--- /dev/null
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */
+
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <utility>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/buf.h>
+#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
+#include <openssl/ec_key.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+#include "../crypto/internal.h"
+#include "internal.h"
+
+
+namespace bssl {
+
+CERT *ssl_cert_new(const SSL_X509_METHOD *x509_method) {
+ CERT *ret = (CERT *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CERT));
+ if (ret == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ OPENSSL_memset(ret, 0, sizeof(CERT));
+ ret->x509_method = x509_method;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static CRYPTO_BUFFER *buffer_up_ref(CRYPTO_BUFFER *buffer) {
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER_up_ref(buffer);
+ return buffer;
+}
+
+CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert) {
+ CERT *ret = (CERT *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CERT));
+ if (ret == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ OPENSSL_memset(ret, 0, sizeof(CERT));
+
+ ret->chain = sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_deep_copy(cert->chain, buffer_up_ref,
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER_free);
+
+ if (cert->privatekey != NULL) {
+ EVP_PKEY_up_ref(cert->privatekey);
+ ret->privatekey = cert->privatekey;
+ }
+
+ ret->key_method = cert->key_method;
+ ret->x509_method = cert->x509_method;
+
+ if (cert->sigalgs != NULL) {
+ ret->sigalgs = (uint16_t *)BUF_memdup(
+ cert->sigalgs, cert->num_sigalgs * sizeof(cert->sigalgs[0]));
+ if (ret->sigalgs == NULL) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ ret->num_sigalgs = cert->num_sigalgs;
+
+ ret->cert_cb = cert->cert_cb;
+ ret->cert_cb_arg = cert->cert_cb_arg;
+
+ ret->x509_method->cert_dup(ret, cert);
+
+ if (cert->signed_cert_timestamp_list != NULL) {
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER_up_ref(cert->signed_cert_timestamp_list);
+ ret->signed_cert_timestamp_list = cert->signed_cert_timestamp_list;
+ }
+
+ if (cert->ocsp_response != NULL) {
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER_up_ref(cert->ocsp_response);
+ ret->ocsp_response = cert->ocsp_response;
+ }
+
+ ret->sid_ctx_length = cert->sid_ctx_length;
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(ret->sid_ctx, cert->sid_ctx, sizeof(ret->sid_ctx));
+
+ ret->enable_early_data = cert->enable_early_data;
+
+ return ret;
+
+err:
+ ssl_cert_free(ret);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+// Free up and clear all certificates and chains
+void ssl_cert_clear_certs(CERT *cert) {
+ if (cert == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ cert->x509_method->cert_clear(cert);
+
+ sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_pop_free(cert->chain, CRYPTO_BUFFER_free);
+ cert->chain = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY_free(cert->privatekey);
+ cert->privatekey = NULL;
+ cert->key_method = NULL;
+}
+
+void ssl_cert_free(CERT *cert) {
+ if (cert == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ ssl_cert_clear_certs(cert);
+ cert->x509_method->cert_free(cert);
+ OPENSSL_free(cert->sigalgs);
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(cert->signed_cert_timestamp_list);
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(cert->ocsp_response);
+
+ OPENSSL_free(cert);
+}
+
+static void ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(CERT *cert, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, void *arg),
+ void *arg) {
+ cert->cert_cb = cb;
+ cert->cert_cb_arg = arg;
+}
+
+enum leaf_cert_and_privkey_result_t {
+ leaf_cert_and_privkey_error,
+ leaf_cert_and_privkey_ok,
+ leaf_cert_and_privkey_mismatch,
+};
+
+// check_leaf_cert_and_privkey checks whether the certificate in |leaf_buffer|
+// and the private key in |privkey| are suitable and coherent. It returns
+// |leaf_cert_and_privkey_error| and pushes to the error queue if a problem is
+// found. If the certificate and private key are valid, but incoherent, it
+// returns |leaf_cert_and_privkey_mismatch|. Otherwise it returns
+// |leaf_cert_and_privkey_ok|.
+static enum leaf_cert_and_privkey_result_t check_leaf_cert_and_privkey(
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER *leaf_buffer, EVP_PKEY *privkey) {
+ CBS cert_cbs;
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER_init_CBS(leaf_buffer, &cert_cbs);
+ UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> pubkey = ssl_cert_parse_pubkey(&cert_cbs);
+ if (!pubkey) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return leaf_cert_and_privkey_error;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_is_key_type_supported(pubkey->type)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
+ return leaf_cert_and_privkey_error;
+ }
+
+ // An ECC certificate may be usable for ECDH or ECDSA. We only support ECDSA
+ // certificates, so sanity-check the key usage extension.
