--- /dev/null
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE. */
+
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/lhash.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+#include "../crypto/internal.h"
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_WINDOWS)
+#include <sys/timeb.h>
+#else
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+
+
+namespace bssl {
+
+// |SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL| is no longer emitted, but continue to define it
+// to avoid downstream churn.
+OPENSSL_DECLARE_ERROR_REASON(SSL, UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL)
+
+// The following errors are no longer emitted, but are used in nginx without
+// #ifdefs.
+OPENSSL_DECLARE_ERROR_REASON(SSL, BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG)
+OPENSSL_DECLARE_ERROR_REASON(SSL, NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED)
+
+// Some error codes are special. Ensure the make_errors.go script never
+// regresses this.
+static_assert(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_NO_RENEGOTIATION ==
+ SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION + SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET,
+ "alert reason code mismatch");
+
+// kMaxHandshakeSize is the maximum size, in bytes, of a handshake message.
+static const size_t kMaxHandshakeSize = (1u << 24) - 1;
+
+static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS g_ex_data_class_ssl =
+ CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS_INIT_WITH_APP_DATA;
+static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS g_ex_data_class_ssl_ctx =
+ CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS_INIT_WITH_APP_DATA;
+
+bool CBBFinishArray(CBB *cbb, Array<uint8_t> *out) {
+ uint8_t *ptr;
+ size_t len;
+ if (!CBB_finish(cbb, &ptr, &len)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return false;
+ }
+ out->Reset(ptr, len);
+ return true;
+}
+
+void ssl_reset_error_state(SSL *ssl) {
+ // Functions which use |SSL_get_error| must reset I/O and error state on
+ // entry.
+ ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ ERR_clear_system_error();
+}
+
+void ssl_set_read_error(SSL* ssl) {
+ ssl->s3->read_shutdown = ssl_shutdown_error;
+ ssl->s3->read_error.reset(ERR_save_state());
+}
+
+static bool check_read_error(const SSL *ssl) {
+ if (ssl->s3->read_shutdown == ssl_shutdown_error) {
+ ERR_restore_state(ssl->s3->read_error.get());
+ return false;
+ }
+ return true;
+}
+
+int ssl_can_write(const SSL *ssl) {
+ return !SSL_in_init(ssl) || ssl->s3->hs->can_early_write;
+}
+
+int ssl_can_read(const SSL *ssl) {
+ return !SSL_in_init(ssl) || ssl->s3->hs->can_early_read;
+}
+
+ssl_open_record_t ssl_open_handshake(SSL *ssl, size_t *out_consumed,
+ uint8_t *out_alert, Span<uint8_t> in) {
+ *out_consumed = 0;
+ if (!check_read_error(ssl)) {
+ *out_alert = 0;
+ return ssl_open_record_error;
+ }
+ auto ret = ssl->method->open_handshake(ssl, out_consumed, out_alert, in);
+ if (ret == ssl_open_record_error) {
+ ssl_set_read_error(ssl);
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+ssl_open_record_t ssl_open_change_cipher_spec(SSL *ssl, size_t *out_consumed,
+ uint8_t *out_alert,
+ Span<uint8_t> in) {
+ *out_consumed = 0;
+ if (!check_read_error(ssl)) {
+ *out_alert = 0;
+ return ssl_open_record_error;
+ }
+ auto ret =
+ ssl->method->open_change_cipher_spec(ssl, out_consumed, out_alert, in);
+ if (ret == ssl_open_record_error) {
+ ssl_set_read_error(ssl);
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+ssl_open_record_t ssl_open_app_data(SSL *ssl, Span<uint8_t> *out,
+ size_t *out_consumed, uint8_t *out_alert,
+ Span<uint8_t> in) {
+ *out_consumed = 0;
+ if (!check_read_error(ssl)) {
+ *out_alert = 0;
+ return ssl_open_record_error;
+ }
+ auto ret = ssl->method->open_app_data(ssl, out, out_consumed, out_alert, in);
+ if (ret == ssl_open_record_error) {
+ ssl_set_read_error(ssl);
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+void ssl_cipher_preference_list_free(
+ struct ssl_cipher_preference_list_st *cipher_list) {
+ if (cipher_list == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipher_list->ciphers);
+ OPENSSL_free(cipher_list->in_group_flags);
+ OPENSSL_free(cipher_list);
+}
+
+void ssl_update_cache(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, int mode) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+ SSL_CTX *ctx = ssl->session_ctx;
+ // Never cache sessions with empty session IDs.
+ if (ssl->s3->established_session->session_id_length == 0 ||
+ ssl->s3->established_session->not_resumable ||
+ (ctx->session_cache_mode & mode) != mode) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ // Clients never use the internal session cache.
+ int use_internal_cache = ssl->server && !(ctx->session_cache_mode &
+ SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE);
+
+ // A client may see new sessions on abbreviated handshakes if the server
+ // decides to renew the ticket. Once the handshake is completed, it should be
+ // inserted into the cache.
+ if (ssl->s3->established_session.get() != ssl->session ||
+ (!ssl->server && hs->ticket_expected)) {
+ if (use_internal_cache) {
+ SSL_CTX_add_session(ctx, ssl->s3->established_session.get());
+ }
+ if (ctx->new_session_cb != NULL) {
+ SSL_SESSION_up_ref(ssl->s3->established_session.get());
+ if (!ctx->new_session_cb(ssl, ssl->s3->established_session.get())) {
+ // |new_session_cb|'s return value signals whether it took ownership.
+ SSL_SESSION_free(ssl->s3->established_session.get());
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (use_internal_cache &&
+ !(ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR)) {
+ // Automatically flush the internal session cache every 255 connections.
+ int flush_cache = 0;
+ CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(&ctx->lock);
+ ctx->handshakes_since_cache_flush++;
+ if (ctx->handshakes_since_cache_flush >= 255) {
+ flush_cache = 1;
+ ctx->handshakes_since_cache_flush = 0;
+ }
+ CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&ctx->lock);
+
+ if (flush_cache) {
+ struct OPENSSL_timeval now;
+ ssl_get_current_time(ssl, &now);
+ SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(ctx, now.tv_sec);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static int cbb_add_hex(CBB *cbb, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len) {
+ static const char hextable[] = "0123456789abcdef";
+ uint8_t *out;
+
+ if (!CBB_add_space(cbb, &out, in_len * 2)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < in_len; i++) {
+ *(out++) = (uint8_t)hextable[in[i] >> 4];
+ *(out++) = (uint8_t)hextable[in[i] & 0xf];
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_log_secret(const SSL *ssl, const char *label, const uint8_t *secret,
+ size_t secret_len) {
+ if (ssl->ctx->keylog_callback == NULL) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ ScopedCBB cbb;
+ uint8_t *out;
+ size_t out_len;
+ if (!CBB_init(cbb.get(), strlen(label) + 1 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2 + 1 +
+ secret_len * 2 + 1) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(cbb.get(), (const uint8_t *)label, strlen(label)) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(cbb.get(), (const uint8_t *)" ", 1) ||
+ !cbb_add_hex(cbb.get(), ssl->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(cbb.get(), (const uint8_t *)" ", 1) ||
+ !cbb_add_hex(cbb.get(), secret, secret_len) ||
+ !CBB_add_u8(cbb.get(), 0 /* NUL */) ||
+ !CBB_finish(cbb.get(), &out, &out_len)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ ssl->ctx->keylog_callback(ssl, (const char *)out);
+ OPENSSL_free(out);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+void ssl_do_info_callback(const SSL *ssl, int type, int value) {
+ void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int value) = NULL;
+ if (ssl->info_callback != NULL) {
+ cb = ssl->info_callback;
+ } else if (ssl->ctx->info_callback != NULL) {
+ cb = ssl->ctx->info_callback;
+ }
+
+ if (cb != NULL) {
+ cb(ssl, type, value);
+ }
+}
+
+void ssl_do_msg_callback(SSL *ssl, int is_write, int content_type,
+ Span<const uint8_t> in) {
+ if (ssl->msg_callback == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ // |version| is zero when calling for |SSL3_RT_HEADER| and |SSL2_VERSION| for
+ // a V2ClientHello.
+ int version;
+ switch (content_type) {
+ case 0:
+ // V2ClientHello
+ version = SSL2_VERSION;
+ break;
+ case SSL3_RT_HEADER:
+ version = 0;
+ break;
+ default:
+ version = SSL_version(ssl);
+ }
+
+ ssl->msg_callback(is_write, version, content_type, in.data(), in.size(), ssl,
+ ssl->msg_callback_arg);
+}
+
+void ssl_get_current_time(const SSL *ssl, struct OPENSSL_timeval *out_clock) {
+ // TODO(martinkr): Change callers to |ssl_ctx_get_current_time| and drop the
+ // |ssl| arg from |current_time_cb| if possible.
+ ssl_ctx_get_current_time(ssl->ctx, out_clock);
+}
+
+void ssl_ctx_get_current_time(const SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ struct OPENSSL_timeval *out_clock) {
+ if (ctx->current_time_cb != NULL) {
+ // TODO(davidben): Update current_time_cb to use OPENSSL_timeval. See
+ // https://crbug.com/boringssl/155.
