorithm_auth & mask_a)) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (SSL_CIPHER_get_min_version(cipher) > hs->max_version ||
+ SSL_CIPHER_get_max_version(cipher) < hs->min_version) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ any_enabled = 1;
+ if (!CBB_add_u16(&child, ssl_cipher_get_value(cipher))) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ // If all ciphers were disabled, return the error to the caller.
+ if (!any_enabled && hs->max_version < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ // For SSLv3, the SCSV is added. Otherwise the renegotiation extension is
+ // added.
+ if (hs->max_version == SSL3_VERSION &&
+ !ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete) {
+ if (!CBB_add_u16(&child, SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xffff)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ssl->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
+ if (!CBB_add_u16(&child, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xffff)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return CBB_flush(out);
+}
+
+int ssl_write_client_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+ ScopedCBB cbb;
+ CBB body;
+ if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ CBB child;
+ if (!CBB_add_u16(&body, hs->client_version) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(&body, ssl->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
+ !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&body, &child)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ // Do not send a session ID on renegotiation.
+ if (!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete &&
+ !CBB_add_bytes(&child, hs->session_id, hs->session_id_len)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) {
+ if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&body, &child) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(&child, ssl->d1->cookie, ssl->d1->cookie_len)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ size_t header_len =
+ SSL_is_dtls(ssl) ? DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH : SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ if (!ssl_write_client_cipher_list(hs, &body) ||
+ !CBB_add_u8(&body, 1 /* one compression method */) ||
+ !CBB_add_u8(&body, 0 /* null compression */) ||
+ !ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(hs, &body, header_len + CBB_len(&body))) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ Array<uint8_t> msg;
+ if (!ssl->method->finish_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &msg)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ // Now that the length prefixes have been computed, fill in the placeholder
+ // PSK binder.
+ if (hs->needs_psk_binder &&
+ !tls13_write_psk_binder(hs, msg.data(), msg.size())) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return ssl->method->add_message(ssl, std::move(msg));
+}
+
+static bool parse_supported_versions(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint16_t *version,
+ const CBS *in) {
+ // If the outer version is not TLS 1.2, or there is no extensions block, use
+ // the outer version.
+ if (*version != TLS1_2_VERSION || CBS_len(in) == 0) {
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+ CBS copy = *in, extensions;
+ if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(©, &extensions) ||
+ CBS_len(©) != 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ bool have_supported_versions;
+ CBS supported_versions;
+ const SSL_EXTENSION_TYPE ext_types[] = {
+ {TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions, &have_supported_versions,
+ &supported_versions},
+ };
+
+ uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ if (!ssl_parse_extensions(&extensions, &alert, ext_types,
+ OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(ext_types),
+ 1 /* ignore unknown */)) {
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ // Override the outer version with the extension, if present.
+ if (have_supported_versions &&
+ (!CBS_get_u16(&supported_versions, version) ||
+ CBS_len(&supported_versions) != 0)) {
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_start_connect(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+
+ ssl_do_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
+ // |session_reused| must be reset in case this is a renegotiation.
+ ssl->s3->session_reused = false;
+
+ // Freeze the version range.
+ if (!ssl_get_version_range(ssl, &hs->min_version, &hs->max_version)) {
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+ // SSL 3.0 ClientHellos should use SSL 3.0 not TLS 1.0, for the record-layer
+ // version.
+ if (hs->max_version == SSL3_VERSION) {
+ ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->SetVersionIfNullCipher(SSL3_VERSION);
+ }
+
+ // Always advertise the ClientHello version from the original maximum version,
+ // even on renegotiation. The static RSA key exchange uses this field, and
+ // some servers fail when it changes across handshakes.
+ if (SSL_is_dtls(hs->ssl)) {
+ hs->client_version =
+ hs->max_version >= TLS1_2_VERSION ? DTLS1_2_VERSION : DTLS1_VERSION;
+ } else {
+ hs->client_version =
+ hs->max_version >= TLS1_2_VERSION ? TLS1_2_VERSION : hs->max_version;
+ }
+
+ // If the configured session has expired or was created at a disabled
+ // version, drop it.
+ if (ssl->session != NULL) {
+ if (ssl->session->is_server ||
+ !ssl_supports_version(hs, ssl->session->ssl_version) ||
+ (ssl->session->session_id_length == 0 &&
+ ssl->session->tlsext_ticklen == 0) ||
+ ssl->session->not_resumable ||
+ !ssl_session_is_time_valid(ssl, ssl->session)) {
+ ssl_set_session(ssl, NULL);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!RAND_bytes(ssl->s3->client_random, sizeof(ssl->s3->client_random))) {
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+ // Initialize a random session ID for the experimental TLS 1.3 variant
+ // requiring a session id.
