--- /dev/null
+/* Copyright (c) 2016, Google Inc.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
+ * SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
+ * OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
+
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <utility>
+
+#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/hkdf.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/stack.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+#include "../crypto/internal.h"
+#include "internal.h"
+
+
+namespace bssl {
+
+// kMaxKeyUpdates is the number of consecutive KeyUpdates that will be
+// processed. Without this limit an attacker could force unbounded processing
+// without being able to return application data.
+static const uint8_t kMaxKeyUpdates = 32;
+
+const uint8_t kHelloRetryRequest[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE] = {
+ 0xcf, 0x21, 0xad, 0x74, 0xe5, 0x9a, 0x61, 0x11, 0xbe, 0x1d, 0x8c,
+ 0x02, 0x1e, 0x65, 0xb8, 0x91, 0xc2, 0xa2, 0x11, 0x16, 0x7a, 0xbb,
+ 0x8c, 0x5e, 0x07, 0x9e, 0x09, 0xe2, 0xc8, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x9c,
+};
+
+// This value was selected by truncating the SHA-256 hash of "Draft TLS 1.3
+// Downgrade" to 8 bytes:
+//
+// echo -n 'Draft TLS 1.3 Downgrade' | sha256sum | head -c 16
+const uint8_t kDraftDowngradeRandom[8] = {0x95, 0xb9, 0x9f, 0x87,
+ 0x22, 0xfe, 0x9b, 0x64};
+
+
+bool tls13_get_cert_verify_signature_input(
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, Array<uint8_t> *out,
+ enum ssl_cert_verify_context_t cert_verify_context) {
+ ScopedCBB cbb;
+ if (!CBB_init(cbb.get(), 64 + 33 + 1 + 2 * EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
+ if (!CBB_add_u8(cbb.get(), 0x20)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+
+ Span<const char> context;
+ if (cert_verify_context == ssl_cert_verify_server) {
+ static const char kContext[] = "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify";
+ context = kContext;
+ } else if (cert_verify_context == ssl_cert_verify_client) {
+ static const char kContext[] = "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify";
+ context = kContext;
+ } else if (cert_verify_context == ssl_cert_verify_channel_id) {
+ static const char kContext[] = "TLS 1.3, Channel ID";
+ context = kContext;
+ } else {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ // Note |context| includes the NUL byte separator.
+ if (!CBB_add_bytes(cbb.get(),
+ reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>(context.data()),
+ context.size())) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ uint8_t context_hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ size_t context_hash_len;
+ if (!hs->transcript.GetHash(context_hash, &context_hash_len) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(cbb.get(), context_hash, context_hash_len) ||
+ !CBBFinishArray(cbb.get(), out)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+int tls13_process_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, const SSLMessage &msg,
+ int allow_anonymous) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+ CBS body = msg.body, context, certificate_list;
+ if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&body, &context) ||
+ CBS_len(&context) != 0 ||
+ !CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&body, &certificate_list) ||
+ CBS_len(&body) != 0) {
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ UniquePtr<STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER)> certs(sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_null());
+ if (!certs) {
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ const bool retain_sha256 =
+ ssl->server && ssl->retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs;
+ UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> pkey;
+ while (CBS_len(&certificate_list) > 0) {
+ CBS certificate, extensions;
+ if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&certificate_list, &certificate) ||
+ !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&certificate_list, &extensions) ||
+ CBS_len(&certificate) == 0) {
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(certs.get()) == 0) {
+ pkey = ssl_cert_parse_pubkey(&certificate);
+ if (!pkey) {
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ // TLS 1.3 always uses certificate keys for signing thus the correct
+ // keyUsage is enforced.
+ if (!ssl_cert_check_digital_signature_key_usage(&certificate)) {
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (retain_sha256) {
+ // Retain the hash of the leaf certificate if requested.
+ SHA256(CBS_data(&certificate), CBS_len(&certificate),
+ hs->new_session->peer_sha256);
+ }
+ }
+
+ UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> buf(
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_from_CBS(&certificate, ssl->ctx->pool));
+ if (!buf ||
+ !PushToStack(certs.get(), std::move(buf))) {
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ // Parse out the extensions.
+ bool have_status_request = false, have_sct = false;
+ CBS status_request, sct;
+ const SSL_EXTENSION_TYPE ext_types[] = {
+ {TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, &have_status_request, &status_request},
+ {TLSEXT_TYPE_certificate_timestamp, &have_sct, &sct},
+ };
+
+ uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ if (!ssl_parse_extensions(&extensions, &alert, ext_types,
+ OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(ext_types),
+ 0 /* reject unknown */)) {
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ // All Certificate extensions are parsed, but only the leaf extensions are
+ // stored.
