--- /dev/null
+/* Copyright (c) 2014, Google Inc.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
+ * SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
+ * OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <vector>
+
+#include <gtest/gtest.h>
+
+#include <openssl/aead.h>
+#include <openssl/cipher.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+#include "../fipsmodule/cipher/internal.h"
+#include "../internal.h"
+#include "../test/file_test.h"
+#include "../test/test_util.h"
+
+
+struct KnownAEAD {
+ const char name[40];
+ const EVP_AEAD *(*func)(void);
+ const char *test_vectors;
+ // limited_implementation indicates that tests that assume a generic AEAD
+ // interface should not be performed. For example, the key-wrap AEADs only
+ // handle inputs that are a multiple of eight bytes in length and the
+ // SSLv3/TLS AEADs have the concept of “direction”.
+ bool limited_implementation;
+ // truncated_tags is true if the AEAD supports truncating tags to arbitrary
+ // lengths.
+ bool truncated_tags;
+ // ad_len, if non-zero, is the required length of the AD.
+ size_t ad_len;
+};
+
+static const struct KnownAEAD kAEADs[] = {
+ {"AES_128_GCM", EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm, "aes_128_gcm_tests.txt", false, true,
+ 0},
+ {"AES_128_GCM_NIST", EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm, "nist_cavp/aes_128_gcm.txt",
+ false, true, 0},
+ {"AES_256_GCM", EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm, "aes_256_gcm_tests.txt", false, true,
+ 0},
+ {"AES_256_GCM_NIST", EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm, "nist_cavp/aes_256_gcm.txt",
+ false, true, 0},
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_SMALL)
+ {"AES_128_GCM_SIV", EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm_siv, "aes_128_gcm_siv_tests.txt",
+ false, false, 0},
+ {"AES_256_GCM_SIV", EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm_siv, "aes_256_gcm_siv_tests.txt",
+ false, false, 0},
+#endif
+ {"ChaCha20Poly1305", EVP_aead_chacha20_poly1305,
+ "chacha20_poly1305_tests.txt", false, true, 0},
+ {"AES_128_CBC_SHA1_TLS", EVP_aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls,
+ "aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls_tests.txt", true, false, 11},
+ {"AES_128_CBC_SHA1_TLSImplicitIV",
+ EVP_aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv,
+ "aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv_tests.txt", true, false, 11},
+ {"AES_128_CBC_SHA256_TLS", EVP_aead_aes_128_cbc_sha256_tls,
+ "aes_128_cbc_sha256_tls_tests.txt", true, false, 11},
+ {"AES_256_CBC_SHA1_TLS", EVP_aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls,
+ "aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls_tests.txt", true, false, 11},
+ {"AES_256_CBC_SHA1_TLSImplicitIV",
+ EVP_aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv,
+ "aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv_tests.txt", true, false, 11},
+ {"AES_256_CBC_SHA256_TLS", EVP_aead_aes_256_cbc_sha256_tls,
+ "aes_256_cbc_sha256_tls_tests.txt", true, false, 11},
+ {"AES_256_CBC_SHA384_TLS", EVP_aead_aes_256_cbc_sha384_tls,
+ "aes_256_cbc_sha384_tls_tests.txt", true, false, 11},
+ {"DES_EDE3_CBC_SHA1_TLS", EVP_aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls,
+ "des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls_tests.txt", true, false, 11},
+ {"DES_EDE3_CBC_SHA1_TLSImplicitIV",
+ EVP_aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv,
+ "des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv_tests.txt", true, false, 11},
+ {"AES_128_CBC_SHA1_SSL3", EVP_aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_ssl3,
+ "aes_128_cbc_sha1_ssl3_tests.txt", true, false, 9},
+ {"AES_256_CBC_SHA1_SSL3", EVP_aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_ssl3,
+ "aes_256_cbc_sha1_ssl3_tests.txt", true, false, 9},
+ {"DES_EDE3_CBC_SHA1_SSL3", EVP_aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_ssl3,
+ "des_ede3_cbc_sha1_ssl3_tests.txt", true, false, 9},
+ {"AES_128_CTR_HMAC_SHA256", EVP_aead_aes_128_ctr_hmac_sha256,