+ if (ssl->session != nullptr &&
+ !ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete &&
+ ssl->session->session_id_length > 0) {
+ hs->session_id_len = ssl->session->session_id_length;
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(hs->session_id, ssl->session->session_id,
+ hs->session_id_len);
+ } else if (hs->max_version >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+ hs->session_id_len = sizeof(hs->session_id);
+ if (!RAND_bytes(hs->session_id, hs->session_id_len)) {
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_write_client_hello(hs)) {
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+ hs->state = state_enter_early_data;
+ return ssl_hs_flush;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_enter_early_data(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+
+ if (SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) {
+ hs->state = state_read_hello_verify_request;
+ return ssl_hs_ok;
+ }
+
+ if (!hs->early_data_offered) {
+ hs->state = state_read_server_hello;
+ return ssl_hs_ok;
+ }
+
+ ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->SetVersionIfNullCipher(ssl->session->ssl_version);
+ if (!ssl->method->add_change_cipher_spec(ssl)) {
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+ if (!tls13_init_early_key_schedule(hs, ssl->session->master_key,
+ ssl->session->master_key_length) ||
+ !tls13_derive_early_secrets(hs) ||
+ !tls13_set_traffic_key(ssl, evp_aead_seal, hs->early_traffic_secret,
+ hs->hash_len)) {
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+ // Stash the early data session, so connection properties may be queried out
+ // of it.
+ hs->in_early_data = true;
+ SSL_SESSION_up_ref(ssl->session);
+ hs->early_session.reset(ssl->session);
+ hs->can_early_write = true;
+
+ hs->state = state_read_server_hello;
+ return ssl_hs_early_return;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_hello_verify_request(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+
+ assert(SSL_is_dtls(ssl));
+
+ SSLMessage msg;
+ if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
+ return ssl_hs_read_message;
+ }
+
+ if (msg.type != DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
+ hs->state = state_read_server_hello;
+ return ssl_hs_ok;
+ }
+
+ CBS hello_verify_request = msg.body, cookie;
+ uint16_t server_version;
+ if (!CBS_get_u16(&hello_verify_request, &server_version) ||
+ !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&hello_verify_request, &cookie) ||
+ CBS_len(&cookie) > sizeof(ssl->d1->cookie) ||
+ CBS_len(&hello_verify_request) != 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(ssl->d1->cookie, CBS_data(&cookie), CBS_len(&cookie));
+ ssl->d1->cookie_len = CBS_len(&cookie);
+
+ ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
+
+ // DTLS resets the handshake buffer after HelloVerifyRequest.
+ if (!hs->transcript.Init()) {
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_write_client_hello(hs)) {
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+ hs->state = state_read_server_hello;
+ return ssl_hs_flush;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_server_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+ SSLMessage msg;
+ if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
+ return ssl_hs_read_server_hello;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, msg, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO)) {
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+ CBS server_hello = msg.body, server_random, session_id;
+ uint16_t server_version, cipher_suite;
+ uint8_t compression_method;
+ if (!CBS_get_u16(&server_hello, &server_version) ||
+ !CBS_get_bytes(&server_hello, &server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
+ !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&server_hello, &session_id) ||
+ CBS_len(&session_id) > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE ||
+ !CBS_get_u16(&server_hello, &cipher_suite) ||
+ !CBS_get_u8(&server_hello, &compression_method)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+ // Use the supported_versions extension if applicable.
+ if (!parse_supported_versions(hs, &server_version, &server_hello)) {
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_supports_version(hs, server_version)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION);
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+ assert(ssl->s3->have_version == ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete);
+ if (!ssl->s3->have_version) {
+ ssl->version = server_version;
+ // At this point, the connection's version is known and ssl->version is
+ // fixed. Begin enforcing the record-layer version.
+ ssl->s3->have_version = true;
+ ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->SetVersionIfNullCipher(ssl->version);
+ } else if (server_version != ssl->version) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION);
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+ hs->state = state_tls13;
+ return ssl_hs_ok;
+ }
+
+ // Clear some TLS 1.3 state that no longer needs to be retained.
+ hs->key_share.reset();
+ hs->key_share_bytes.Reset();
+
+ // A TLS 1.2 server would not know to skip the early data we offered. Report
+ // an error code sooner. The caller may use this error code to implement the
+ // fallback described in draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18 appendix C.3.
+ if (hs->early_data_offered) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_ON_EARLY_DATA);
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION);
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+ // Copy over the server random.
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(ssl->s3->server_random, CBS_data(&server_random),
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+
+ // Measure, but do not enforce, the TLS 1.3 anti-downgrade feature, with a
+ // different value.
+ //
+ // For draft TLS 1.3 versions, it is not safe to deploy this feature. However,
+ // some TLS terminators are non-compliant and copy the origin server's value,
+ // so we wish to measure eventual compatibility impact.
+ if (!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete &&
+ hs->max_version >= TLS1_3_VERSION &&
+ OPENSSL_memcmp(ssl->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
+ sizeof(kDraftDowngradeRandom),
+ kDraftDowngradeRandom,
+ sizeof(kDraftDowngradeRandom)) == 0) {
+ ssl->s3->draft_downgrade = true;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete && ssl->session != NULL &&
+ ssl->session->session_id_length != 0 &&
+ CBS_mem_equal(&session_id, ssl->session->session_id,
+ ssl->session->session_id_length)) {
+ ssl->s3->session_reused = true;
+ } else {
+ // The server may also have echoed back the TLS 1.3 compatibility mode
+ // session ID. As we know this is not a session the server knows about, any
+ // server resuming it is in error. Reject the first connection
+ // deterministicly, rather than installing an invalid session into the
+ // session cache. https://crbug.com/796910
+ if (hs->session_id_len != 0 &&
+ CBS_mem_equal(&session_id, hs->session_id, hs->session_id_len)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SERVER_ECHOED_INVALID_SESSION_ID);
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+ // The session wasn't resumed. Create a fresh SSL_SESSION to
+ // fill out.