+ struct timeval clock;
+ ctx->current_time_cb(nullptr /* ssl */, &clock);
+ if (clock.tv_sec < 0) {
+ assert(0);
+ out_clock->tv_sec = 0;
+ out_clock->tv_usec = 0;
+ } else {
+ out_clock->tv_sec = (uint64_t)clock.tv_sec;
+ out_clock->tv_usec = (uint32_t)clock.tv_usec;
+ }
+ return;
+ }
+
+#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_DETERMINISTIC_MODE)
+ out_clock->tv_sec = 1234;
+ out_clock->tv_usec = 1234;
+#elif defined(OPENSSL_WINDOWS)
+ struct _timeb time;
+ _ftime(&time);
+ if (time.time < 0) {
+ assert(0);
+ out_clock->tv_sec = 0;
+ out_clock->tv_usec = 0;
+ } else {
+ out_clock->tv_sec = time.time;
+ out_clock->tv_usec = time.millitm * 1000;
+ }
+#else
+ struct timeval clock;
+ gettimeofday(&clock, NULL);
+ if (clock.tv_sec < 0) {
+ assert(0);
+ out_clock->tv_sec = 0;
+ out_clock->tv_usec = 0;
+ } else {
+ out_clock->tv_sec = (uint64_t)clock.tv_sec;
+ out_clock->tv_usec = (uint32_t)clock.tv_usec;
+ }
+#endif
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_handoff_mode(SSL_CTX *ctx, bool on) {
+ ctx->handoff = on;
+}
+
+} // namespace bssl
+
+using namespace bssl;
+
+int SSL_library_init(void) {
+ CRYPTO_library_init();
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int OPENSSL_init_ssl(uint64_t opts, const OPENSSL_INIT_SETTINGS *settings) {
+ CRYPTO_library_init();
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static uint32_t ssl_session_hash(const SSL_SESSION *sess) {
+ const uint8_t *session_id = sess->session_id;
+
+ uint8_t tmp_storage[sizeof(uint32_t)];
+ if (sess->session_id_length < sizeof(tmp_storage)) {
+ OPENSSL_memset(tmp_storage, 0, sizeof(tmp_storage));
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(tmp_storage, sess->session_id, sess->session_id_length);
+ session_id = tmp_storage;
+ }
+
+ uint32_t hash =
+ ((uint32_t)session_id[0]) |
+ ((uint32_t)session_id[1] << 8) |
+ ((uint32_t)session_id[2] << 16) |
+ ((uint32_t)session_id[3] << 24);
+
+ return hash;
+}
+
+// NB: If this function (or indeed the hash function which uses a sort of
+// coarser function than this one) is changed, ensure
+// SSL_CTX_has_matching_session_id() is checked accordingly. It relies on being
+// able to construct an SSL_SESSION that will collide with any existing session
+// with a matching session ID.
+static int ssl_session_cmp(const SSL_SESSION *a, const SSL_SESSION *b) {
+ if (a->ssl_version != b->ssl_version) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (a->session_id_length != b->session_id_length) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ return OPENSSL_memcmp(a->session_id, b->session_id, a->session_id_length);
+}
+
+SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *method) {
+ SSL_CTX *ret = NULL;
+
+ if (method == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NULL_SSL_METHOD_PASSED);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ ret = (SSL_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_CTX));
+ if (ret == NULL) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ OPENSSL_memset(ret, 0, sizeof(SSL_CTX));
+
+ ret->method = method->method;
+ ret->x509_method = method->x509_method;
+
+ CRYPTO_MUTEX_init(&ret->lock);
+
+ ret->session_cache_mode = SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER;
+ ret->session_cache_size = SSL_SESSION_CACHE_MAX_SIZE_DEFAULT;
+
+ ret->session_timeout = SSL_DEFAULT_SESSION_TIMEOUT;
+ ret->session_psk_dhe_timeout = SSL_DEFAULT_SESSION_PSK_DHE_TIMEOUT;
+
+ ret->references = 1;
+
+ ret->max_cert_list = SSL_MAX_CERT_LIST_DEFAULT;
+ ret->verify_mode = SSL_VERIFY_NONE;
+ ret->cert = ssl_cert_new(method->x509_method);
+ if (ret->cert == NULL) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ret->sessions = lh_SSL_SESSION_new(ssl_session_hash, ssl_session_cmp);
+ if (ret->sessions == NULL) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!ret->x509_method->ssl_ctx_new(ret)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!SSL_CTX_set_strict_cipher_list(ret, SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST)) {
+ goto err2;
+ }
+
+ ret->client_CA = sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_null();
+ if (ret->client_CA == NULL) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&ret->ex_data);
+
+ ret->max_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
+
+ // Disable the auto-chaining feature by default. Once this has stuck without
+ // problems, the feature will be removed entirely.
+ ret->mode = SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN;
+
+ // Lock the SSL_CTX to the specified version, for compatibility with legacy
+ // uses of SSL_METHOD.
+ if (!SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(ret, method->version) ||
+ !SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(ret, method->version)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err2;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+
+err:
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+err2:
+ SSL_CTX_free(ret);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_up_ref(SSL_CTX *ctx) {
+ CRYPTO_refcount_inc(&ctx->references);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *ctx) {
+ if (ctx == NULL ||
+ !CRYPTO_refcount_dec_and_test_zero(&ctx->references)) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ // Free internal session cache. However: the remove_cb() may reference the
+ // ex_data of SSL_CTX, thus the ex_data store can only be removed after the
+ // sessions were flushed. As the ex_data handling routines might also touch
+ // the session cache, the most secure solution seems to be: empty (flush) the
+ // cache, then free ex_data, then finally free the cache. (See ticket
+ // [openssl.org #212].)
+ SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(ctx, 0);
+
+ CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class_ssl_ctx, ctx, &ctx->ex_data);
+
+ CRYPTO_MUTEX_cleanup(&ctx->lock);
+ lh_SSL_SESSION_free(ctx->sessions);
+ ssl_cipher_preference_list_free(ctx->cipher_list);
+ ssl_cert_free(ctx->cert);
+ sk_SSL_CUSTOM_EXTENSION_pop_free(ctx->client_custom_extensions,
+ SSL_CUSTOM_EXTENSION_free);
+ sk_SSL_CUSTOM_EXTENSION_pop_free(ctx->server_custom_extensions,
+ SSL_CUSTOM_EXTENSION_free);
+ sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_pop_free(ctx->client_CA, CRYPTO_BUFFER_free);
+ ctx->x509_method->ssl_ctx_free(ctx);
+ sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(ctx->srtp_profiles);
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx->psk_identity_hint);
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx->supported_group_list);
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx->alpn_client_proto_list);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(ctx->tlsext_channel_id_private);
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx->verify_sigalgs);
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current);
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_prev);
+
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+}
+
+SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx) {
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NULL_SSL_CTX);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (ctx->method == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SSL_CTX_HAS_NO_DEFAULT_SSL_VERSION);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ SSL *ssl = (SSL *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL));
+ if (ssl == NULL) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ OPENSSL_memset(ssl, 0, sizeof(SSL));
+
+ ssl->conf_min_version = ctx->conf_min_version;
+ ssl->conf_max_version = ctx->conf_max_version;
+ ssl->tls13_variant = ctx->tls13_variant;
+
+ // RFC 6347 states that implementations SHOULD use an initial timer value of
+ // 1 second.