+ "aes_128_ctr_hmac_sha256.txt", false, true, 0},
+ {"AES_256_CTR_HMAC_SHA256", EVP_aead_aes_256_ctr_hmac_sha256,
+ "aes_256_ctr_hmac_sha256.txt", false, true, 0},
+ {"AES_128_CCM_BLUETOOTH", EVP_aead_aes_128_ccm_bluetooth,
+ "aes_128_ccm_bluetooth_tests.txt", false, false, 0},
+ {"AES_128_CCM_BLUETOOTH_8", EVP_aead_aes_128_ccm_bluetooth_8,
+ "aes_128_ccm_bluetooth_8_tests.txt", false, false, 0},
+};
+
+class PerAEADTest : public testing::TestWithParam<KnownAEAD> {
+ public:
+ const EVP_AEAD *aead() { return GetParam().func(); }
+};
+
+INSTANTIATE_TEST_CASE_P(, PerAEADTest, testing::ValuesIn(kAEADs),
+ [](const testing::TestParamInfo<KnownAEAD> ¶ms)
+ -> std::string { return params.param.name; });
+
+// Tests an AEAD against a series of test vectors from a file, using the
+// FileTest format. As an example, here's a valid test case:
+//
+// KEY: 5a19f3173586b4c42f8412f4d5a786531b3231753e9e00998aec12fda8df10e4
+// NONCE: 978105dfce667bf4
+// IN: 6a4583908d
+// AD: b654574932
+// CT: 5294265a60
+// TAG: 1d45758621762e061368e68868e2f929
+TEST_P(PerAEADTest, TestVector) {
+ std::string test_vectors = "crypto/cipher_extra/test/";
+ test_vectors += GetParam().test_vectors;
+ FileTestGTest(test_vectors.c_str(), [&](FileTest *t) {
+ std::vector<uint8_t> key, nonce, in, ad, ct, tag;
+ ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&key, "KEY"));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&nonce, "NONCE"));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&in, "IN"));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&ad, "AD"));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&ct, "CT"));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&tag, "TAG"));
+ size_t tag_len = tag.size();
+ if (t->HasAttribute("TAG_LEN")) {
+ // Legacy AEADs are MAC-then-encrypt and may include padding in the TAG
+ // field. TAG_LEN contains the actual size of the digest in that case.
+ std::string tag_len_str;
+ ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetAttribute(&tag_len_str, "TAG_LEN"));
+ tag_len = strtoul(tag_len_str.c_str(), nullptr, 10);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(tag_len);
+ }
+
+ bssl::ScopedEVP_AEAD_CTX ctx;
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_init_with_direction(
+ ctx.get(), aead(), key.data(), key.size(), tag_len, evp_aead_seal));
+
+ std::vector<uint8_t> out(in.size() + EVP_AEAD_max_overhead(aead()));
+ if (!t->HasAttribute("NO_SEAL")) {
+ size_t out_len;
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal(ctx.get(), out.data(), &out_len, out.size(),
+ nonce.data(), nonce.size(), in.data(),
+ in.size(), ad.data(), ad.size()));
+ out.resize(out_len);
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(out.size(), ct.size() + tag.size());
+ EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(ct), Bytes(out.data(), ct.size()));
+ EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(tag), Bytes(out.data() + ct.size(), tag.size()));
+ } else {
+ out.resize(ct.size() + tag.size());
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(out.data(), ct.data(), ct.size());
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(out.data() + ct.size(), tag.data(), tag.size());
+ }
+
+ // The "stateful" AEADs for implementing pre-AEAD cipher suites need to be
+ // reset after each operation.
+ ctx.Reset();
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_init_with_direction(
+ ctx.get(), aead(), key.data(), key.size(), tag_len, evp_aead_open));
+
+ std::vector<uint8_t> out2(out.size());
+ size_t out2_len;
+ int ret = EVP_AEAD_CTX_open(ctx.get(), out2.data(), &out2_len, out2.size(),
+ nonce.data(), nonce.size(), out.data(),
+ out.size(), ad.data(), ad.size());
+ if (t->HasAttribute("FAILS")) {
+ ASSERT_FALSE(ret) << "Decrypted bad data.";
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ return;
+ }
+
+ ASSERT_TRUE(ret) << "Failed to decrypt.";
+ out2.resize(out2_len);
+ EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(in), Bytes(out2));
+
+ // The "stateful" AEADs for implementing pre-AEAD cipher suites need to be
+ // reset after each operation.