+ ssl_set_session(ssl, NULL);
+ if (!ssl_get_new_session(hs, 0 /* client */)) {
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+ // Note: session_id could be empty.
+ hs->new_session->session_id_length = CBS_len(&session_id);
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(hs->new_session->session_id, CBS_data(&session_id),
+ CBS_len(&session_id));
+ }
+
+ const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = SSL_get_cipher_by_value(cipher_suite);
+ if (cipher == NULL) {
+ // unknown cipher
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+ // The cipher must be allowed in the selected version and enabled.
+ uint32_t mask_a, mask_k;
+ ssl_get_client_disabled(ssl, &mask_a, &mask_k);
+ if ((cipher->algorithm_mkey & mask_k) || (cipher->algorithm_auth & mask_a) ||
+ SSL_CIPHER_get_min_version(cipher) > ssl_protocol_version(ssl) ||
+ SSL_CIPHER_get_max_version(cipher) < ssl_protocol_version(ssl) ||
+ !sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(ssl), NULL, cipher)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl->session != NULL) {
+ if (ssl->session->ssl_version != ssl->version) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_VERSION_NOT_RETURNED);
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+ if (ssl->session->cipher != cipher) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+ if (!ssl_session_is_context_valid(ssl, ssl->session)) {
+ // This is actually a client application bug.
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL,
+ SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+ } else {
+ hs->new_session->cipher = cipher;
+ }
+ hs->new_cipher = cipher;
+
+ // Now that the cipher is known, initialize the handshake hash and hash the
+ // ServerHello.
+ if (!hs->transcript.InitHash(ssl_protocol_version(ssl), hs->new_cipher) ||
+ !ssl_hash_message(hs, msg)) {
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+ // If doing a full handshake, the server may request a client certificate
+ // which requires hashing the handshake transcript. Otherwise, the handshake
+ // buffer may be released.
+ if (ssl->session != NULL ||
+ !ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(hs->new_cipher)) {
+ hs->transcript.FreeBuffer();
+ }
+
+ // Only the NULL compression algorithm is supported.
+ if (compression_method != 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+ // TLS extensions
+ if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(hs, &server_hello)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+ // There should be nothing left over in the record.
+ if (CBS_len(&server_hello) != 0) {
+ // wrong packet length
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl->session != NULL &&
+ hs->extended_master_secret != ssl->session->extended_master_secret) {
+ if (ssl->session->extended_master_secret) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RESUMED_EMS_SESSION_WITHOUT_EMS_EXTENSION);
+ } else {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RESUMED_NON_EMS_SESSION_WITH_EMS_EXTENSION);
+ }
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl->token_binding_negotiated &&
+ (!hs->extended_master_secret || !ssl->s3->send_connection_binding)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NEGOTIATED_TB_WITHOUT_EMS_OR_RI);
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION);
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+ ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
+
+ if (ssl->session != NULL) {
+ hs->state = state_read_session_ticket;
+ return ssl_hs_ok;
+ }
+
+ hs->state = state_read_server_certificate;
+ return ssl_hs_ok;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_tls13(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ enum ssl_hs_wait_t wait = tls13_client_handshake(hs);
+ if (wait == ssl_hs_ok) {
+ hs->state = state_finish_client_handshake;
+ return ssl_hs_ok;
+ }
+
+ return wait;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_server_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+
+ if (!ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(hs->new_cipher)) {
+ hs->state = state_read_certificate_status;
+ return ssl_hs_ok;
+ }
+
+ SSLMessage msg;
+ if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
+ return ssl_hs_read_message;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, msg, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) ||
+ !ssl_hash_message(hs, msg)) {
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+ CBS body = msg.body;
+ uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ UniquePtr<STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER)> chain;
+ if (!ssl_parse_cert_chain(&alert, &chain, &hs->peer_pubkey, NULL, &body,
+ ssl->ctx->pool)) {
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+ sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_pop_free(hs->new_session->certs, CRYPTO_BUFFER_free);
+ hs->new_session->certs = chain.release();
+
+ if (sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(hs->new_session->certs) == 0 ||
+ CBS_len(&body) != 0 ||
+ !ssl->ctx->x509_method->session_cache_objects(hs->new_session.get())) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_check_leaf_certificate(
+ hs, hs->peer_pubkey.get(),
+ sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(hs->new_session->certs, 0))) {
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+ ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
+
+ hs->state = state_read_certificate_status;
+ return ssl_hs_ok;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_certificate_status(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+
+ if (!hs->certificate_status_expected) {
+ hs->state = state_verify_server_certificate;
+ return ssl_hs_ok;
+ }
+
+ SSLMessage msg;
+ if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
+ return ssl_hs_read_message;
+ }
+
+ if (msg.type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
+ // A server may send status_request in ServerHello and then change its mind
+ // about sending CertificateStatus.