+ if (pubkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC &&
+ !ssl_cert_check_digital_signature_key_usage(&cert_cbs)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
+ return leaf_cert_and_privkey_error;
+ }
+
+ if (privkey != NULL &&
+ // Sanity-check that the private key and the certificate match.
+ !ssl_compare_public_and_private_key(pubkey.get(), privkey)) {
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ return leaf_cert_and_privkey_mismatch;
+ }
+
+ return leaf_cert_and_privkey_ok;
+}
+
+static int cert_set_chain_and_key(
+ CERT *cert, CRYPTO_BUFFER *const *certs, size_t num_certs,
+ EVP_PKEY *privkey, const SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_METHOD *privkey_method) {
+ if (num_certs == 0 ||
+ (privkey == NULL && privkey_method == NULL)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (privkey != NULL && privkey_method != NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CANNOT_HAVE_BOTH_PRIVKEY_AND_METHOD);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ switch (check_leaf_cert_and_privkey(certs[0], privkey)) {
+ case leaf_cert_and_privkey_error:
+ return 0;
+ case leaf_cert_and_privkey_mismatch:
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_AND_PRIVATE_KEY_MISMATCH);
+ return 0;
+ case leaf_cert_and_privkey_ok:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER) *certs_sk = sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_null();
+ if (certs_sk == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < num_certs; i++) {
+ if (!sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_push(certs_sk, certs[i])) {
+ sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_pop_free(certs_sk, CRYPTO_BUFFER_free);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER_up_ref(certs[i]);
+ }
+
+ EVP_PKEY_free(cert->privatekey);
+ cert->privatekey = privkey;
+ if (privkey != NULL) {
+ EVP_PKEY_up_ref(privkey);
+ }
+ cert->key_method = privkey_method;
+
+ sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_pop_free(cert->chain, CRYPTO_BUFFER_free);
+ cert->chain = certs_sk;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_set_cert(CERT *cert, UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> buffer) {
+ switch (check_leaf_cert_and_privkey(buffer.get(), cert->privatekey)) {
+ case leaf_cert_and_privkey_error:
+ return 0;
+ case leaf_cert_and_privkey_mismatch:
+ // don't fail for a cert/key mismatch, just free current private key
+ // (when switching to a different cert & key, first this function should
+ // be used, then |ssl_set_pkey|.
+ EVP_PKEY_free(cert->privatekey);
+ cert->privatekey = NULL;
+ break;
+ case leaf_cert_and_privkey_ok:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ cert->x509_method->cert_flush_cached_leaf(cert);
+
+ if (cert->chain != NULL) {
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(cert->chain, 0));
+ sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_set(cert->chain, 0, buffer.release());
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ cert->chain = sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_null();
+ if (cert->chain == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!PushToStack(cert->chain, std::move(buffer))) {
+ sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(cert->chain);
+ cert->chain = NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_has_certificate(const SSL *ssl) {
+ return ssl->cert->chain != NULL &&
+ sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(ssl->cert->chain, 0) != NULL &&
+ ssl_has_private_key(ssl);
+}
+
+bool ssl_parse_cert_chain(uint8_t *out_alert,
+ UniquePtr<STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER)> *out_chain,
+ UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> *out_pubkey,
+ uint8_t *out_leaf_sha256, CBS *cbs,
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER_POOL *pool) {
+ out_chain->reset();
+ out_pubkey->reset();
+
+ CBS certificate_list;
+ if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(cbs, &certificate_list)) {
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (CBS_len(&certificate_list) == 0) {
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ UniquePtr<STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER)> chain(sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_null());
+ if (!chain) {
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> pubkey;
+ while (CBS_len(&certificate_list) > 0) {
+ CBS certificate;
+ if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&certificate_list, &certificate) ||
+ CBS_len(&certificate) == 0) {
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(chain.get()) == 0) {
+ pubkey = ssl_cert_parse_pubkey(&certificate);
+ if (!pubkey) {
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ // Retain the hash of the leaf certificate if requested.