+ ctx.Reset();
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_init_with_direction(
+ ctx.get(), aead(), key.data(), key.size(), tag_len, evp_aead_open));
+
+ // Garbage at the end isn't ignored.
+ out.push_back(0);
+ out2.resize(out.size());
+ EXPECT_FALSE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_open(
+ ctx.get(), out2.data(), &out2_len, out2.size(), nonce.data(),
+ nonce.size(), out.data(), out.size(), ad.data(), ad.size()))
+ << "Decrypted bad data with trailing garbage.";
+ ERR_clear_error();
+
+ // The "stateful" AEADs for implementing pre-AEAD cipher suites need to be
+ // reset after each operation.
+ ctx.Reset();
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_init_with_direction(
+ ctx.get(), aead(), key.data(), key.size(), tag_len, evp_aead_open));
+
+ // Verify integrity is checked.
+ out[0] ^= 0x80;
+ out.resize(out.size() - 1);
+ out2.resize(out.size());
+ EXPECT_FALSE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_open(
+ ctx.get(), out2.data(), &out2_len, out2.size(), nonce.data(),
+ nonce.size(), out.data(), out.size(), ad.data(), ad.size()))
+ << "Decrypted bad data with corrupted byte.";
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ });
+}
+
+TEST_P(PerAEADTest, TestExtraInput) {
+ const KnownAEAD &aead_config = GetParam();
+ if (!aead()->seal_scatter_supports_extra_in) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ const std::string test_vectors =
+ "crypto/cipher_extra/test/" + std::string(aead_config.test_vectors);
+ FileTestGTest(test_vectors.c_str(), [&](FileTest *t) {
+ if (t->HasAttribute("NO_SEAL") ||
+ t->HasAttribute("FAILS")) {
+ t->SkipCurrent();
+ return;
+ }
+
+ std::vector<uint8_t> key, nonce, in, ad, ct, tag;
+ ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&key, "KEY"));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&nonce, "NONCE"));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&in, "IN"));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&ad, "AD"));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&ct, "CT"));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&tag, "TAG"));
+
+ bssl::ScopedEVP_AEAD_CTX ctx;
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_init(ctx.get(), aead(), key.data(), key.size(),
+ tag.size(), nullptr));
+ std::vector<uint8_t> out_tag(EVP_AEAD_max_overhead(aead()) + in.size());
+ std::vector<uint8_t> out(in.size());
+
+ for (size_t extra_in_size = 0; extra_in_size < in.size(); extra_in_size++) {
+ size_t tag_bytes_written;
+ SCOPED_TRACE(extra_in_size);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal_scatter(
+ ctx.get(), out.data(), out_tag.data(), &tag_bytes_written,
+ out_tag.size(), nonce.data(), nonce.size(), in.data(),
+ in.size() - extra_in_size, in.data() + in.size() - extra_in_size,
+ extra_in_size, ad.data(), ad.size()));
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(tag_bytes_written, extra_in_size + tag.size());
+
+ memcpy(out.data() + in.size() - extra_in_size, out_tag.data(),
+ extra_in_size);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(ct), Bytes(out.data(), in.size()));
+ EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(tag), Bytes(out_tag.data() + extra_in_size,
+ tag_bytes_written - extra_in_size));
+ }
+ });
+}
+
+TEST_P(PerAEADTest, TestVectorScatterGather) {
+ std::string test_vectors = "crypto/cipher_extra/test/";
+ const KnownAEAD &aead_config = GetParam();
+ test_vectors += aead_config.test_vectors;
+ FileTestGTest(test_vectors.c_str(), [&](FileTest *t) {
+ std::vector<uint8_t> key, nonce, in, ad, ct, tag;
+ ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&key, "KEY"));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&nonce, "NONCE"));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&in, "IN"));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&ad, "AD"));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&ct, "CT"));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&tag, "TAG"));
+ size_t tag_len = tag.size();
+ if (t->HasAttribute("TAG_LEN")) {
+ // Legacy AEADs are MAC-then-encrypt and may include padding in the TAG
+ // field. TAG_LEN contains the actual size of the digest in that case.