+ ssl->initial_timeout_duration_ms = 1000;
+
+ ssl->options = ctx->options;
+ ssl->mode = ctx->mode;
+ ssl->max_cert_list = ctx->max_cert_list;
+
+ ssl->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert);
+ if (ssl->cert == NULL) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ssl->msg_callback = ctx->msg_callback;
+ ssl->msg_callback_arg = ctx->msg_callback_arg;
+ ssl->verify_mode = ctx->verify_mode;
+ ssl->verify_callback = ctx->default_verify_callback;
+ ssl->custom_verify_callback = ctx->custom_verify_callback;
+ ssl->retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs =
+ ctx->retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs;
+
+ ssl->quiet_shutdown = ctx->quiet_shutdown;
+ ssl->max_send_fragment = ctx->max_send_fragment;
+
+ SSL_CTX_up_ref(ctx);
+ ssl->ctx = ctx;
+ SSL_CTX_up_ref(ctx);
+ ssl->session_ctx = ctx;
+
+ if (!ssl->ctx->x509_method->ssl_new(ssl)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->supported_group_list) {
+ ssl->supported_group_list = (uint16_t *)BUF_memdup(
+ ctx->supported_group_list, ctx->supported_group_list_len * 2);
+ if (!ssl->supported_group_list) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ssl->supported_group_list_len = ctx->supported_group_list_len;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->alpn_client_proto_list) {
+ ssl->alpn_client_proto_list = (uint8_t *)BUF_memdup(
+ ctx->alpn_client_proto_list, ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
+ if (ssl->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ssl->alpn_client_proto_list_len = ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
+ }
+
+ ssl->method = ctx->method;
+
+ if (!ssl->method->ssl_new(ssl)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&ssl->ex_data);
+
+ ssl->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
+ if (ctx->psk_identity_hint) {
+ ssl->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(ctx->psk_identity_hint);
+ if (ssl->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ ssl->psk_client_callback = ctx->psk_client_callback;
+ ssl->psk_server_callback = ctx->psk_server_callback;
+
+ ssl->tlsext_channel_id_enabled = ctx->tlsext_channel_id_enabled;
+ if (ctx->tlsext_channel_id_private) {
+ EVP_PKEY_up_ref(ctx->tlsext_channel_id_private);
+ ssl->tlsext_channel_id_private = ctx->tlsext_channel_id_private;
+ }
+
+ ssl->signed_cert_timestamps_enabled = ctx->signed_cert_timestamps_enabled;
+ ssl->ocsp_stapling_enabled = ctx->ocsp_stapling_enabled;
+ ssl->handoff = ctx->handoff;
+
+ return ssl;
+
+err:
+ SSL_free(ssl);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void SSL_free(SSL *ssl) {
+ if (ssl == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl->ctx != NULL) {
+ ssl->ctx->x509_method->ssl_free(ssl);
+ }
+
+ CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class_ssl, ssl, &ssl->ex_data);
+
+ BIO_free_all(ssl->rbio);
+ BIO_free_all(ssl->wbio);
+
+ // add extra stuff
+ ssl_cipher_preference_list_free(ssl->cipher_list);
+
+ SSL_SESSION_free(ssl->session);
+
+ ssl_cert_free(ssl->cert);
+
+ OPENSSL_free(ssl->tlsext_hostname);
+ SSL_CTX_free(ssl->session_ctx);
+ OPENSSL_free(ssl->supported_group_list);
+ OPENSSL_free(ssl->alpn_client_proto_list);
+ OPENSSL_free(ssl->token_binding_params);
+ OPENSSL_free(ssl->quic_transport_params);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(ssl->tlsext_channel_id_private);
+ OPENSSL_free(ssl->psk_identity_hint);
+ sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_pop_free(ssl->client_CA, CRYPTO_BUFFER_free);
+ sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(ssl->srtp_profiles);
+
+ if (ssl->method != NULL) {
+ ssl->method->ssl_free(ssl);
+ }
+ SSL_CTX_free(ssl->ctx);
+
+ OPENSSL_free(ssl);
+}
+
+void SSL_set_connect_state(SSL *ssl) {
+ ssl->server = false;
+ ssl->do_handshake = ssl_client_handshake;
+}
+
+void SSL_set_accept_state(SSL *ssl) {
+ ssl->server = true;
+ ssl->do_handshake = ssl_server_handshake;
+}
+
+void SSL_set0_rbio(SSL *ssl, BIO *rbio) {
+ BIO_free_all(ssl->rbio);
+ ssl->rbio = rbio;
+}
+
+void SSL_set0_wbio(SSL *ssl, BIO *wbio) {
+ BIO_free_all(ssl->wbio);
+ ssl->wbio = wbio;
+}
+
+void SSL_set_bio(SSL *ssl, BIO *rbio, BIO *wbio) {
+ // For historical reasons, this function has many different cases in ownership
+ // handling.
+
+ // If nothing has changed, do nothing
+ if (rbio == SSL_get_rbio(ssl) && wbio == SSL_get_wbio(ssl)) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ // If the two arguments are equal, one fewer reference is granted than
+ // taken.
+ if (rbio != NULL && rbio == wbio) {
+ BIO_up_ref(rbio);
+ }
+
+ // If only the wbio is changed, adopt only one reference.
+ if (rbio == SSL_get_rbio(ssl)) {
+ SSL_set0_wbio(ssl, wbio);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ // There is an asymmetry here for historical reasons. If only the rbio is
+ // changed AND the rbio and wbio were originally different, then we only adopt
+ // one reference.
+ if (wbio == SSL_get_wbio(ssl) && SSL_get_rbio(ssl) != SSL_get_wbio(ssl)) {
+ SSL_set0_rbio(ssl, rbio);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ // Otherwise, adopt both references.
+ SSL_set0_rbio(ssl, rbio);
+ SSL_set0_wbio(ssl, wbio);
+}
+
+BIO *SSL_get_rbio(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->rbio; }
+
+BIO *SSL_get_wbio(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->wbio; }
+
+int SSL_do_handshake(SSL *ssl) {
+ ssl_reset_error_state(ssl);
+
+ if (ssl->do_handshake == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CONNECTION_TYPE_NOT_SET);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (!SSL_in_init(ssl)) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ // Run the handshake.
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs = ssl->s3->hs.get();
+
+ bool early_return = false;
+ int ret = ssl_run_handshake(hs, &early_return);
+ ssl_do_info_callback(
+ ssl, ssl->server ? SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT : SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT, ret);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ // Destroy the handshake object if the handshake has completely finished.
+ if (!early_return) {
+ ssl->s3->hs.reset();
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_connect(SSL *ssl) {
+ if (ssl->do_handshake == NULL) {
+ // Not properly initialized yet
+ SSL_set_connect_state(ssl);
+ }
+
+ return SSL_do_handshake(ssl);
+}
+
+int SSL_accept(SSL *ssl) {
+ if (ssl->do_handshake == NULL) {
+ // Not properly initialized yet
+ SSL_set_accept_state(ssl);
+ }
+
+ return SSL_do_handshake(ssl);
+}
+
+static int ssl_do_post_handshake(SSL *ssl, const SSLMessage &msg) {
+ if (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+ return tls13_post_handshake(ssl, msg);
+ }
+
+ // We do not accept renegotiations as a server or SSL 3.0. SSL 3.0 will be
+ // removed entirely in the future and requires retaining more data for
+ // renegotiation_info.
+ if (ssl->server || ssl->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
+ goto no_renegotiation;
+ }
+
+ if (msg.type != SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST || CBS_len(&msg.body) != 0) {
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ switch (ssl->renegotiate_mode) {
+ case ssl_renegotiate_ignore:
+ // Ignore the HelloRequest.
+ return 1;
+
+ case ssl_renegotiate_once:
+ if (ssl->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) {
+ goto no_renegotiation;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case ssl_renegotiate_never:
+ goto no_renegotiation;
+
+ case ssl_renegotiate_freely:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ // Renegotiation is only supported at quiescent points in the application
+ // protocol, namely in HTTPS, just before reading the HTTP response. Require
+ // the record-layer be idle and avoid complexities of sending a handshake
+ // record while an application_data record is being written.
+ if (!ssl->s3->write_buffer.empty() ||
+ ssl->s3->write_shutdown != ssl_shutdown_none) {
+ goto no_renegotiation;
+ }
+
+ // Begin a new handshake.
+ if (ssl->s3->hs != nullptr) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ssl->s3->hs = ssl_handshake_new(ssl);
+ if (ssl->s3->hs == nullptr) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ ssl->s3->total_renegotiations++;
+ return 1;
+
+no_renegotiation:
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int ssl_read_impl(SSL *ssl) {
+ ssl_reset_error_state(ssl);
+
+ if (ssl->do_handshake == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ // Replay post-handshake message errors.
+ if (!check_read_error(ssl)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ while (ssl->s3->pending_app_data.empty()) {
+ // Complete the current handshake, if any. False Start will cause
+ // |SSL_do_handshake| to return mid-handshake, so this may require multiple
+ // iterations.
+ while (!ssl_can_read(ssl)) {
+ int ret = SSL_do_handshake(ssl);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Process any buffered post-handshake messages.
+ SSLMessage msg;
+ if (ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
+ // If we received an interrupt in early read (EndOfEarlyData), loop again
+ // for the handshake to process it.
+ if (SSL_in_init(ssl)) {
+ ssl->s3->hs->can_early_read = false;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ // Handle the post-handshake message and try again.
+ if (!ssl_do_post_handshake(ssl, msg)) {
+ ssl_set_read_error(ssl);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
+ continue; // Loop again. We may have begun a new handshake.
+ }
+
+ uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ size_t consumed = 0;
+ auto ret = ssl_open_app_data(ssl, &ssl->s3->pending_app_data, &consumed,
+ &alert, ssl->s3->read_buffer.span());
+ bool retry;
+ int bio_ret = ssl_handle_open_record(ssl, &retry, ret, consumed, alert);
+ if (bio_ret <= 0) {
+ return bio_ret;
+ }
+ if (!retry) {
+ assert(!ssl->s3->pending_app_data.empty());
+ ssl->s3->key_update_count = 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_read(SSL *ssl, void *buf, int num) {
+ int ret = SSL_peek(ssl, buf, num);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ // TODO(davidben): In DTLS, should the rest of the record be discarded? DTLS
+ // is not a stream. See https://crbug.com/boringssl/65.
+ ssl->s3->pending_app_data =
+ ssl->s3->pending_app_data.subspan(static_cast<size_t>(ret));
+ if (ssl->s3->pending_app_data.empty()) {
+ ssl->s3->read_buffer.DiscardConsumed();
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int SSL_peek(SSL *ssl, void *buf, int num) {
+ int ret = ssl_read_impl(ssl);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ if (num <= 0) {
+ return num;
+ }
+ size_t todo =
+ std::min(ssl->s3->pending_app_data.size(), static_cast<size_t>(num));
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(buf, ssl->s3->pending_app_data.data(), todo);
+ return static_cast<int>(todo);
+}
+
+int SSL_write(SSL *ssl, const void *buf, int num) {
+ ssl_reset_error_state(ssl);
+
+ if (ssl->do_handshake == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl->s3->write_shutdown != ssl_shutdown_none) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ int ret = 0;
+ bool needs_handshake = false;
+ do {
+ // If necessary, complete the handshake implicitly.