+ hs->state = state_verify_server_certificate;
+ return ssl_hs_ok;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_hash_message(hs, msg)) {
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+ CBS certificate_status = msg.body, ocsp_response;
+ uint8_t status_type;
+ if (!CBS_get_u8(&certificate_status, &status_type) ||
+ status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp ||
+ !CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&certificate_status, &ocsp_response) ||
+ CBS_len(&ocsp_response) == 0 ||
+ CBS_len(&certificate_status) != 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(hs->new_session->ocsp_response);
+ hs->new_session->ocsp_response =
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_from_CBS(&ocsp_response, ssl->ctx->pool);
+ if (hs->new_session->ocsp_response == nullptr) {
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+ ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
+
+ hs->state = state_verify_server_certificate;
+ return ssl_hs_ok;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_verify_server_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ if (!ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(hs->new_cipher)) {
+ hs->state = state_read_server_key_exchange;
+ return ssl_hs_ok;
+ }
+
+ switch (ssl_verify_peer_cert(hs)) {
+ case ssl_verify_ok:
+ break;
+ case ssl_verify_invalid:
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ case ssl_verify_retry:
+ hs->state = state_verify_server_certificate;
+ return ssl_hs_certificate_verify;
+ }
+
+ hs->state = state_read_server_key_exchange;
+ return ssl_hs_ok;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_server_key_exchange(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+ SSLMessage msg;
+ if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
+ return ssl_hs_read_message;
+ }
+
+ if (msg.type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
+ // Some ciphers (pure PSK) have an optional ServerKeyExchange message.
+ if (ssl_cipher_requires_server_key_exchange(hs->new_cipher)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+ hs->state = state_read_certificate_request;
+ return ssl_hs_ok;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_hash_message(hs, msg)) {
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+ uint32_t alg_k = hs->new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+ uint32_t alg_a = hs->new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
+ CBS server_key_exchange = msg.body;
+ if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) {
+ CBS psk_identity_hint;
+
+ // Each of the PSK key exchanges begins with a psk_identity_hint.
+ if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange,
+ &psk_identity_hint)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+ // Store the PSK identity hint for the ClientKeyExchange. Assume that the
+ // maximum length of a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum
+ // length of a PSK identity. Also do not allow NULL characters; identities
+ // are saved as C strings.
+ //
+ // TODO(davidben): Should invalid hints be ignored? It's a hint rather than
+ // a specific identity.
+ if (CBS_len(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN ||
+ CBS_contains_zero_byte(&psk_identity_hint)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+ // Save non-empty identity hints as a C string. Empty identity hints we
+ // treat as missing. Plain PSK makes it possible to send either no hint
+ // (omit ServerKeyExchange) or an empty hint, while ECDHE_PSK can only spell
+ // empty hint. Having different capabilities is odd, so we interpret empty
+ // and missing as identical.
+ char *raw = nullptr;
+ if (CBS_len(&psk_identity_hint) != 0 &&
+ !CBS_strdup(&psk_identity_hint, &raw)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+ hs->peer_psk_identity_hint.reset(raw);
+ }
+
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) {
+ // Parse the server parameters.
+ uint8_t group_type;
+ uint16_t group_id;
+ CBS point;
+ if (!CBS_get_u8(&server_key_exchange, &group_type) ||
+ group_type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE ||
+ !CBS_get_u16(&server_key_exchange, &group_id) ||
+ !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &point)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+ hs->new_session->group_id = group_id;
+
+ // Ensure the group is consistent with preferences.
+ if (!tls1_check_group_id(ssl, group_id)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+ // Initialize ECDH and save the peer public key for later.
+ hs->key_share = SSLKeyShare::Create(group_id);
+ if (!hs->key_share ||
+ !hs->peer_key.CopyFrom(point)) {
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+ } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+ // At this point, |server_key_exchange| contains the signature, if any, while
+ // |msg.body| contains the entire message. From that, derive a CBS containing
+ // just the parameter.
+ CBS parameter;
+ CBS_init(¶meter, CBS_data(&msg.body),
+ CBS_len(&msg.body) - CBS_len(&server_key_exchange));
+
+ // ServerKeyExchange should be signed by the server's public key.
+ if (ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(hs->new_cipher)) {
+ uint16_t signature_algorithm = 0;
+ if (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+ if (!CBS_get_u16(&server_key_exchange, &signature_algorithm)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+ uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ if (!tls12_check_peer_sigalg(ssl, &alert, signature_algorithm)) {
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+ hs->new_session->peer_signature_algorithm = signature_algorithm;
+ } else if (!tls1_get_legacy_signature_algorithm(&signature_algorithm,
+ hs->peer_pubkey.get())) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE);
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+ // The last field in |server_key_exchange| is the signature.
+ CBS signature;
+ if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &signature) ||
+ CBS_len(&server_key_exchange) != 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+ ScopedCBB transcript;
+ Array<uint8_t> transcript_data;
+ if (!CBB_init(transcript.get(),
+ 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + CBS_len(¶meter)) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(transcript.get(), ssl->s3->client_random,
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(transcript.get(), ssl->s3->server_random,
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(transcript.get(), CBS_data(¶meter),
+ CBS_len(¶meter)) ||
+ !CBBFinishArray(transcript.get(), &transcript_data)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+ bool sig_ok = ssl_public_key_verify(ssl, signature, signature_algorithm,
+ hs->peer_pubkey.get(), transcript_data);
+#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
+ sig_ok = true;
+ ERR_clear_error();
+#endif
+ if (!sig_ok) {
+ // bad signature
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR);
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+ } else {
+ // PSK ciphers are the only supported certificate-less ciphers.
