--- /dev/null
+/* Copyright (c) 2015, Google Inc.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
+ * SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
+ * OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
+
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/aead.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+#include "../crypto/internal.h"
+#include "internal.h"
+
+
+#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
+#define FUZZER_MODE true
+#else
+#define FUZZER_MODE false
+#endif
+
+namespace bssl {
+
+SSLAEADContext::SSLAEADContext(uint16_t version_arg, bool is_dtls_arg,
+ const SSL_CIPHER *cipher_arg)
+ : cipher_(cipher_arg),
+ version_(version_arg),
+ is_dtls_(is_dtls_arg),
+ variable_nonce_included_in_record_(false),
+ random_variable_nonce_(false),
+ omit_length_in_ad_(false),
+ omit_version_in_ad_(false),
+ omit_ad_(false),
+ xor_fixed_nonce_(false) {
+ OPENSSL_memset(fixed_nonce_, 0, sizeof(fixed_nonce_));
+}
+
+SSLAEADContext::~SSLAEADContext() {}
+
+UniquePtr<SSLAEADContext> SSLAEADContext::CreateNullCipher(bool is_dtls) {
+ return MakeUnique<SSLAEADContext>(0 /* version */, is_dtls,
+ nullptr /* cipher */);
+}
+
+UniquePtr<SSLAEADContext> SSLAEADContext::Create(
+ enum evp_aead_direction_t direction, uint16_t version, int is_dtls,
+ const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, Span<const uint8_t> enc_key,
+ Span<const uint8_t> mac_key, Span<const uint8_t> fixed_iv) {
+ const EVP_AEAD *aead;
+ uint16_t protocol_version;
+ size_t expected_mac_key_len, expected_fixed_iv_len;
+ if (!ssl_protocol_version_from_wire(&protocol_version, version) ||
+ !ssl_cipher_get_evp_aead(&aead, &expected_mac_key_len,
+ &expected_fixed_iv_len, cipher, protocol_version,
+ is_dtls) ||
+ // Ensure the caller returned correct key sizes.
+ expected_fixed_iv_len != fixed_iv.size() ||
+ expected_mac_key_len != mac_key.size()) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return nullptr;
+ }
+
+ uint8_t merged_key[EVP_AEAD_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
+ if (!mac_key.empty()) {
+ // This is a "stateful" AEAD (for compatibility with pre-AEAD cipher
+ // suites).
+ if (mac_key.size() + enc_key.size() + fixed_iv.size() >
+ sizeof(merged_key)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return nullptr;
+ }
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(merged_key, mac_key.data(), mac_key.size());
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(merged_key + mac_key.size(), enc_key.data(), enc_key.size());
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(merged_key + mac_key.size() + enc_key.size(),
+ fixed_iv.data(), fixed_iv.size());
+ enc_key = MakeConstSpan(merged_key,
+ enc_key.size() + mac_key.size() + fixed_iv.size());
+ }
+
+ UniquePtr<SSLAEADContext> aead_ctx =
+ MakeUnique<SSLAEADContext>(version, is_dtls, cipher);
+ if (!aead_ctx) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return nullptr;
+ }
+
+ assert(aead_ctx->ProtocolVersion() == protocol_version);
+
+ if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_init_with_direction(
+ aead_ctx->ctx_.get(), aead, enc_key.data(), enc_key.size(),
+ EVP_AEAD_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH, direction)) {
+ return nullptr;
+ }
+
+ assert(EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(aead) <= EVP_AEAD_MAX_NONCE_LENGTH);
+ static_assert(EVP_AEAD_MAX_NONCE_LENGTH < 256,
+ "variable_nonce_len doesn't fit in uint8_t");
+ aead_ctx->variable_nonce_len_ = (uint8_t)EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(aead);
+ if (mac_key.empty()) {
+ assert(fixed_iv.size() <= sizeof(aead_ctx->fixed_nonce_));
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(aead_ctx->fixed_nonce_, fixed_iv.data(), fixed_iv.size());
+ aead_ctx->fixed_nonce_len_ = fixed_iv.size();
+
+ if (cipher->algorithm_enc & SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305) {
+ // The fixed nonce into the actual nonce (the sequence number).
+ aead_ctx->xor_fixed_nonce_ = true;
+ aead_ctx->variable_nonce_len_ = 8;
+ } else {
+ // The fixed IV is prepended to the nonce.
+ assert(fixed_iv.size() <= aead_ctx->variable_nonce_len_);
+ aead_ctx->variable_nonce_len_ -= fixed_iv.size();
+ }
+
+ // AES-GCM uses an explicit nonce.
+ if (cipher->algorithm_enc & (SSL_AES128GCM | SSL_AES256GCM)) {
+ aead_ctx->variable_nonce_included_in_record_ = true;
+ }
+
+ // The TLS 1.3 construction XORs the fixed nonce into the sequence number
+ // and omits the additional data.