+ if (!ssl_can_write(ssl)) {
+ ret = SSL_do_handshake(ssl);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ret = ssl->method->write_app_data(ssl, &needs_handshake,
+ (const uint8_t *)buf, num);
+ } while (needs_handshake);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int SSL_shutdown(SSL *ssl) {
+ ssl_reset_error_state(ssl);
+
+ if (ssl->do_handshake == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ // If we are in the middle of a handshake, silently succeed. Consumers often
+ // call this function before |SSL_free|, whether the handshake succeeded or
+ // not. We assume the caller has already handled failed handshakes.
+ if (SSL_in_init(ssl)) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl->quiet_shutdown) {
+ // Do nothing if configured not to send a close_notify.
+ ssl->s3->write_shutdown = ssl_shutdown_close_notify;
+ ssl->s3->read_shutdown = ssl_shutdown_close_notify;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ // This function completes in two stages. It sends a close_notify and then it
+ // waits for a close_notify to come in. Perform exactly one action and return
+ // whether or not it succeeds.
+
+ if (ssl->s3->write_shutdown != ssl_shutdown_close_notify) {
+ // Send a close_notify.
+ if (ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) <= 0) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ } else if (ssl->s3->alert_dispatch) {
+ // Finish sending the close_notify.
+ if (ssl->method->dispatch_alert(ssl) <= 0) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ } else if (ssl->s3->read_shutdown != ssl_shutdown_close_notify) {
+ if (SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) {
+ // Bidirectional shutdown doesn't make sense for an unordered
+ // transport. DTLS alerts also aren't delivered reliably, so we may even
+ // time out because the peer never received our close_notify. Report to
+ // the caller that the channel has fully shut down.
+ if (ssl->s3->read_shutdown == ssl_shutdown_error) {
+ ERR_restore_state(ssl->s3->read_error.get());
+ return -1;
+ }
+ ssl->s3->read_shutdown = ssl_shutdown_close_notify;
+ } else {
+ // Keep discarding data until we see a close_notify.
+ for (;;) {
+ ssl->s3->pending_app_data = Span<uint8_t>();
+ int ret = ssl_read_impl(ssl);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (ssl->s3->read_shutdown != ssl_shutdown_close_notify) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Return 0 for unidirectional shutdown and 1 for bidirectional shutdown.
+ return ssl->s3->read_shutdown == ssl_shutdown_close_notify;
+}
+
+int SSL_send_fatal_alert(SSL *ssl, uint8_t alert) {
+ if (ssl->s3->alert_dispatch) {
+ if (ssl->s3->send_alert[0] != SSL3_AL_FATAL ||
+ ssl->s3->send_alert[1] != alert) {
+ // We are already attempting to write a different alert.
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return ssl->method->dispatch_alert(ssl);
+ }
+
+ return ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
+}
+
+int SSL_set_quic_transport_params(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *params,
+ size_t params_len) {
+ ssl->quic_transport_params = (uint8_t *)BUF_memdup(params, params_len);
+ if (!ssl->quic_transport_params) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ssl->quic_transport_params_len = params_len;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+void SSL_get_peer_quic_transport_params(const SSL *ssl,
+ const uint8_t **out_params,
+ size_t *out_params_len) {
+ *out_params = ssl->s3->peer_quic_transport_params.data();
+ *out_params_len = ssl->s3->peer_quic_transport_params.size();
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_early_data_enabled(SSL_CTX *ctx, int enabled) {
+ ctx->cert->enable_early_data = !!enabled;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_tls13_variant(SSL_CTX *ctx, enum tls13_variant_t variant) {
+ ctx->tls13_variant = variant;
+}
+
+void SSL_set_tls13_variant(SSL *ssl, enum tls13_variant_t variant) {
+ ssl->tls13_variant = variant;
+}
+
+void SSL_set_early_data_enabled(SSL *ssl, int enabled) {
+ ssl->cert->enable_early_data = !!enabled;
+}
+
+int SSL_in_early_data(const SSL *ssl) {
+ if (ssl->s3->hs == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return ssl->s3->hs->in_early_data;
+}
+
+int SSL_early_data_accepted(const SSL *ssl) {
+ return ssl->s3->early_data_accepted;
+}
+
+void SSL_reset_early_data_reject(SSL *ssl) {
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs = ssl->s3->hs.get();
+ if (hs == NULL ||
+ hs->wait != ssl_hs_early_data_rejected) {
+ abort();
+ }
+
+ hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
+ hs->in_early_data = false;
+ hs->early_session.reset();
+
+ // Discard any unfinished writes from the perspective of |SSL_write|'s
+ // retry. The handshake will transparently flush out the pending record
+ // (discarded by the server) to keep the framing correct.
+ ssl->s3->wpend_pending = false;
+}
+
+static int bio_retry_reason_to_error(int reason) {
+ switch (reason) {
+ case BIO_RR_CONNECT:
+ return SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT;
+ case BIO_RR_ACCEPT:
+ return SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT;
+ default:
+ return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL;
+ }
+}
+
+int SSL_get_error(const SSL *ssl, int ret_code) {
+ if (ret_code > 0) {
+ return SSL_ERROR_NONE;
+ }
+
+ // Make things return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL when doing SSL_do_handshake etc,
+ // where we do encode the error
+ uint32_t err = ERR_peek_error();
+ if (err != 0) {
+ if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_SYS) {
+ return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL;
+ }
+ return SSL_ERROR_SSL;
+ }
+
+ if (ret_code == 0) {
+ if (ssl->s3->read_shutdown == ssl_shutdown_close_notify) {
+ return SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN;
+ }
+ // An EOF was observed which violates the protocol, and the underlying
+ // transport does not participate in the error queue. Bubble up to the
+ // caller.
+ return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL;
+ }
+
+ switch (ssl->s3->rwstate) {
+ case SSL_PENDING_SESSION:
+ return SSL_ERROR_PENDING_SESSION;
+
+ case SSL_CERTIFICATE_SELECTION_PENDING:
+ return SSL_ERROR_PENDING_CERTIFICATE;
+
+ case SSL_HANDOFF:
+ return SSL_ERROR_HANDOFF;
+
+ case SSL_READING: {
+ BIO *bio = SSL_get_rbio(ssl);
+ if (BIO_should_read(bio)) {
+ return SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ;
+ }
+
+ if (BIO_should_write(bio)) {
+ // TODO(davidben): OpenSSL historically checked for writes on the read
+ // BIO. Can this be removed?
+ return SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE;
+ }
+
+ if (BIO_should_io_special(bio)) {
+ return bio_retry_reason_to_error(BIO_get_retry_reason(bio));
+ }
+
+ break;
+ }
+
+ case SSL_WRITING: {
+ BIO *bio = SSL_get_wbio(ssl);
+ if (BIO_should_write(bio)) {
+ return SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE;
+ }
+
+ if (BIO_should_read(bio)) {
+ // TODO(davidben): OpenSSL historically checked for reads on the write
+ // BIO. Can this be removed?
+ return SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ;
+ }
+
+ if (BIO_should_io_special(bio)) {
+ return bio_retry_reason_to_error(BIO_get_retry_reason(bio));
+ }
+
+ break;
+ }
+
+ case SSL_X509_LOOKUP:
+ return SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP;
+
+ case SSL_CHANNEL_ID_LOOKUP:
+ return SSL_ERROR_WANT_CHANNEL_ID_LOOKUP;
+
+ case SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_OPERATION:
+ return SSL_ERROR_WANT_PRIVATE_KEY_OPERATION;
+
+ case SSL_PENDING_TICKET:
+ return SSL_ERROR_PENDING_TICKET;
+
+ case SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED:
+ return SSL_ERROR_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED;
+
+ case SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY:
+ return SSL_ERROR_WANT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
+ }
+
+ return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL;
+}
+
+uint32_t SSL_CTX_set_options(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint32_t options) {
+ ctx->options |= options;
+ return ctx->options;
+}
+
+uint32_t SSL_CTX_clear_options(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint32_t options) {
+ ctx->options &= ~options;
+ return ctx->options;
+}
+
+uint32_t SSL_CTX_get_options(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->options; }
+
+uint32_t SSL_set_options(SSL *ssl, uint32_t options) {
+ ssl->options |= options;
+ return ssl->options;
+}
+
+uint32_t SSL_clear_options(SSL *ssl, uint32_t options) {
+ ssl->options &= ~options;
+ return ssl->options;
+}
+
+uint32_t SSL_get_options(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->options; }
+
+uint32_t SSL_CTX_set_mode(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint32_t mode) {
+ ctx->mode |= mode;
+ return ctx->mode;
+}
+
+uint32_t SSL_CTX_clear_mode(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint32_t mode) {
+ ctx->mode &= ~mode;
+ return ctx->mode;
+}
+
+uint32_t SSL_CTX_get_mode(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->mode; }
+
+uint32_t SSL_set_mode(SSL *ssl, uint32_t mode) {
+ ssl->mode |= mode;
+ return ssl->mode;
+}
+
+uint32_t SSL_clear_mode(SSL *ssl, uint32_t mode) {
+ ssl->mode &= ~mode;
+ return ssl->mode;
+}
+
+uint32_t SSL_get_mode(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->mode; }
+
+void SSL_CTX_set0_buffer_pool(SSL_CTX *ctx, CRYPTO_BUFFER_POOL *pool) {
+ ctx->pool = pool;
+}
+
+int SSL_get_tls_unique(const SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len,
+ size_t max_out) {
+ *out_len = 0;
+ OPENSSL_memset(out, 0, max_out);
+
+ // tls-unique is not defined for SSL 3.0 or TLS 1.3.