+ assert(alg_a == SSL_aPSK);
+
+ if (CBS_len(&server_key_exchange) > 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
+ hs->state = state_read_certificate_request;
+ return ssl_hs_ok;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_certificate_request(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+
+ if (!ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(hs->new_cipher)) {
+ hs->state = state_read_server_hello_done;
+ return ssl_hs_ok;
+ }
+
+ SSLMessage msg;
+ if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
+ return ssl_hs_read_message;
+ }
+
+ if (msg.type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO_DONE) {
+ // If we get here we don't need the handshake buffer as we won't be doing
+ // client auth.
+ hs->transcript.FreeBuffer();
+ hs->state = state_read_server_hello_done;
+ return ssl_hs_ok;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, msg, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) ||
+ !ssl_hash_message(hs, msg)) {
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+ // Get the certificate types.
+ CBS body = msg.body, certificate_types;
+ if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&body, &certificate_types)) {
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+ if (!hs->certificate_types.CopyFrom(certificate_types)) {
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+ CBS supported_signature_algorithms;
+ if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &supported_signature_algorithms) ||
+ !tls1_parse_peer_sigalgs(hs, &supported_signature_algorithms)) {
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+ }
+
+ uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ UniquePtr<STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER)> ca_names =
+ ssl_parse_client_CA_list(ssl, &alert, &body);
+ if (!ca_names) {
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+ if (CBS_len(&body) != 0) {
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+ hs->cert_request = true;
+ hs->ca_names = std::move(ca_names);
+ ssl->ctx->x509_method->hs_flush_cached_ca_names(hs);
+
+ ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
+ hs->state = state_read_server_hello_done;
+ return ssl_hs_ok;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_server_hello_done(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+ SSLMessage msg;
+ if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
+ return ssl_hs_read_message;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, msg, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO_DONE) ||
+ !ssl_hash_message(hs, msg)) {
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+ // ServerHelloDone is empty.
+ if (CBS_len(&msg.body) != 0) {
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+ ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
+ hs->state = state_send_client_certificate;
+ return ssl_hs_ok;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_send_client_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+
+ // The peer didn't request a certificate.
+ if (!hs->cert_request) {
+ hs->state = state_send_client_key_exchange;
+ return ssl_hs_ok;
+ }
+
+ // Call cert_cb to update the certificate.
+ if (ssl->cert->cert_cb != NULL) {
+ int rv = ssl->cert->cert_cb(ssl, ssl->cert->cert_cb_arg);
+ if (rv == 0) {
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+ if (rv < 0) {
+ hs->state = state_send_client_certificate;
+ return ssl_hs_x509_lookup;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_has_certificate(ssl)) {
+ // Without a client certificate, the handshake buffer may be released.
+ hs->transcript.FreeBuffer();
+
+ // In SSL 3.0, the Certificate message is replaced with a warning alert.
+ if (ssl->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
+ if (!ssl->method->add_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_WARNING,
+ SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE)) {
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+ hs->state = state_send_client_key_exchange;
+ return ssl_hs_ok;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_on_certificate_selected(hs) ||
+ !ssl_output_cert_chain(ssl)) {
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+
+ hs->state = state_send_client_key_exchange;
+ return ssl_hs_ok;
+}
+
+static_assert(sizeof(size_t) >= sizeof(unsigned),
+ "size_t is smaller than unsigned");
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_send_client_key_exchange(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+ ScopedCBB cbb;
+ CBB body;
+ if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body,
+ SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+ Array<uint8_t> pms;
+ uint32_t alg_k = hs->new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+ uint32_t alg_a = hs->new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
+
+ // If using a PSK key exchange, prepare the pre-shared key.
+ unsigned psk_len = 0;
+ uint8_t psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
+ if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) {
+ if (ssl->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+ char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
+ OPENSSL_memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
+ psk_len =
+ ssl->psk_client_callback(ssl, hs->peer_psk_identity_hint.get(),
+ identity, sizeof(identity), psk, sizeof(psk));
+ if (psk_len == 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+ assert(psk_len <= PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN);
+
+ OPENSSL_free(hs->new_session->psk_identity);
+ hs->new_session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(identity);
+ if (hs->new_session->psk_identity == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+ // Write out psk_identity.
+ CBB child;
+ if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &child) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(&child, (const uint8_t *)identity,
+ OPENSSL_strnlen(identity, sizeof(identity))) ||
+ !CBB_flush(&body)) {
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Depending on the key exchange method, compute |pms|.
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
+ if (!pms.Init(SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)) {
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+ RSA *rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(hs->peer_pubkey.get());
+ if (rsa == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+ pms[0] = hs->client_version >> 8;
+ pms[1] = hs->client_version & 0xff;
+ if (!RAND_bytes(&pms[2], SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH - 2)) {
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+ CBB child, *enc_pms = &body;
+ size_t enc_pms_len;
+ // In TLS, there is a length prefix.