+ if (have_status_request) {
+ if (ssl->server || !ssl->ocsp_stapling_enabled) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_EXTENSION);
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ uint8_t status_type;
+ CBS ocsp_response;
+ if (!CBS_get_u8(&status_request, &status_type) ||
+ status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp ||
+ !CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&status_request, &ocsp_response) ||
+ CBS_len(&ocsp_response) == 0 ||
+ CBS_len(&status_request) != 0) {
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(certs.get()) == 1) {
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(hs->new_session->ocsp_response);
+ hs->new_session->ocsp_response =
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_from_CBS(&ocsp_response, ssl->ctx->pool);
+ if (hs->new_session->ocsp_response == nullptr) {
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (have_sct) {
+ if (ssl->server || !ssl->signed_cert_timestamps_enabled) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_EXTENSION);
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_is_sct_list_valid(&sct)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ERROR_PARSING_EXTENSION);
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(certs.get()) == 1) {
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(hs->new_session->signed_cert_timestamp_list);
+ hs->new_session->signed_cert_timestamp_list =
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_from_CBS(&sct, ssl->ctx->pool);
+ if (hs->new_session->signed_cert_timestamp_list == nullptr) {
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Store a null certificate list rather than an empty one if the peer didn't
+ // send certificates.
+ if (sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(certs.get()) == 0) {
+ certs.reset();
+ }
+
+ hs->peer_pubkey = std::move(pkey);
+
+ sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_pop_free(hs->new_session->certs, CRYPTO_BUFFER_free);
+ hs->new_session->certs = certs.release();
+
+ if (!ssl->ctx->x509_method->session_cache_objects(hs->new_session.get())) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(hs->new_session->certs) == 0) {
+ if (!allow_anonymous) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ // OpenSSL returns X509_V_OK when no certificates are requested. This is
+ // classed by them as a bug, but it's assumed by at least NGINX.
+ hs->new_session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
+
+ // No certificate, so nothing more to do.
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ hs->new_session->peer_sha256_valid = retain_sha256;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int tls13_process_certificate_verify(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, const SSLMessage &msg) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+ if (hs->peer_pubkey == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ CBS body = msg.body, signature;
+ uint16_t signature_algorithm;
+ if (!CBS_get_u16(&body, &signature_algorithm) ||
+ !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &signature) ||
+ CBS_len(&body) != 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ if (!tls12_check_peer_sigalg(ssl, &alert, signature_algorithm)) {
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ hs->new_session->peer_signature_algorithm = signature_algorithm;
+
+ Array<uint8_t> input;
+ if (!tls13_get_cert_verify_signature_input(
+ hs, &input,
+ ssl->server ? ssl_cert_verify_client : ssl_cert_verify_server)) {
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ bool sig_ok = ssl_public_key_verify(ssl, signature, signature_algorithm,
+ hs->peer_pubkey.get(), input);
+#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
+ sig_ok = true;
+ ERR_clear_error();
+#endif
+ if (!sig_ok) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int tls13_process_finished(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, const SSLMessage &msg,
+ int use_saved_value) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+ uint8_t verify_data_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ const uint8_t *verify_data;
+ size_t verify_data_len;
+ if (use_saved_value) {
+ assert(ssl->server);
+ verify_data = hs->expected_client_finished;
+ verify_data_len = hs->hash_len;
+ } else {
+ if (!tls13_finished_mac(hs, verify_data_buf, &verify_data_len,
+ !ssl->server)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ verify_data = verify_data_buf;
+ }
+
+ int finished_ok = CBS_mem_equal(&msg.body, verify_data, verify_data_len);
+#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
+ finished_ok = 1;
+#endif
+ if (!finished_ok) {
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int tls13_add_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+ ScopedCBB cbb;
+ CBB body, certificate_list;
+ if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) ||
+ // The request context is always empty in the handshake.