+ if (!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete ||
+ ssl_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_VERSION ||
+ ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ // The tls-unique value is the first Finished message in the handshake, which
+ // is the client's in a full handshake and the server's for a resumption. See
+ // https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5929#section-3.1.
+ const uint8_t *finished = ssl->s3->previous_client_finished;
+ size_t finished_len = ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len;
+ if (ssl->session != NULL) {
+ // tls-unique is broken for resumed sessions unless EMS is used.
+ if (!ssl->session->extended_master_secret) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ finished = ssl->s3->previous_server_finished;
+ finished_len = ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len;
+ }
+
+ *out_len = finished_len;
+ if (finished_len > max_out) {
+ *out_len = max_out;
+ }
+
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(out, finished, *out_len);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int set_session_id_context(CERT *cert, const uint8_t *sid_ctx,
+ size_t sid_ctx_len) {
+ if (sid_ctx_len > sizeof(cert->sid_ctx)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ static_assert(sizeof(cert->sid_ctx) < 256, "sid_ctx too large");
+ cert->sid_ctx_length = (uint8_t)sid_ctx_len;
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(cert->sid_ctx, sid_ctx, sid_ctx_len);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(SSL_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *sid_ctx,
+ size_t sid_ctx_len) {
+ return set_session_id_context(ctx->cert, sid_ctx, sid_ctx_len);
+}
+
+int SSL_set_session_id_context(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *sid_ctx,
+ size_t sid_ctx_len) {
+ return set_session_id_context(ssl->cert, sid_ctx, sid_ctx_len);
+}
+
+const uint8_t *SSL_get0_session_id_context(const SSL *ssl, size_t *out_len) {
+ *out_len = ssl->cert->sid_ctx_length;
+ return ssl->cert->sid_ctx;
+}
+
+void SSL_certs_clear(SSL *ssl) { ssl_cert_clear_certs(ssl->cert); }
+
+int SSL_get_fd(const SSL *ssl) { return SSL_get_rfd(ssl); }
+
+int SSL_get_rfd(const SSL *ssl) {
+ int ret = -1;
+ BIO *b = BIO_find_type(SSL_get_rbio(ssl), BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR);
+ if (b != NULL) {
+ BIO_get_fd(b, &ret);
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int SSL_get_wfd(const SSL *ssl) {
+ int ret = -1;
+ BIO *b = BIO_find_type(SSL_get_wbio(ssl), BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR);
+ if (b != NULL) {
+ BIO_get_fd(b, &ret);
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int SSL_set_fd(SSL *ssl, int fd) {
+ BIO *bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_socket());
+ if (bio == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+ SSL_set_bio(ssl, bio, bio);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_set_wfd(SSL *ssl, int fd) {
+ BIO *rbio = SSL_get_rbio(ssl);
+ if (rbio == NULL || BIO_method_type(rbio) != BIO_TYPE_SOCKET ||
+ BIO_get_fd(rbio, NULL) != fd) {
+ BIO *bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_socket());
+ if (bio == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+ SSL_set0_wbio(ssl, bio);
+ } else {
+ // Copy the rbio over to the wbio.
+ BIO_up_ref(rbio);
+ SSL_set0_wbio(ssl, rbio);
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_set_rfd(SSL *ssl, int fd) {
+ BIO *wbio = SSL_get_wbio(ssl);
+ if (wbio == NULL || BIO_method_type(wbio) != BIO_TYPE_SOCKET ||
+ BIO_get_fd(wbio, NULL) != fd) {
+ BIO *bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_socket());
+ if (bio == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+ SSL_set0_rbio(ssl, bio);
+ } else {
+ // Copy the wbio over to the rbio.
+ BIO_up_ref(wbio);
+ SSL_set0_rbio(ssl, wbio);
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static size_t copy_finished(void *out, size_t out_len, const uint8_t *in,
+ size_t in_len) {
+ if (out_len > in_len) {
+ out_len = in_len;
+ }
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(out, in, out_len);
+ return in_len;
+}
+
+size_t SSL_get_finished(const SSL *ssl, void *buf, size_t count) {
+ if (!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete ||
+ ssl_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_VERSION ||
+ ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl->server) {
+ return copy_finished(buf, count, ssl->s3->previous_server_finished,
+ ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len);
+ }
+
+ return copy_finished(buf, count, ssl->s3->previous_client_finished,
+ ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len);
+}
+
+size_t SSL_get_peer_finished(const SSL *ssl, void *buf, size_t count) {
+ if (!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete ||
+ ssl_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_VERSION ||
+ ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl->server) {
+ return copy_finished(buf, count, ssl->s3->previous_client_finished,
+ ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len);
+ }
+
+ return copy_finished(buf, count, ssl->s3->previous_server_finished,
+ ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len);
+}
+
+int SSL_get_verify_mode(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->verify_mode; }
+
+int SSL_get_extms_support(const SSL *ssl) {
+ // TLS 1.3 does not require extended master secret and always reports as
+ // supporting it.
+ if (!ssl->s3->have_version) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ // If the initial handshake completed, query the established session.
+ if (ssl->s3->established_session != NULL) {
+ return ssl->s3->established_session->extended_master_secret;
+ }
+
+ // Otherwise, query the in-progress handshake.
+ if (ssl->s3->hs != NULL) {
+ return ssl->s3->hs->extended_master_secret;
+ }
+ assert(0);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_get_read_ahead(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; }
+
+int SSL_get_read_ahead(const SSL *ssl) { return 0; }
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(SSL_CTX *ctx, int yes) { }
+
+void SSL_set_read_ahead(SSL *ssl, int yes) { }
+
+int SSL_pending(const SSL *ssl) {
+ return static_cast<int>(ssl->s3->pending_app_data.size());
+}
+
+// Fix this so it checks all the valid key/cert options
+int SSL_CTX_check_private_key(const SSL_CTX *ctx) {
+ return ssl_cert_check_private_key(ctx->cert, ctx->cert->privatekey);
+}
+
+// Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter
+int SSL_check_private_key(const SSL *ssl) {
+ return ssl_cert_check_private_key(ssl->cert, ssl->cert->privatekey);
+}
+
+long SSL_get_default_timeout(const SSL *ssl) {
+ return SSL_DEFAULT_SESSION_TIMEOUT;
+}
+
+int SSL_renegotiate(SSL *ssl) {
+ // Caller-initiated renegotiation is not supported.
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int SSL_renegotiate_pending(SSL *ssl) {
+ return SSL_in_init(ssl) && ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete;
+}
+
+int SSL_total_renegotiations(const SSL *ssl) {
+ return ssl->s3->total_renegotiations;
+}
+
+size_t SSL_CTX_get_max_cert_list(const SSL_CTX *ctx) {
+ return ctx->max_cert_list;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_max_cert_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t max_cert_list) {
+ if (max_cert_list > kMaxHandshakeSize) {
+ max_cert_list = kMaxHandshakeSize;
+ }
+ ctx->max_cert_list = (uint32_t)max_cert_list;
+}
+
+size_t SSL_get_max_cert_list(const SSL *ssl) {
+ return ssl->max_cert_list;
+}
+
+void SSL_set_max_cert_list(SSL *ssl, size_t max_cert_list) {
+ if (max_cert_list > kMaxHandshakeSize) {
+ max_cert_list = kMaxHandshakeSize;
+ }
+ ssl->max_cert_list = (uint32_t)max_cert_list;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_max_send_fragment(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t max_send_fragment) {
+ if (max_send_fragment < 512) {
+ max_send_fragment = 512;
+ }
+ if (max_send_fragment > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) {
+ max_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
+ }
+ ctx->max_send_fragment = (uint16_t)max_send_fragment;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_set_max_send_fragment(SSL *ssl, size_t max_send_fragment) {
+ if (max_send_fragment < 512) {
+ max_send_fragment = 512;
+ }
+ if (max_send_fragment > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) {
+ max_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
+ }
+ ssl->max_send_fragment = (uint16_t)max_send_fragment;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_set_mtu(SSL *ssl, unsigned mtu) {
+ if (!SSL_is_dtls(ssl) || mtu < dtls1_min_mtu()) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ssl->d1->mtu = mtu;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support(const SSL *ssl) {
+ if (!ssl->s3->have_version) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION ||
+ ssl->s3->send_connection_binding;
+}
+
+size_t SSL_CTX_sess_number(const SSL_CTX *ctx) {
+ MutexReadLock lock(const_cast<CRYPTO_MUTEX *>(&ctx->lock));
+ return lh_SSL_SESSION_num_items(ctx->sessions);
+}
+
+unsigned long SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned long size) {
+ unsigned long ret = ctx->session_cache_size;
+ ctx->session_cache_size = size;
+ return ret;
+}
+
+unsigned long SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(const SSL_CTX *ctx) {
+ return ctx->session_cache_size;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode) {
+ int ret = ctx->session_cache_mode;
+ ctx->session_cache_mode = mode;
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_get_session_cache_mode(const SSL_CTX *ctx) {
+ return ctx->session_cache_mode;
+}
+
+
+int SSL_CTX_get_tlsext_ticket_keys(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *out, size_t len) {
+ if (out == NULL) {
+ return 48;
+ }
+ if (len != 48) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_TICKET_KEYS_LENGTH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ // The default ticket keys are initialized lazily. Trigger a key
+ // rotation to initialize them.