+ if (ssl->version > SSL3_VERSION) {
+ if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &child)) {
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+ enc_pms = &child;
+ }
+
+ uint8_t *ptr;
+ if (!CBB_reserve(enc_pms, &ptr, RSA_size(rsa)) ||
+ !RSA_encrypt(rsa, &enc_pms_len, ptr, RSA_size(rsa), pms.data(),
+ pms.size(), RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) ||
+ !CBB_did_write(enc_pms, enc_pms_len) ||
+ !CBB_flush(&body)) {
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+ } else if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) {
+ // Generate a keypair and serialize the public half.
+ CBB child;
+ if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&body, &child)) {
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+ // Compute the premaster.
+ uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ if (!hs->key_share->Accept(&child, &pms, &alert, hs->peer_key)) {
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+ if (!CBB_flush(&body)) {
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+ // The key exchange state may now be discarded.
+ hs->key_share.reset();
+ hs->peer_key.Reset();
+ } else if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
+ // For plain PSK, other_secret is a block of 0s with the same length as
+ // the pre-shared key.
+ if (!pms.Init(psk_len)) {
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+ OPENSSL_memset(pms.data(), 0, pms.size());
+ } else {
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+ // For a PSK cipher suite, other_secret is combined with the pre-shared
+ // key.
+ if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) {
+ ScopedCBB pms_cbb;
+ CBB child;
+ if (!CBB_init(pms_cbb.get(), 2 + psk_len + 2 + pms.size()) ||
+ !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(pms_cbb.get(), &child) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(&child, pms.data(), pms.size()) ||
+ !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(pms_cbb.get(), &child) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(&child, psk, psk_len) ||
+ !CBBFinishArray(pms_cbb.get(), &pms)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+ }
+
+ // The message must be added to the finished hash before calculating the
+ // master secret.
+ if (!ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get())) {
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+ hs->new_session->master_key_length =
+ tls1_generate_master_secret(hs, hs->new_session->master_key, pms);
+ if (hs->new_session->master_key_length == 0) {
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+ hs->new_session->extended_master_secret = hs->extended_master_secret;
+
+ hs->state = state_send_client_certificate_verify;
+ return ssl_hs_ok;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_send_client_certificate_verify(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+
+ if (!hs->cert_request || !ssl_has_certificate(ssl)) {
+ hs->state = state_send_client_finished;
+ return ssl_hs_ok;
+ }
+
+ assert(ssl_has_private_key(ssl));
+ ScopedCBB cbb;
+ CBB body, child;
+ if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body,
+ SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)) {
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+ uint16_t signature_algorithm;
+ if (!tls1_choose_signature_algorithm(hs, &signature_algorithm)) {
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+ if (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+ // Write out the digest type in TLS 1.2.
+ if (!CBB_add_u16(&body, signature_algorithm)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Set aside space for the signature.
+ const size_t max_sig_len = EVP_PKEY_size(hs->local_pubkey.get());
+ uint8_t *ptr;
+ if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &child) ||
+ !CBB_reserve(&child, &ptr, max_sig_len)) {
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+ size_t sig_len = max_sig_len;
+ // The SSL3 construction for CertificateVerify does not decompose into a
+ // single final digest and signature, and must be special-cased.
+ if (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) == SSL3_VERSION) {
+ if (ssl->cert->key_method != NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL_FOR_CUSTOM_KEY);
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+ uint8_t digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ size_t digest_len;
+ if (!hs->transcript.GetSSL3CertVerifyHash(
+ digest, &digest_len, hs->new_session.get(), signature_algorithm)) {
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+ UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY_CTX> pctx(EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(ssl->cert->privatekey, NULL));
+ if (!pctx ||
+ !EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx.get()) ||
+ !EVP_PKEY_sign(pctx.get(), ptr, &sig_len, digest, digest_len)) {
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+ } else {
+ switch (ssl_private_key_sign(hs, ptr, &sig_len, max_sig_len,
+ signature_algorithm,
+ hs->transcript.buffer())) {
+ case ssl_private_key_success:
+ break;
+ case ssl_private_key_failure:
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ case ssl_private_key_retry:
+ hs->state = state_send_client_certificate_verify;
+ return ssl_hs_private_key_operation;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!CBB_did_write(&child, sig_len) ||
+ !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get())) {
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+ // The handshake buffer is no longer necessary.
+ hs->transcript.FreeBuffer();
+
+ hs->state = state_send_client_finished;
+ return ssl_hs_ok;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_send_client_finished(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+ // Resolve Channel ID first, before any non-idempotent operations.
+ if (ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) {
+ if (!ssl_do_channel_id_callback(ssl)) {
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl->tlsext_channel_id_private == NULL) {
+ hs->state = state_send_client_finished;
+ return ssl_hs_channel_id_lookup;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl->method->add_change_cipher_spec(ssl) ||
+ !tls1_change_cipher_state(hs, evp_aead_seal)) {
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+ if (hs->next_proto_neg_seen) {
+ static const uint8_t kZero[32] = {0};
+ size_t padding_len =
+ 32 - ((ssl->s3->next_proto_negotiated.size() + 2) % 32);
+
+ ScopedCBB cbb;
+ CBB body, child;
+ if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body, SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) ||
+ !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&body, &child) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(&child, ssl->s3->next_proto_negotiated.data(),
+ ssl->s3->next_proto_negotiated.size()) ||
+ !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&body, &child) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(&child, kZero, padding_len) ||
+ !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get())) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) {
+ ScopedCBB cbb;
+ CBB body;
+ if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body, SSL3_MT_CHANNEL_ID) ||
+ !tls1_write_channel_id(hs, &body) ||
+ !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get())) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_send_finished(hs)) {
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+ hs->state = state_finish_flight;
+ return ssl_hs_flush;
+}
+
+static bool can_false_start(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+
+ // False Start only for TLS 1.2 with an ECDHE+AEAD cipher.