+ if (out_leaf_sha256 != NULL) {
+ SHA256(CBS_data(&certificate), CBS_len(&certificate), out_leaf_sha256);
+ }
+ }
+
+ UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> buf(
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_from_CBS(&certificate, pool));
+ if (!buf ||
+ !PushToStack(chain.get(), std::move(buf))) {
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+
+ *out_chain = std::move(chain);
+ *out_pubkey = std::move(pubkey);
+ return true;
+}
+
+int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb) {
+ if (!ssl_has_certificate(ssl)) {
+ return CBB_add_u24(cbb, 0);
+ }
+
+ CBB certs;
+ if (!CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(cbb, &certs)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER) *chain = ssl->cert->chain;
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(chain); i++) {
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER *buffer = sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(chain, i);
+ CBB child;
+ if (!CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(&certs, &child) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(&child, CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(buffer),
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(buffer)) ||
+ !CBB_flush(&certs)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return CBB_flush(cbb);
+}
+
+// ssl_cert_skip_to_spki parses a DER-encoded, X.509 certificate from |in| and
+// positions |*out_tbs_cert| to cover the TBSCertificate, starting at the
+// subjectPublicKeyInfo.
+static int ssl_cert_skip_to_spki(const CBS *in, CBS *out_tbs_cert) {
+ /* From RFC 5280, section 4.1
+ * Certificate ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * tbsCertificate TBSCertificate,
+ * signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
+ * signatureValue BIT STRING }
+
+ * TBSCertificate ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * version [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1,
+ * serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber,
+ * signature AlgorithmIdentifier,
+ * issuer Name,
+ * validity Validity,
+ * subject Name,
+ * subjectPublicKeyInfo SubjectPublicKeyInfo,
+ * ... } */
+ CBS buf = *in;
+
+ CBS toplevel;
+ if (!CBS_get_asn1(&buf, &toplevel, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+ CBS_len(&buf) != 0 ||
+ !CBS_get_asn1(&toplevel, out_tbs_cert, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+ // version
+ !CBS_get_optional_asn1(
+ out_tbs_cert, NULL, NULL,
+ CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 0) ||
+ // serialNumber
+ !CBS_get_asn1(out_tbs_cert, NULL, CBS_ASN1_INTEGER) ||
+ // signature algorithm
+ !CBS_get_asn1(out_tbs_cert, NULL, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+ // issuer
+ !CBS_get_asn1(out_tbs_cert, NULL, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+ // validity
+ !CBS_get_asn1(out_tbs_cert, NULL, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+ // subject
+ !CBS_get_asn1(out_tbs_cert, NULL, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> ssl_cert_parse_pubkey(const CBS *in) {
+ CBS buf = *in, tbs_cert;
+ if (!ssl_cert_skip_to_spki(&buf, &tbs_cert)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CANNOT_PARSE_LEAF_CERT);
+ return nullptr;
+ }
+
+ return UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY>(EVP_parse_public_key(&tbs_cert));
+}
+
+int ssl_compare_public_and_private_key(const EVP_PKEY *pubkey,
+ const EVP_PKEY *privkey) {
+ if (EVP_PKEY_is_opaque(privkey)) {
+ // We cannot check an opaque private key and have to trust that it
+ // matches.
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ switch (EVP_PKEY_cmp(pubkey, privkey)) {
+ case 1:
+ ret = 1;
+ break;
+ case 0:
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH);
+ break;
+ case -1:
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH);
+ break;
+ case -2:
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE);
+ break;
+ default:
+ assert(0);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int ssl_cert_check_private_key(const CERT *cert, const EVP_PKEY *privkey) {
+ if (privkey == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (cert->chain == NULL ||
+ sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(cert->chain, 0) == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ CBS cert_cbs;
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER_init_CBS(sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(cert->chain, 0), &cert_cbs);
+ UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> pubkey = ssl_cert_parse_pubkey(&cert_cbs);
+ if (!pubkey) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return ssl_compare_public_and_private_key(pubkey.get(), privkey);
+}
+
+int ssl_cert_check_digital_signature_key_usage(const CBS *in) {
+ CBS buf = *in;
+
+ CBS tbs_cert, outer_extensions;
+ int has_extensions;
+ if (!ssl_cert_skip_to_spki(&buf, &tbs_cert) ||
+ // subjectPublicKeyInfo
+ !CBS_get_asn1(&tbs_cert, NULL, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+ // issuerUniqueID
+ !CBS_get_optional_asn1(
+ &tbs_cert, NULL, NULL,
+ CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 1) ||
+ // subjectUniqueID
+ !CBS_get_optional_asn1(
+ &tbs_cert, NULL, NULL,
+ CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 2) ||
+ !CBS_get_optional_asn1(
+ &tbs_cert, &outer_extensions, &has_extensions,
+ CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 3)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CANNOT_PARSE_LEAF_CERT);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!has_extensions) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ CBS extensions;