+ if (!ssl_ctx_rotate_ticket_encryption_key(ctx)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ uint8_t *out_bytes = reinterpret_cast<uint8_t *>(out);
+ MutexReadLock lock(&ctx->lock);
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(out_bytes, ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current->name, 16);
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(out_bytes + 16, ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current->hmac_key, 16);
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(out_bytes + 32, ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current->aes_key, 16);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_keys(SSL_CTX *ctx, const void *in, size_t len) {
+ if (in == NULL) {
+ return 48;
+ }
+ if (len != 48) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_TICKET_KEYS_LENGTH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current) {
+ ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current =
+ (tlsext_ticket_key *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(tlsext_ticket_key));
+ if (!ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ OPENSSL_memset(ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current, 0, sizeof(tlsext_ticket_key));
+ const uint8_t *in_bytes = reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>(in);
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current->name, in_bytes, 16);
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current->hmac_key, in_bytes + 16, 16);
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current->aes_key, in_bytes + 32, 16);
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_prev);
+ ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_prev = nullptr;
+ // Disable automatic key rotation.
+ ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current->next_rotation_tv_sec = 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb(
+ SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*callback)(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *key_name, uint8_t *iv,
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, HMAC_CTX *hmac_ctx,
+ int encrypt)) {
+ ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb = callback;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set1_curves(SSL_CTX *ctx, const int *curves, size_t curves_len) {
+ return tls1_set_curves(&ctx->supported_group_list,
+ &ctx->supported_group_list_len, curves,
+ curves_len);
+}
+
+int SSL_set1_curves(SSL *ssl, const int *curves, size_t curves_len) {
+ return tls1_set_curves(&ssl->supported_group_list,
+ &ssl->supported_group_list_len, curves,
+ curves_len);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set1_curves_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *curves) {
+ return tls1_set_curves_list(&ctx->supported_group_list,
+ &ctx->supported_group_list_len, curves);
+}
+
+int SSL_set1_curves_list(SSL *ssl, const char *curves) {
+ return tls1_set_curves_list(&ssl->supported_group_list,
+ &ssl->supported_group_list_len, curves);
+}
+
+uint16_t SSL_get_curve_id(const SSL *ssl) {
+ // TODO(davidben): This checks the wrong session if there is a renegotiation
+ // in progress.
+ SSL_SESSION *session = SSL_get_session(ssl);
+ if (session == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return session->group_id;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(SSL_CTX *ctx, const DH *dh) {
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_set_tmp_dh(SSL *ssl, const DH *dh) {
+ return 1;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_CTX_get_ciphers(const SSL_CTX *ctx) {
+ return ctx->cipher_list->ciphers;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_cipher_in_group(const SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t i) {
+ if (i >= sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ctx->cipher_list->ciphers)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return ctx->cipher_list->in_group_flags[i];
+}
+
+STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get_ciphers(const SSL *ssl) {
+ if (ssl == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ const struct ssl_cipher_preference_list_st *prefs =
+ ssl_get_cipher_preferences(ssl);
+ if (prefs == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return prefs->ciphers;
+}
+
+const char *SSL_get_cipher_list(const SSL *ssl, int n) {
+ if (ssl == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk = SSL_get_ciphers(ssl);
+ if (sk == NULL || n < 0 || (size_t)n >= sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk)) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, n);
+ if (c == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return c->name;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str) {
+ return ssl_create_cipher_list(&ctx->cipher_list, str, false /* not strict */);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_strict_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str) {
+ return ssl_create_cipher_list(&ctx->cipher_list, str, true /* strict */);
+}
+
+int SSL_set_cipher_list(SSL *ssl, const char *str) {
+ return ssl_create_cipher_list(&ssl->cipher_list, str, false /* not strict */);
+}
+
+int SSL_set_strict_cipher_list(SSL *ssl, const char *str) {
+ return ssl_create_cipher_list(&ssl->cipher_list, str, true /* strict */);
+}
+
+const char *SSL_get_servername(const SSL *ssl, const int type) {
+ if (type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ // Historically, |SSL_get_servername| was also the configuration getter
+ // corresponding to |SSL_set_tlsext_host_name|.
+ if (ssl->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
+ return ssl->tlsext_hostname;
+ }
+
+ return ssl->s3->hostname.get();
+}
+
+int SSL_get_servername_type(const SSL *ssl) {
+ if (SSL_get_servername(ssl, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name) == NULL) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_custom_verify(
+ SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode,
+ enum ssl_verify_result_t (*callback)(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert)) {
+ ctx->verify_mode = mode;
+ ctx->custom_verify_callback = callback;
+}
+
+void SSL_set_custom_verify(
+ SSL *ssl, int mode,
+ enum ssl_verify_result_t (*callback)(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert)) {
+ ssl->verify_mode = mode;
+ ssl->custom_verify_callback = callback;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_enable_signed_cert_timestamps(SSL_CTX *ctx) {
+ ctx->signed_cert_timestamps_enabled = true;
+}
+
+void SSL_enable_signed_cert_timestamps(SSL *ssl) {
+ ssl->signed_cert_timestamps_enabled = true;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_enable_ocsp_stapling(SSL_CTX *ctx) {
+ ctx->ocsp_stapling_enabled = true;
+}
+
+void SSL_enable_ocsp_stapling(SSL *ssl) {
+ ssl->ocsp_stapling_enabled = true;
+}
+
+void SSL_get0_signed_cert_timestamp_list(const SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out,
+ size_t *out_len) {
+ SSL_SESSION *session = SSL_get_session(ssl);
+ if (ssl->server || !session || !session->signed_cert_timestamp_list) {
+ *out_len = 0;
+ *out = NULL;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ *out = CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(session->signed_cert_timestamp_list);
+ *out_len = CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(session->signed_cert_timestamp_list);
+}
+
+void SSL_get0_ocsp_response(const SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out,
+ size_t *out_len) {
+ SSL_SESSION *session = SSL_get_session(ssl);
+ if (ssl->server || !session || !session->ocsp_response) {
+ *out_len = 0;
+ *out = NULL;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ *out = CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(session->ocsp_response);
+ *out_len = CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(session->ocsp_response);
+}
+
+int SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(SSL *ssl, const char *name) {
+ OPENSSL_free(ssl->tlsext_hostname);
+ ssl->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
+
+ if (name == NULL) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ size_t len = strlen(name);
+ if (len == 0 || len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_SERVERNAME);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ssl->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(name);
+ if (ssl->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(
+ SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*callback)(SSL *ssl, int *out_alert, void *arg)) {
+ ctx->tlsext_servername_callback = callback;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *arg) {
+ ctx->tlsext_servername_arg = arg;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_select_next_proto(uint8_t **out, uint8_t *out_len, const uint8_t *peer,
+ unsigned peer_len, const uint8_t *supported,
+ unsigned supported_len) {
+ const uint8_t *result;
+ int status;
+
+ // For each protocol in peer preference order, see if we support it.
+ for (unsigned i = 0; i < peer_len;) {
+ for (unsigned j = 0; j < supported_len;) {
+ if (peer[i] == supported[j] &&
+ OPENSSL_memcmp(&peer[i + 1], &supported[j + 1], peer[i]) == 0) {
+ // We found a match
+ result = &peer[i];
+ status = OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED;
+ goto found;
+ }
+ j += supported[j];
+ j++;
+ }
+ i += peer[i];
+ i++;
+ }
+
+ // There's no overlap between our protocols and the peer's list.