+ !CBB_add_u8(&body, 0) ||
+ !CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(&body, &certificate_list)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_has_certificate(ssl)) {
+ return ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get());
+ }
+
+ CERT *cert = ssl->cert;
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER *leaf_buf = sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(cert->chain, 0);
+ CBB leaf, extensions;
+ if (!CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(&certificate_list, &leaf) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(&leaf, CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(leaf_buf),
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(leaf_buf)) ||
+ !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&certificate_list, &extensions)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (hs->scts_requested && ssl->cert->signed_cert_timestamp_list != NULL) {
+ CBB contents;
+ if (!CBB_add_u16(&extensions, TLSEXT_TYPE_certificate_timestamp) ||
+ !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &contents) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(
+ &contents,
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(ssl->cert->signed_cert_timestamp_list),
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(ssl->cert->signed_cert_timestamp_list)) ||
+ !CBB_flush(&extensions)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (hs->ocsp_stapling_requested &&
+ ssl->cert->ocsp_response != NULL) {
+ CBB contents, ocsp_response;
+ if (!CBB_add_u16(&extensions, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) ||
+ !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &contents) ||
+ !CBB_add_u8(&contents, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) ||
+ !CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(&contents, &ocsp_response) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(&ocsp_response,
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(ssl->cert->ocsp_response),
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(ssl->cert->ocsp_response)) ||
+ !CBB_flush(&extensions)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (size_t i = 1; i < sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(cert->chain); i++) {
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER *cert_buf = sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(cert->chain, i);
+ CBB child;
+ if (!CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(&certificate_list, &child) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(&child, CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(cert_buf),
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(cert_buf)) ||
+ !CBB_add_u16(&certificate_list, 0 /* no extensions */)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get());
+}
+
+enum ssl_private_key_result_t tls13_add_certificate_verify(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+ uint16_t signature_algorithm;
+ if (!tls1_choose_signature_algorithm(hs, &signature_algorithm)) {
+ return ssl_private_key_failure;
+ }
+
+ ScopedCBB cbb;
+ CBB body;
+ if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body,
+ SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) ||
+ !CBB_add_u16(&body, signature_algorithm)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return ssl_private_key_failure;
+ }
+
+ // Sign the digest.
+ CBB child;
+ const size_t max_sig_len = EVP_PKEY_size(hs->local_pubkey.get());
+ uint8_t *sig;
+ size_t sig_len;
+ if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &child) ||
+ !CBB_reserve(&child, &sig, max_sig_len)) {
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return ssl_private_key_failure;
+ }
+
+ Array<uint8_t> msg;
+ if (!tls13_get_cert_verify_signature_input(
+ hs, &msg,
+ ssl->server ? ssl_cert_verify_server : ssl_cert_verify_client)) {
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return ssl_private_key_failure;
+ }
+
+ enum ssl_private_key_result_t sign_result = ssl_private_key_sign(
+ hs, sig, &sig_len, max_sig_len, signature_algorithm, msg);
+ if (sign_result != ssl_private_key_success) {
+ return sign_result;
+ }
+
+ if (!CBB_did_write(&child, sig_len) ||
+ !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get())) {
+ return ssl_private_key_failure;
+ }
+
+ return ssl_private_key_success;
+}
+
+int tls13_add_finished(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+ size_t verify_data_len;
+ uint8_t verify_data[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+
+ if (!tls13_finished_mac(hs, verify_data, &verify_data_len, ssl->server)) {
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ ScopedCBB cbb;
+ CBB body;
+ if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body, SSL3_MT_FINISHED) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(&body, verify_data, verify_data_len) ||
+ !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get())) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int tls13_receive_key_update(SSL *ssl, const SSLMessage &msg) {
+ CBS body = msg.body;
+ uint8_t key_update_request;
+ if (!CBS_get_u8(&body, &key_update_request) ||
+ CBS_len(&body) != 0 ||
+ (key_update_request != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED &&
+ key_update_request != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!tls13_rotate_traffic_key(ssl, evp_aead_open)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ // Acknowledge the KeyUpdate
+ if (key_update_request == SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED &&
+ !ssl->s3->key_update_pending) {
+ ScopedCBB cbb;
+ CBB body_cbb;
+ if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body_cbb,
+ SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) ||
+ !CBB_add_u8(&body_cbb, SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED) ||
+ !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get()) ||
+ !tls13_rotate_traffic_key(ssl, evp_aead_seal)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ // Suppress KeyUpdate acknowledgments until this change is written to the
+ // wire. This prevents us from accumulating write obligations when read and
+ // write progress at different rates. See draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18, section
+ // 4.5.3.
+ ssl->s3->key_update_pending = true;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int tls13_post_handshake(SSL *ssl, const SSLMessage &msg) {
+ if (msg.type == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
+ ssl->s3->key_update_count++;
+ if (ssl->s3->key_update_count > kMaxKeyUpdates) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_KEY_UPDATES);
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return tls13_receive_key_update(ssl, msg);
+ }
+
+ ssl->s3->key_update_count = 0;
+
+ if (msg.type == SSL3_MT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET && !ssl->server) {
+ return tls13_process_new_session_ticket(ssl, msg);
+ }
+
+ ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+} // namespace bssl
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