+ if (!CBS_get_asn1(&outer_extensions, &extensions, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CANNOT_PARSE_LEAF_CERT);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ while (CBS_len(&extensions) > 0) {
+ CBS extension, oid, contents;
+ if (!CBS_get_asn1(&extensions, &extension, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+ !CBS_get_asn1(&extension, &oid, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT) ||
+ (CBS_peek_asn1_tag(&extension, CBS_ASN1_BOOLEAN) &&
+ !CBS_get_asn1(&extension, NULL, CBS_ASN1_BOOLEAN)) ||
+ !CBS_get_asn1(&extension, &contents, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
+ CBS_len(&extension) != 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CANNOT_PARSE_LEAF_CERT);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ static const uint8_t kKeyUsageOID[3] = {0x55, 0x1d, 0x0f};
+ if (CBS_len(&oid) != sizeof(kKeyUsageOID) ||
+ OPENSSL_memcmp(CBS_data(&oid), kKeyUsageOID, sizeof(kKeyUsageOID)) !=
+ 0) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ CBS bit_string;
+ if (!CBS_get_asn1(&contents, &bit_string, CBS_ASN1_BITSTRING) ||
+ CBS_len(&contents) != 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CANNOT_PARSE_LEAF_CERT);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ // This is the KeyUsage extension. See
+ // https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.3
+ if (!CBS_is_valid_asn1_bitstring(&bit_string)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CANNOT_PARSE_LEAF_CERT);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!CBS_asn1_bitstring_has_bit(&bit_string, 0)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_SIGNING);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ // No KeyUsage extension found.
+ return 1;
+}
+
+UniquePtr<STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER)> ssl_parse_client_CA_list(SSL *ssl,
+ uint8_t *out_alert,
+ CBS *cbs) {
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER_POOL *const pool = ssl->ctx->pool;
+
+ UniquePtr<STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER)> ret(sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_null());
+ if (!ret) {
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return nullptr;
+ }
+
+ CBS child;
+ if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(cbs, &child)) {
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ return nullptr;
+ }
+
+ while (CBS_len(&child) > 0) {
+ CBS distinguished_name;
+ if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&child, &distinguished_name)) {
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG);
+ return nullptr;
+ }
+
+ UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> buffer(
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_from_CBS(&distinguished_name, pool));
+ if (!buffer ||
+ !PushToStack(ret.get(), std::move(buffer))) {
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return nullptr;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl->ctx->x509_method->check_client_CA_list(ret.get())) {
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return nullptr;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+bool ssl_has_client_CAs(SSL *ssl) {
+ STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER) *names = ssl->client_CA;
+ if (names == NULL) {
+ names = ssl->ctx->client_CA;
+ }
+ if (names == NULL) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ return sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(names) > 0;
+}
+
+int ssl_add_client_CA_list(SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb) {
+ CBB child, name_cbb;
+ if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cbb, &child)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER) *names = ssl->client_CA;
+ if (names == NULL) {
+ names = ssl->ctx->client_CA;
+ }
+ if (names == NULL) {
+ return CBB_flush(cbb);
+ }
+
+ for (const CRYPTO_BUFFER *name : names) {
+ if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&child, &name_cbb) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(&name_cbb, CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(name),
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(name))) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return CBB_flush(cbb);
+}
+
+int ssl_check_leaf_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+ const CRYPTO_BUFFER *leaf) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+ assert(ssl_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION);
+
+ // Check the certificate's type matches the cipher.
+ if (!(hs->new_cipher->algorithm_auth & ssl_cipher_auth_mask_for_key(pkey))) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ // Check key usages for all key types but RSA. This is needed to distinguish
+ // ECDH certificates, which we do not support, from ECDSA certificates. In
+ // principle, we should check RSA key usages based on cipher, but this breaks
+ // buggy antivirus deployments. Other key types are always used for signing.
+ //
+ // TODO(davidben): Get more recent data on RSA key usages.
+ if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
+ CBS leaf_cbs;
+ CBS_init(&leaf_cbs, CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(leaf), CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(leaf));
+ if (!ssl_cert_check_digital_signature_key_usage(&leaf_cbs)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
+ // Check the key's group and point format are acceptable.