+ result = supported;
+ status = OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
+
+found:
+ *out = (uint8_t *)result + 1;
+ *out_len = result[0];
+ return status;
+}
+
+void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out_data,
+ unsigned *out_len) {
+ *out_data = ssl->s3->next_proto_negotiated.data();
+ *out_len = ssl->s3->next_proto_negotiated.size();
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(
+ SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out, unsigned *out_len, void *arg),
+ void *arg) {
+ ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb = cb;
+ ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg = arg;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(
+ SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, uint8_t **out, uint8_t *out_len,
+ const uint8_t *in, unsigned in_len, void *arg),
+ void *arg) {
+ ctx->next_proto_select_cb = cb;
+ ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg = arg;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos(SSL_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *protos,
+ unsigned protos_len) {
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx->alpn_client_proto_list);
+ ctx->alpn_client_proto_list = (uint8_t *)BUF_memdup(protos, protos_len);
+ if (!ctx->alpn_client_proto_list) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+ ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len = protos_len;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int SSL_set_alpn_protos(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *protos, unsigned protos_len) {
+ OPENSSL_free(ssl->alpn_client_proto_list);
+ ssl->alpn_client_proto_list = (uint8_t *)BUF_memdup(protos, protos_len);
+ if (!ssl->alpn_client_proto_list) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+ ssl->alpn_client_proto_list_len = protos_len;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out,
+ uint8_t *out_len, const uint8_t *in,
+ unsigned in_len, void *arg),
+ void *arg) {
+ ctx->alpn_select_cb = cb;
+ ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg = arg;
+}
+
+void SSL_get0_alpn_selected(const SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out_data,
+ unsigned *out_len) {
+ if (SSL_in_early_data(ssl) && !ssl->server) {
+ *out_data = ssl->s3->hs->early_session->early_alpn;
+ *out_len = ssl->s3->hs->early_session->early_alpn_len;
+ } else {
+ *out_data = ssl->s3->alpn_selected.data();
+ *out_len = ssl->s3->alpn_selected.size();
+ }
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_allow_unknown_alpn_protos(SSL_CTX *ctx, int enabled) {
+ ctx->allow_unknown_alpn_protos = !!enabled;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_tls_channel_id_enabled(SSL_CTX *ctx, int enabled) {
+ ctx->tlsext_channel_id_enabled = !!enabled;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_enable_tls_channel_id(SSL_CTX *ctx) {
+ SSL_CTX_set_tls_channel_id_enabled(ctx, 1);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+void SSL_set_tls_channel_id_enabled(SSL *ssl, int enabled) {
+ ssl->tlsext_channel_id_enabled = !!enabled;
+}
+
+int SSL_enable_tls_channel_id(SSL *ssl) {
+ SSL_set_tls_channel_id_enabled(ssl, 1);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int is_p256_key(EVP_PKEY *private_key) {
+ const EC_KEY *ec_key = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(private_key);
+ return ec_key != NULL &&
+ EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec_key)) ==
+ NID_X9_62_prime256v1;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set1_tls_channel_id(SSL_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *private_key) {
+ if (!is_p256_key(private_key)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CHANNEL_ID_NOT_P256);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ EVP_PKEY_free(ctx->tlsext_channel_id_private);
+ EVP_PKEY_up_ref(private_key);
+ ctx->tlsext_channel_id_private = private_key;
+ ctx->tlsext_channel_id_enabled = true;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_set1_tls_channel_id(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY *private_key) {
+ if (!is_p256_key(private_key)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CHANNEL_ID_NOT_P256);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ EVP_PKEY_free(ssl->tlsext_channel_id_private);
+ EVP_PKEY_up_ref(private_key);
+ ssl->tlsext_channel_id_private = private_key;
+ ssl->tlsext_channel_id_enabled = true;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+size_t SSL_get_tls_channel_id(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out) {
+ if (!ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(out, ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id,
+ (max_out < 64) ? max_out : 64);
+ return 64;
+}
+
+int SSL_set_token_binding_params(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *params, size_t len) {
+ if (len > 256) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ OPENSSL_free(ssl->token_binding_params);
+ ssl->token_binding_params = (uint8_t *)BUF_memdup(params, len);
+ if (!ssl->token_binding_params) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ssl->token_binding_params_len = len;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_is_token_binding_negotiated(const SSL *ssl) {
+ return ssl->token_binding_negotiated;
+}
+
+uint8_t SSL_get_negotiated_token_binding_param(const SSL *ssl) {
+ return ssl->negotiated_token_binding_param;
+}
+
+size_t SSL_get0_certificate_types(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out_types) {
+ if (ssl->server || ssl->s3->hs == NULL) {
+ *out_types = NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ *out_types = ssl->s3->hs->certificate_types.data();
+ return ssl->s3->hs->certificate_types.size();
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY *SSL_get_privatekey(const SSL *ssl) {
+ if (ssl->cert != NULL) {
+ return ssl->cert->privatekey;
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY *SSL_CTX_get0_privatekey(const SSL_CTX *ctx) {
+ if (ctx->cert != NULL) {
+ return ctx->cert->privatekey;
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_current_cipher(const SSL *ssl) {
+ return ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->cipher();
+}
+
+int SSL_session_reused(const SSL *ssl) {
+ return ssl->s3->session_reused || SSL_in_early_data(ssl);
+}
+
+const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *ssl) { return NULL; }
+
+const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *ssl) { return NULL; }
+
+int *SSL_get_server_tmp_key(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY **out_key) { return 0; }
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode) {
+ ctx->quiet_shutdown = (mode != 0);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL_CTX *ctx) {
+ return ctx->quiet_shutdown;
+}
+
+void SSL_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL *ssl, int mode) {
+ ssl->quiet_shutdown = (mode != 0);
+}
+
+int SSL_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->quiet_shutdown; }
+
+void SSL_set_shutdown(SSL *ssl, int mode) {
+ // It is an error to clear any bits that have already been set. (We can't try
+ // to get a second close_notify or send two.)
+ assert((SSL_get_shutdown(ssl) & mode) == SSL_get_shutdown(ssl));
+
+ if (mode & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN &&
+ ssl->s3->read_shutdown == ssl_shutdown_none) {
+ ssl->s3->read_shutdown = ssl_shutdown_close_notify;
+ }
+
+ if (mode & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN &&
+ ssl->s3->write_shutdown == ssl_shutdown_none) {
+ ssl->s3->write_shutdown = ssl_shutdown_close_notify;
+ }
+}
+
+int SSL_get_shutdown(const SSL *ssl) {
+ int ret = 0;
+ if (ssl->s3->read_shutdown != ssl_shutdown_none) {
+ // Historically, OpenSSL set |SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN| on both close_notify
+ // and fatal alert.
+ ret |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
+ }
+ if (ssl->s3->write_shutdown == ssl_shutdown_close_notify) {
+ // Historically, OpenSSL set |SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN| on only close_notify.
+ ret |= SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+SSL_CTX *SSL_get_SSL_CTX(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->ctx; }
+
+SSL_CTX *SSL_set_SSL_CTX(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX *ctx) {
+ if (ssl->ctx == ctx) {
+ return ssl->ctx;
+ }
+
+ // One cannot change the X.509 callbacks during a connection.
+ if (ssl->ctx->x509_method != ctx->x509_method) {
+ assert(0);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ ctx = ssl->session_ctx;
+ }
+
+ ssl_cert_free(ssl->cert);
+ ssl->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert);
+
+ SSL_CTX_up_ref(ctx);
+ SSL_CTX_free(ssl->ctx);
+ ssl->ctx = ctx;
+
+ return ssl->ctx;
+}
+
+void SSL_set_info_callback(SSL *ssl,
+ void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int value)) {
+ ssl->info_callback = cb;
+}
+
+void (*SSL_get_info_callback(const SSL *ssl))(const SSL *ssl, int type,
+ int value) {
+ return ssl->info_callback;
+}
+
+int SSL_state(const SSL *ssl) {
+ return SSL_in_init(ssl) ? SSL_ST_INIT : SSL_ST_OK;
+}
+
+void SSL_set_state(SSL *ssl, int state) { }
+
+char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *ssl, char *buf, int len) {
+ if (len <= 0) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ buf[0] = '\0';
+ return buf;
+}
+
+int SSL_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_unused *unused,
+ CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_unused, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) {
+ int index;
+ if (!CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(&g_ex_data_class_ssl, &index, argl, argp,
+ free_func)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return index;
+}
+
+int SSL_set_ex_data(SSL *ssl, int idx, void *data) {
+ return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ssl->ex_data, idx, data);
+}
+
+void *SSL_get_ex_data(const SSL *ssl, int idx) {
+ return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ssl->ex_data, idx);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_unused *unused,
+ CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_unused,
+ CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) {
+ int index;
+ if (!CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(&g_ex_data_class_ssl_ctx, &index, argl, argp,
+ free_func)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return index;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(SSL_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data) {
+ return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data);
+}
+
+void *SSL_CTX_get_ex_data(const SSL_CTX *ctx, int idx) {
+ return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx);
+}
+
+int SSL_want(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->s3->rwstate; }
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ RSA *(*cb)(SSL *ssl, int is_export,
+ int keylength)) {}
+
+void SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL *ssl, RSA *(*cb)(SSL *ssl, int is_export,
+ int keylength)) {}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ DH *(*cb)(SSL *ssl, int is_export,
+ int keylength)) {}
+
+void SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL *ssl, DH *(*cb)(SSL *ssl, int is_export,
+ int keylength)) {}
+
+static int use_psk_identity_hint(char **out, const char *identity_hint) {
+ if (identity_hint != NULL && strlen(identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ // Clear currently configured hint, if any.
+ OPENSSL_free(*out);
+ *out = NULL;
+
+ // Treat the empty hint as not supplying one. Plain PSK makes it possible to
+ // send either no hint (omit ServerKeyExchange) or an empty hint, while
+ // ECDHE_PSK can only spell empty hint. Having different capabilities is odd,
+ // so we interpret empty and missing as identical.