+ if (protocol_version >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+ aead_ctx->xor_fixed_nonce_ = true;
+ aead_ctx->variable_nonce_len_ = 8;
+ aead_ctx->variable_nonce_included_in_record_ = false;
+ aead_ctx->omit_ad_ = true;
+ assert(fixed_iv.size() >= aead_ctx->variable_nonce_len_);
+ }
+ } else {
+ assert(protocol_version < TLS1_3_VERSION);
+ aead_ctx->variable_nonce_included_in_record_ = true;
+ aead_ctx->random_variable_nonce_ = true;
+ aead_ctx->omit_length_in_ad_ = true;
+ aead_ctx->omit_version_in_ad_ = (protocol_version == SSL3_VERSION);
+ }
+
+ return aead_ctx;
+}
+
+void SSLAEADContext::SetVersionIfNullCipher(uint16_t version) {
+ if (is_null_cipher()) {
+ version_ = version;
+ }
+}
+
+uint16_t SSLAEADContext::ProtocolVersion() const {
+ uint16_t protocol_version;
+ if(!ssl_protocol_version_from_wire(&protocol_version, version_)) {
+ assert(false);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return protocol_version;
+}
+
+uint16_t SSLAEADContext::RecordVersion() const {
+ if (version_ == 0) {
+ assert(is_null_cipher());
+ return is_dtls_ ? DTLS1_VERSION : TLS1_VERSION;
+ }
+
+ if (ProtocolVersion() <= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+ return version_;
+ }
+
+ return TLS1_2_VERSION;
+}
+
+size_t SSLAEADContext::ExplicitNonceLen() const {
+ if (!FUZZER_MODE && variable_nonce_included_in_record_) {
+ return variable_nonce_len_;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+bool SSLAEADContext::SuffixLen(size_t *out_suffix_len, const size_t in_len,
+ const size_t extra_in_len) const {
+ if (is_null_cipher() || FUZZER_MODE) {
+ *out_suffix_len = extra_in_len;
+ return true;
+ }
+ return !!EVP_AEAD_CTX_tag_len(ctx_.get(), out_suffix_len, in_len,
+ extra_in_len);
+}
+
+size_t SSLAEADContext::MaxOverhead() const {
+ return ExplicitNonceLen() +
+ (is_null_cipher() || FUZZER_MODE
+ ? 0
+ : EVP_AEAD_max_overhead(EVP_AEAD_CTX_aead(ctx_.get())));
+}
+
+size_t SSLAEADContext::GetAdditionalData(uint8_t out[13], uint8_t type,
+ uint16_t record_version,
+ const uint8_t seqnum[8],
+ size_t plaintext_len) {
+ if (omit_ad_) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(out, seqnum, 8);
+ size_t len = 8;
+ out[len++] = type;
+ if (!omit_version_in_ad_) {
+ out[len++] = static_cast<uint8_t>((record_version >> 8));
+ out[len++] = static_cast<uint8_t>(record_version);
+ }
+ if (!omit_length_in_ad_) {
+ out[len++] = static_cast<uint8_t>((plaintext_len >> 8));
+ out[len++] = static_cast<uint8_t>(plaintext_len);
+ }
+ return len;
+}
+
+bool SSLAEADContext::Open(Span<uint8_t> *out, uint8_t type,
+ uint16_t record_version, const uint8_t seqnum[8],
+ Span<uint8_t> in) {
+ if (is_null_cipher() || FUZZER_MODE) {
+ // Handle the initial NULL cipher.
+ *out = in;
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ // TLS 1.2 AEADs include the length in the AD and are assumed to have fixed
+ // overhead. Otherwise the parameter is unused.
+ size_t plaintext_len = 0;
+ if (!omit_length_in_ad_) {
+ size_t overhead = MaxOverhead();
+ if (in.size() < overhead) {
+ // Publicly invalid.
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
+ return false;
+ }
+ plaintext_len = in.size() - overhead;
+ }
+ uint8_t ad[13];
+ size_t ad_len =
+ GetAdditionalData(ad, type, record_version, seqnum, plaintext_len);
+
+ // Assemble the nonce.
+ uint8_t nonce[EVP_AEAD_MAX_NONCE_LENGTH];
+ size_t nonce_len = 0;
+
+ // Prepend the fixed nonce, or left-pad with zeros if XORing.
+ if (xor_fixed_nonce_) {
+ nonce_len = fixed_nonce_len_ - variable_nonce_len_;
+ OPENSSL_memset(nonce, 0, nonce_len);
+ } else {
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(nonce, fixed_nonce_, fixed_nonce_len_);
+ nonce_len += fixed_nonce_len_;
+ }
+
+ // Add the variable nonce.
+ if (variable_nonce_included_in_record_) {
+ if (in.size() < variable_nonce_len_) {
+ // Publicly invalid.
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
+ return false;
+ }
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(nonce + nonce_len, in.data(), variable_nonce_len_);
+ in = in.subspan(variable_nonce_len_);
+ } else {
+ assert(variable_nonce_len_ == 8);
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(nonce + nonce_len, seqnum, variable_nonce_len_);
+ }
+ nonce_len += variable_nonce_len_;
+
+ // XOR the fixed nonce, if necessary.