+ if (SSL_is_dtls(ssl) ||
+ SSL_version(ssl) != TLS1_2_VERSION ||
+ hs->new_cipher->algorithm_mkey != SSL_kECDHE ||
+ hs->new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ // Additionally require ALPN or NPN by default.
+ //
+ // TODO(davidben): Can this constraint be relaxed globally now that cipher
+ // suite requirements have been relaxed?
+ if (!ssl->ctx->false_start_allowed_without_alpn &&
+ ssl->s3->alpn_selected.empty() &&
+ ssl->s3->next_proto_negotiated.empty()) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_finish_flight(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+ if (ssl->session != NULL) {
+ hs->state = state_finish_client_handshake;
+ return ssl_hs_ok;
+ }
+
+ // This is a full handshake. If it involves ChannelID, then record the
+ // handshake hashes at this point in the session so that any resumption of
+ // this session with ChannelID can sign those hashes.
+ if (!tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id(hs)) {
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+ hs->state = state_read_session_ticket;
+
+ if ((SSL_get_mode(ssl) & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_FALSE_START) &&
+ can_false_start(hs) &&
+ // No False Start on renegotiation (would complicate the state machine).
+ !ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete) {
+ hs->in_false_start = true;
+ hs->can_early_write = true;
+ return ssl_hs_early_return;
+ }
+
+ return ssl_hs_ok;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_session_ticket(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+
+ if (!hs->ticket_expected) {
+ hs->state = state_process_change_cipher_spec;
+ return ssl_hs_read_change_cipher_spec;
+ }
+
+ SSLMessage msg;
+ if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
+ return ssl_hs_read_message;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, msg, SSL3_MT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) ||
+ !ssl_hash_message(hs, msg)) {
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+ CBS new_session_ticket = msg.body, ticket;
+ uint32_t tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint;
+ if (!CBS_get_u32(&new_session_ticket, &tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint) ||
+ !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&new_session_ticket, &ticket) ||
+ CBS_len(&new_session_ticket) != 0) {
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+ if (CBS_len(&ticket) == 0) {
+ // RFC 5077 allows a server to change its mind and send no ticket after
+ // negotiating the extension. The value of |ticket_expected| is checked in
+ // |ssl_update_cache| so is cleared here to avoid an unnecessary update.
+ hs->ticket_expected = false;
+ ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
+ hs->state = state_process_change_cipher_spec;
+ return ssl_hs_read_change_cipher_spec;
+ }
+
+ SSL_SESSION *session = hs->new_session.get();
+ UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> renewed_session;
+ if (ssl->session != NULL) {
+ // The server is sending a new ticket for an existing session. Sessions are
+ // immutable once established, so duplicate all but the ticket of the
+ // existing session.
+ renewed_session =
+ SSL_SESSION_dup(ssl->session, SSL_SESSION_INCLUDE_NONAUTH);
+ if (!renewed_session) {
+ // This should never happen.
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+ session = renewed_session.get();
+ }
+
+ // |tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint| is measured from when the ticket was issued.
+ ssl_session_rebase_time(ssl, session);
+
+ if (!CBS_stow(&ticket, &session->tlsext_tick, &session->tlsext_ticklen)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+ session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint;
+
+ // Generate a session ID for this session based on the session ticket. We use
+ // the session ID mechanism for detecting ticket resumption. This also fits in
+ // with assumptions elsewhere in OpenSSL.
+ if (!EVP_Digest(CBS_data(&ticket), CBS_len(&ticket),
+ session->session_id, &session->session_id_length,
+ EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+ if (renewed_session) {
+ session->not_resumable = 0;
+ SSL_SESSION_free(ssl->session);
+ ssl->session = renewed_session.release();
+ }
+
+ ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
+ hs->state = state_process_change_cipher_spec;
+ return ssl_hs_read_change_cipher_spec;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ if (!tls1_change_cipher_state(hs, evp_aead_open)) {
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+ hs->state = state_read_server_finished;
+ return ssl_hs_ok;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_server_finished(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+ enum ssl_hs_wait_t wait = ssl_get_finished(hs);
+ if (wait != ssl_hs_ok) {
+ return wait;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl->session != NULL) {
+ hs->state = state_send_client_finished;
+ return ssl_hs_ok;
+ }
+
+ hs->state = state_finish_client_handshake;
+ return ssl_hs_ok;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_finish_client_handshake(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+
+ ssl->method->on_handshake_complete(ssl);
+
+ if (ssl->session != NULL) {
+ SSL_SESSION_up_ref(ssl->session);
+ ssl->s3->established_session.reset(ssl->session);
+ } else {
+ // We make a copy of the session in order to maintain the immutability
+ // of the new established_session due to False Start. The caller may
+ // have taken a reference to the temporary session.