+ if (identity_hint != NULL && identity_hint[0] != '\0') {
+ *out = BUF_strdup(identity_hint);
+ if (*out == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *identity_hint) {
+ return use_psk_identity_hint(&ctx->psk_identity_hint, identity_hint);
+}
+
+int SSL_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL *ssl, const char *identity_hint) {
+ return use_psk_identity_hint(&ssl->psk_identity_hint, identity_hint);
+}
+
+const char *SSL_get_psk_identity_hint(const SSL *ssl) {
+ if (ssl == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return ssl->psk_identity_hint;
+}
+
+const char *SSL_get_psk_identity(const SSL *ssl) {
+ if (ssl == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ SSL_SESSION *session = SSL_get_session(ssl);
+ if (session == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return session->psk_identity;
+}
+
+void SSL_set_psk_client_callback(
+ SSL *ssl, unsigned (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity,
+ unsigned max_identity_len, uint8_t *psk,
+ unsigned max_psk_len)) {
+ ssl->psk_client_callback = cb;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback(
+ SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity,
+ unsigned max_identity_len, uint8_t *psk,
+ unsigned max_psk_len)) {
+ ctx->psk_client_callback = cb;
+}
+
+void SSL_set_psk_server_callback(
+ SSL *ssl, unsigned (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *identity, uint8_t *psk,
+ unsigned max_psk_len)) {
+ ssl->psk_server_callback = cb;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback(
+ SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *identity,
+ uint8_t *psk, unsigned max_psk_len)) {
+ ctx->psk_server_callback = cb;
+}
+
+int SSL_set_dummy_pq_padding_size(SSL *ssl, size_t num_bytes) {
+ if (num_bytes > 0xffff) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ ssl->dummy_pq_padding_len = num_bytes;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_dummy_pq_padding_used(SSL *ssl) {
+ if (ssl->server) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return ssl->did_dummy_pq_padding;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ void (*cb)(int write_p, int version,
+ int content_type, const void *buf,
+ size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)) {
+ ctx->msg_callback = cb;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback_arg(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *arg) {
+ ctx->msg_callback_arg = arg;
+}
+
+void SSL_set_msg_callback(SSL *ssl,
+ void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type,
+ const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl,
+ void *arg)) {
+ ssl->msg_callback = cb;
+}
+
+void SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(SSL *ssl, void *arg) {
+ ssl->msg_callback_arg = arg;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_keylog_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, const char *line)) {
+ ctx->keylog_callback = cb;
+}
+
+void (*SSL_CTX_get_keylog_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx))(const SSL *ssl,
+ const char *line) {
+ return ctx->keylog_callback;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_current_time_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,
+ struct timeval *out_clock)) {
+ ctx->current_time_cb = cb;
+}
+
+int SSL_is_init_finished(const SSL *ssl) {
+ return !SSL_in_init(ssl);
+}
+
+int SSL_in_init(const SSL *ssl) {
+ // This returns false once all the handshake state has been finalized, to
+ // allow callbacks and getters based on SSL_in_init to return the correct
+ // values.
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs = ssl->s3->hs.get();
+ return hs != nullptr && !hs->handshake_finalized;
+}
+
+int SSL_in_false_start(const SSL *ssl) {
+ if (ssl->s3->hs == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return ssl->s3->hs->in_false_start;
+}
+
+int SSL_cutthrough_complete(const SSL *ssl) {
+ return SSL_in_false_start(ssl);
+}
+
+void SSL_get_structure_sizes(size_t *ssl_size, size_t *ssl_ctx_size,
+ size_t *ssl_session_size) {
+ *ssl_size = sizeof(SSL);
+ *ssl_ctx_size = sizeof(SSL_CTX);
+ *ssl_session_size = sizeof(SSL_SESSION);
+}
+
+int SSL_is_server(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->server; }
+
+int SSL_is_dtls(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->method->is_dtls; }
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_select_certificate_cb(
+ SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ enum ssl_select_cert_result_t (*cb)(const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *)) {
+ ctx->select_certificate_cb = cb;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_dos_protection_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ int (*cb)(const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *)) {
+ ctx->dos_protection_cb = cb;
+}
+
+void SSL_set_renegotiate_mode(SSL *ssl, enum ssl_renegotiate_mode_t mode) {
+ ssl->renegotiate_mode = mode;
+}
+
+int SSL_get_ivs(const SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out_read_iv,
+ const uint8_t **out_write_iv, size_t *out_iv_len) {
+ size_t write_iv_len;
+ if (!ssl->s3->aead_read_ctx->GetIV(out_read_iv, out_iv_len) ||
+ !ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->GetIV(out_write_iv, &write_iv_len) ||
+ *out_iv_len != write_iv_len) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static uint64_t be_to_u64(const uint8_t in[8]) {
+ return (((uint64_t)in[0]) << 56) | (((uint64_t)in[1]) << 48) |
+ (((uint64_t)in[2]) << 40) | (((uint64_t)in[3]) << 32) |
+ (((uint64_t)in[4]) << 24) | (((uint64_t)in[5]) << 16) |
+ (((uint64_t)in[6]) << 8) | ((uint64_t)in[7]);
+}
+
+uint64_t SSL_get_read_sequence(const SSL *ssl) {
+ // TODO(davidben): Internally represent sequence numbers as uint64_t.
+ if (SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) {
+ // max_seq_num already includes the epoch.
+ assert(ssl->d1->r_epoch == (ssl->d1->bitmap.max_seq_num >> 48));
+ return ssl->d1->bitmap.max_seq_num;
+ }
+ return be_to_u64(ssl->s3->read_sequence);
+}
+
+uint64_t SSL_get_write_sequence(const SSL *ssl) {
+ uint64_t ret = be_to_u64(ssl->s3->write_sequence);
+ if (SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) {
+ assert((ret >> 48) == 0);
+ ret |= ((uint64_t)ssl->d1->w_epoch) << 48;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+uint16_t SSL_get_peer_signature_algorithm(const SSL *ssl) {
+ // TODO(davidben): This checks the wrong session if there is a renegotiation
+ // in progress.
+ SSL_SESSION *session = SSL_get_session(ssl);
+ if (session == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return session->peer_signature_algorithm;
+}
+
+size_t SSL_get_client_random(const SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out) {
+ if (max_out == 0) {
+ return sizeof(ssl->s3->client_random);
+ }
+ if (max_out > sizeof(ssl->s3->client_random)) {
+ max_out = sizeof(ssl->s3->client_random);
+ }
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(out, ssl->s3->client_random, max_out);
+ return max_out;
+}
+
+size_t SSL_get_server_random(const SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out) {
+ if (max_out == 0) {
+ return sizeof(ssl->s3->server_random);
+ }
+ if (max_out > sizeof(ssl->s3->server_random)) {
+ max_out = sizeof(ssl->s3->server_random);
+ }
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(out, ssl->s3->server_random, max_out);
+ return max_out;
+}
+
+const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_pending_cipher(const SSL *ssl) {
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs = ssl->s3->hs.get();
+ if (hs == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return hs->new_cipher;
+}
+
+void SSL_set_retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs(SSL *ssl, int enabled) {
+ ssl->retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs = !!enabled;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs(SSL_CTX *ctx, int enabled) {
+ ctx->retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs = !!enabled;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_grease_enabled(SSL_CTX *ctx, int enabled) {
+ ctx->grease_enabled = !!enabled;
+}
+
+int32_t SSL_get_ticket_age_skew(const SSL *ssl) {
+ return ssl->s3->ticket_age_skew;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_false_start_allowed_without_alpn(SSL_CTX *ctx, int allowed) {
+ ctx->false_start_allowed_without_alpn = !!allowed;
+}
+
+int SSL_is_draft_downgrade(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->s3->draft_downgrade; }
+
+int SSL_clear(SSL *ssl) {
+ // In OpenSSL, reusing a client |SSL| with |SSL_clear| causes the previously
+ // established session to be offered the next time around. wpa_supplicant
+ // depends on this behavior, so emulate it.
+ UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> session;
+ if (!ssl->server && ssl->s3->established_session != NULL) {
+ session.reset(ssl->s3->established_session.get());
+ SSL_SESSION_up_ref(session.get());
+ }
+
+ // The ssl->d1->mtu is simultaneously configuration (preserved across
+ // clear) and connection-specific state (gets reset).
+ //
+ // TODO(davidben): Avoid this.
+ unsigned mtu = 0;
+ if (ssl->d1 != NULL) {
+ mtu = ssl->d1->mtu;
+ }
+
+ ssl->method->ssl_free(ssl);
+ if (!ssl->method->ssl_new(ssl)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_is_dtls(ssl) && (SSL_get_options(ssl) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU)) {
+ ssl->d1->mtu = mtu;
+ }
+
+ if (session != nullptr) {
+ SSL_set_session(ssl, session.get());
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_sess_connect(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; }
+int SSL_CTX_sess_connect_good(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; }
+int SSL_CTX_sess_connect_renegotiate(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; }
+int SSL_CTX_sess_accept(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; }
+int SSL_CTX_sess_accept_renegotiate(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; }
+int SSL_CTX_sess_accept_good(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; }
+int SSL_CTX_sess_hits(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; }
+int SSL_CTX_sess_cb_hits(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; }
+int SSL_CTX_sess_misses(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; }
+int SSL_CTX_sess_timeouts(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; }
+int SSL_CTX_sess_cache_full(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; }
+
+int SSL_num_renegotiations(const SSL *ssl) {
+ return SSL_total_renegotiations(ssl);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_need_tmp_RSA(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; }
+int SSL_need_tmp_RSA(const SSL *ssl) { return 0; }
+int SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa(SSL_CTX *ctx, const RSA *rsa) { return 1; }
+int SSL_set_tmp_rsa(SSL *ssl, const RSA *rsa) { return 1; }
+void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void) {}
+void SSL_load_error_strings(void) {}
+int SSL_cache_hit(SSL *ssl) { return SSL_session_reused(ssl); }
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh(SSL_CTX *ctx, const EC_KEY *ec_key) {
+ if (ec_key == NULL || EC_KEY_get0_group(ec_key) == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ int nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec_key));
+ return SSL_CTX_set1_curves(ctx, &nid, 1);
+}
+
+int SSL_set_tmp_ecdh(SSL *ssl, const EC_KEY *ec_key) {
+ if (ec_key == NULL || EC_KEY_get0_group(ec_key) == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ int nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec_key));
+ return SSL_set1_curves(ssl, &nid, 1);
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_ticket_aead_method(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ const SSL_TICKET_AEAD_METHOD *aead_method) {
+ ctx->ticket_aead_method = aead_method;
+}
git://repos.xcallymotion.com / motion2.git / blobdiff