+ EC_KEY *ec_key = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
+ uint16_t group_id;
+ if (!ssl_nid_to_group_id(
+ &group_id, EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec_key))) ||
+ !tls1_check_group_id(ssl, group_id) ||
+ EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec_key) != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_on_certificate_selected(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+ if (!ssl_has_certificate(ssl)) {
+ // Nothing to do.
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl->ctx->x509_method->ssl_auto_chain_if_needed(ssl)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ CBS leaf;
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER_init_CBS(sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(ssl->cert->chain, 0), &leaf);
+
+ hs->local_pubkey = ssl_cert_parse_pubkey(&leaf);
+ return hs->local_pubkey != NULL;
+}
+
+} // namespace bssl
+
+using namespace bssl;
+
+int SSL_set_chain_and_key(SSL *ssl, CRYPTO_BUFFER *const *certs,
+ size_t num_certs, EVP_PKEY *privkey,
+ const SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_METHOD *privkey_method) {
+ return cert_set_chain_and_key(ssl->cert, certs, num_certs, privkey,
+ privkey_method);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_chain_and_key(SSL_CTX *ctx, CRYPTO_BUFFER *const *certs,
+ size_t num_certs, EVP_PKEY *privkey,
+ const SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_METHOD *privkey_method) {
+ return cert_set_chain_and_key(ctx->cert, certs, num_certs, privkey,
+ privkey_method);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_ASN1(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t der_len,
+ const uint8_t *der) {
+ UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> buffer(CRYPTO_BUFFER_new(der, der_len, NULL));
+ if (!buffer) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return ssl_set_cert(ctx->cert, std::move(buffer));
+}
+
+int SSL_use_certificate_ASN1(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *der, size_t der_len) {
+ UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> buffer(CRYPTO_BUFFER_new(der, der_len, NULL));
+ if (!buffer) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return ssl_set_cert(ssl->cert, std::move(buffer));
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, void *arg),
+ void *arg) {
+ ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(ctx->cert, cb, arg);
+}
+
+void SSL_set_cert_cb(SSL *ssl, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg) {
+ ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(ssl->cert, cb, arg);
+}
+
+STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER) *SSL_get0_peer_certificates(const SSL *ssl) {
+ SSL_SESSION *session = SSL_get_session(ssl);
+ if (session == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return session->certs;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER) *SSL_get0_server_requested_CAs(const SSL *ssl) {
+ if (ssl->s3->hs == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return ssl->s3->hs->ca_names.get();
+}
+
+static int set_signed_cert_timestamp_list(CERT *cert, const uint8_t *list,
+ size_t list_len) {
+ CBS sct_list;
+ CBS_init(&sct_list, list, list_len);
+ if (!ssl_is_sct_list_valid(&sct_list)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SCT_LIST);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(cert->signed_cert_timestamp_list);
+ cert->signed_cert_timestamp_list =
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER_new(CBS_data(&sct_list), CBS_len(&sct_list), NULL);
+ return cert->signed_cert_timestamp_list != NULL;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_signed_cert_timestamp_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *list,
+ size_t list_len) {
+ return set_signed_cert_timestamp_list(ctx->cert, list, list_len);
+}
+
+int SSL_set_signed_cert_timestamp_list(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *list,
+ size_t list_len) {
+ return set_signed_cert_timestamp_list(ssl->cert, list, list_len);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_ocsp_response(SSL_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *response,
+ size_t response_len) {
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(ctx->cert->ocsp_response);
+ ctx->cert->ocsp_response = CRYPTO_BUFFER_new(response, response_len, NULL);
+ return ctx->cert->ocsp_response != NULL;
+}
+
+int SSL_set_ocsp_response(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *response,
+ size_t response_len) {
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(ssl->cert->ocsp_response);
+ ssl->cert->ocsp_response = CRYPTO_BUFFER_new(response, response_len, NULL);
+ return ssl->cert->ocsp_response != NULL;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set0_client_CAs(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER) *name_list) {
+ ctx->x509_method->ssl_ctx_flush_cached_client_CA(ctx);
+ sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_pop_free(ctx->client_CA, CRYPTO_BUFFER_free);
+ ctx->client_CA = name_list;
+}
+
+void SSL_set0_client_CAs(SSL *ssl, STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER) *name_list) {
+ ssl->ctx->x509_method->ssl_flush_cached_client_CA(ssl);
+ sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_pop_free(ssl->client_CA, CRYPTO_BUFFER_free);
+ ssl->client_CA = name_list;
+}
git://repos.xcallymotion.com / motion2.git / blobdiff