+ ssl->s3->established_session =
+ SSL_SESSION_dup(hs->new_session.get(), SSL_SESSION_DUP_ALL);
+ if (!ssl->s3->established_session) {
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+ // Renegotiations do not participate in session resumption.
+ if (!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete) {
+ ssl->s3->established_session->not_resumable = 0;
+ }
+
+ hs->new_session.reset();
+ }
+
+ hs->handshake_finalized = true;
+ ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete = true;
+ ssl_update_cache(hs, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
+
+ hs->state = state_done;
+ return ssl_hs_ok;
+}
+
+enum ssl_hs_wait_t ssl_client_handshake(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ while (hs->state != state_done) {
+ enum ssl_hs_wait_t ret = ssl_hs_error;
+ enum ssl_client_hs_state_t state =
+ static_cast<enum ssl_client_hs_state_t>(hs->state);
+ switch (state) {
+ case state_start_connect:
+ ret = do_start_connect(hs);
+ break;
+ case state_enter_early_data:
+ ret = do_enter_early_data(hs);
+ break;
+ case state_read_hello_verify_request:
+ ret = do_read_hello_verify_request(hs);
+ break;
+ case state_read_server_hello:
+ ret = do_read_server_hello(hs);
+ break;
+ case state_tls13:
+ ret = do_tls13(hs);
+ break;
+ case state_read_server_certificate:
+ ret = do_read_server_certificate(hs);
+ break;
+ case state_read_certificate_status:
+ ret = do_read_certificate_status(hs);
+ break;
+ case state_verify_server_certificate:
+ ret = do_verify_server_certificate(hs);
+ break;
+ case state_read_server_key_exchange:
+ ret = do_read_server_key_exchange(hs);
+ break;
+ case state_read_certificate_request:
+ ret = do_read_certificate_request(hs);
+ break;
+ case state_read_server_hello_done:
+ ret = do_read_server_hello_done(hs);
+ break;
+ case state_send_client_certificate:
+ ret = do_send_client_certificate(hs);
+ break;
+ case state_send_client_key_exchange:
+ ret = do_send_client_key_exchange(hs);
+ break;
+ case state_send_client_certificate_verify:
+ ret = do_send_client_certificate_verify(hs);
+ break;
+ case state_send_client_finished:
+ ret = do_send_client_finished(hs);
+ break;
+ case state_finish_flight:
+ ret = do_finish_flight(hs);
+ break;
+ case state_read_session_ticket:
+ ret = do_read_session_ticket(hs);
+ break;
+ case state_process_change_cipher_spec:
+ ret = do_process_change_cipher_spec(hs);
+ break;
+ case state_read_server_finished:
+ ret = do_read_server_finished(hs);
+ break;
+ case state_finish_client_handshake:
+ ret = do_finish_client_handshake(hs);
+ break;
+ case state_done:
+ ret = ssl_hs_ok;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (hs->state != state) {
+ ssl_do_info_callback(hs->ssl, SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP, 1);
+ }
+
+ if (ret != ssl_hs_ok) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ssl_do_info_callback(hs->ssl, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
+ return ssl_hs_ok;
+}
+
+const char *ssl_client_handshake_state(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ enum ssl_client_hs_state_t state =
+ static_cast<enum ssl_client_hs_state_t>(hs->state);
+ switch (state) {
+ case state_start_connect:
+ return "TLS client start_connect";
+ case state_enter_early_data:
+ return "TLS client enter_early_data";
+ case state_read_hello_verify_request:
+ return "TLS client read_hello_verify_request";
+ case state_read_server_hello:
+ return "TLS client read_server_hello";
+ case state_tls13:
+ return tls13_client_handshake_state(hs);
+ case state_read_server_certificate:
+ return "TLS client read_server_certificate";
+ case state_read_certificate_status:
+ return "TLS client read_certificate_status";
+ case state_verify_server_certificate:
+ return "TLS client verify_server_certificate";
+ case state_read_server_key_exchange:
+ return "TLS client read_server_key_exchange";
+ case state_read_certificate_request:
+ return "TLS client read_certificate_request";
+ case state_read_server_hello_done:
+ return "TLS client read_server_hello_done";
+ case state_send_client_certificate:
+ return "TLS client send_client_certificate";
+ case state_send_client_key_exchange:
+ return "TLS client send_client_key_exchange";
+ case state_send_client_certificate_verify:
+ return "TLS client send_client_certificate_verify";
+ case state_send_client_finished:
+ return "TLS client send_client_finished";
+ case state_finish_flight:
+ return "TLS client finish_flight";
+ case state_read_session_ticket:
+ return "TLS client read_session_ticket";
+ case state_process_change_cipher_spec:
+ return "TLS client process_change_cipher_spec";
+ case state_read_server_finished:
+ return "TLS client read_server_finished";
+ case state_finish_client_handshake:
+ return "TLS client finish_client_handshake";
+ case state_done:
+ return "TLS client done";
+ }
+
+ return "TLS client unknown";
+}
+
+}
git://repos.xcallymotion.com / motion2.git / blobdiff