+ if (xor_fixed_nonce_) {
+ assert(nonce_len == fixed_nonce_len_);
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < fixed_nonce_len_; i++) {
+ nonce[i] ^= fixed_nonce_[i];
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Decrypt in-place.
+ size_t len;
+ if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_open(ctx_.get(), in.data(), &len, in.size(), nonce,
+ nonce_len, in.data(), in.size(), ad, ad_len)) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ *out = in.subspan(0, len);
+ return true;
+}
+
+bool SSLAEADContext::SealScatter(uint8_t *out_prefix, uint8_t *out,
+ uint8_t *out_suffix, uint8_t type,
+ uint16_t record_version,
+ const uint8_t seqnum[8], const uint8_t *in,
+ size_t in_len, const uint8_t *extra_in,
+ size_t extra_in_len) {
+ const size_t prefix_len = ExplicitNonceLen();
+ size_t suffix_len;
+ if (!SuffixLen(&suffix_len, in_len, extra_in_len)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE);
+ return false;
+ }
+ if ((in != out && buffers_alias(in, in_len, out, in_len)) ||
+ buffers_alias(in, in_len, out_prefix, prefix_len) ||
+ buffers_alias(in, in_len, out_suffix, suffix_len)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_OUTPUT_ALIASES_INPUT);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (is_null_cipher() || FUZZER_MODE) {
+ // Handle the initial NULL cipher.
+ OPENSSL_memmove(out, in, in_len);
+ OPENSSL_memmove(out_suffix, extra_in, extra_in_len);
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ uint8_t ad[13];
+ size_t ad_len = GetAdditionalData(ad, type, record_version, seqnum, in_len);
+
+ // Assemble the nonce.
+ uint8_t nonce[EVP_AEAD_MAX_NONCE_LENGTH];
+ size_t nonce_len = 0;
+
+ // Prepend the fixed nonce, or left-pad with zeros if XORing.
+ if (xor_fixed_nonce_) {
+ nonce_len = fixed_nonce_len_ - variable_nonce_len_;
+ OPENSSL_memset(nonce, 0, nonce_len);
+ } else {
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(nonce, fixed_nonce_, fixed_nonce_len_);
+ nonce_len += fixed_nonce_len_;
+ }
+
+ // Select the variable nonce.
+ if (random_variable_nonce_) {
+ assert(variable_nonce_included_in_record_);
+ if (!RAND_bytes(nonce + nonce_len, variable_nonce_len_)) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ } else {
+ // When sending we use the sequence number as the variable part of the
+ // nonce.
+ assert(variable_nonce_len_ == 8);
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(nonce + nonce_len, seqnum, variable_nonce_len_);
+ }
+ nonce_len += variable_nonce_len_;
+
+ // Emit the variable nonce if included in the record.
+ if (variable_nonce_included_in_record_) {
+ assert(!xor_fixed_nonce_);
+ if (buffers_alias(in, in_len, out_prefix, variable_nonce_len_)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_OUTPUT_ALIASES_INPUT);
+ return false;
+ }
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(out_prefix, nonce + fixed_nonce_len_,
+ variable_nonce_len_);
+ }
+
+ // XOR the fixed nonce, if necessary.
+ if (xor_fixed_nonce_) {
+ assert(nonce_len == fixed_nonce_len_);
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < fixed_nonce_len_; i++) {
+ nonce[i] ^= fixed_nonce_[i];
+ }
+ }
+
+ size_t written_suffix_len;
+ bool result = !!EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal_scatter(
+ ctx_.get(), out, out_suffix, &written_suffix_len, suffix_len, nonce,
+ nonce_len, in, in_len, extra_in, extra_in_len, ad, ad_len);
+ assert(!result || written_suffix_len == suffix_len);
+ return result;
+}
+
+bool SSLAEADContext::Seal(uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len, size_t max_out_len,
+ uint8_t type, uint16_t record_version,
+ const uint8_t seqnum[8], const uint8_t *in,
+ size_t in_len) {
+ const size_t prefix_len = ExplicitNonceLen();
+ size_t suffix_len;
+ if (!SuffixLen(&suffix_len, in_len, 0)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE);
+ return false;
+ }
+ if (in_len + prefix_len < in_len ||
+ in_len + prefix_len + suffix_len < in_len + prefix_len) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE);
+ return false;
+ }
+ if (in_len + prefix_len + suffix_len > max_out_len) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (!SealScatter(out, out + prefix_len, out + prefix_len + in_len, type,
+ record_version, seqnum, in, in_len, 0, 0)) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ *out_len = prefix_len + in_len + suffix_len;
+ return true;
+}
+
+bool SSLAEADContext::GetIV(const uint8_t **out_iv, size_t *out_iv_len) const {
+ return !is_null_cipher() &&
+ EVP_AEAD_CTX_get_iv(ctx_.get(), out_iv, out_iv_len);
+}
+
+} // namespace bssl