+ std::string tag_len_str;
+ ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetAttribute(&tag_len_str, "TAG_LEN"));
+ tag_len = strtoul(tag_len_str.c_str(), nullptr, 10);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(tag_len);
+ }
+
+ bssl::ScopedEVP_AEAD_CTX ctx;
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_init_with_direction(
+ ctx.get(), aead(), key.data(), key.size(), tag_len, evp_aead_seal));
+
+ std::vector<uint8_t> out(in.size());
+ std::vector<uint8_t> out_tag(EVP_AEAD_max_overhead(aead()));
+ if (!t->HasAttribute("NO_SEAL")) {
+ size_t out_tag_len;
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal_scatter(
+ ctx.get(), out.data(), out_tag.data(), &out_tag_len, out_tag.size(),
+ nonce.data(), nonce.size(), in.data(), in.size(), nullptr, 0,
+ ad.data(), ad.size()));
+ out_tag.resize(out_tag_len);
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(out.size(), ct.size());
+ ASSERT_EQ(out_tag.size(), tag.size());
+ EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(ct), Bytes(out.data(), ct.size()));
+ EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(tag), Bytes(out_tag.data(), tag.size()));
+ } else {
+ out.resize(ct.size());
+ out_tag.resize(tag.size());
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(out.data(), ct.data(), ct.size());
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(out_tag.data(), tag.data(), tag.size());
+ }
+
+ // The "stateful" AEADs for implementing pre-AEAD cipher suites need to be
+ // reset after each operation.
+ ctx.Reset();
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_init_with_direction(
+ ctx.get(), aead(), key.data(), key.size(), tag_len, evp_aead_open));
+
+ std::vector<uint8_t> out2(out.size());
+ int ret = EVP_AEAD_CTX_open_gather(
+ ctx.get(), out2.data(), nonce.data(), nonce.size(), out.data(),
+ out.size(), out_tag.data(), out_tag.size(), ad.data(), ad.size());
+
+ // Skip decryption for AEADs that don't implement open_gather().
+ if (!ret) {
+ int err = ERR_peek_error();
+ if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_CIPHER &&
+ ERR_GET_REASON(err) == CIPHER_R_CTRL_NOT_IMPLEMENTED) {
+ t->SkipCurrent();
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (t->HasAttribute("FAILS")) {
+ ASSERT_FALSE(ret) << "Decrypted bad data";
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ return;
+ }
+
+ ASSERT_TRUE(ret) << "Failed to decrypt: "
+ << ERR_reason_error_string(ERR_get_error());
+ EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(in), Bytes(out2));
+
+ // The "stateful" AEADs for implementing pre-AEAD cipher suites need to be
+ // reset after each operation.
+ ctx.Reset();
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_init_with_direction(
+ ctx.get(), aead(), key.data(), key.size(), tag_len, evp_aead_open));
+
+ // Garbage at the end isn't ignored.
+ out_tag.push_back(0);
+ out2.resize(out.size());
+ EXPECT_FALSE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_open_gather(
+ ctx.get(), out2.data(), nonce.data(), nonce.size(), out.data(),
+ out.size(), out_tag.data(), out_tag.size(), ad.data(), ad.size()))
+ << "Decrypted bad data with trailing garbage.";
+ ERR_clear_error();
+
+ // The "stateful" AEADs for implementing pre-AEAD cipher suites need to be
+ // reset after each operation.
+ ctx.Reset();
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_init_with_direction(
+ ctx.get(), aead(), key.data(), key.size(), tag_len, evp_aead_open));
+
+ // Verify integrity is checked.
+ out_tag[0] ^= 0x80;
+ out_tag.resize(out_tag.size() - 1);
+ out2.resize(out.size());
+ EXPECT_FALSE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_open_gather(
+ ctx.get(), out2.data(), nonce.data(), nonce.size(), out.data(),
+ out.size(), out_tag.data(), out_tag.size(), ad.data(), ad.size()))
+ << "Decrypted bad data with corrupted byte.";
+ ERR_clear_error();
+
+ ctx.Reset();
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_init_with_direction(
+ ctx.get(), aead(), key.data(), key.size(), tag_len, evp_aead_open));
+
+ // Check edge case for tag length.
+ EXPECT_FALSE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_open_gather(
+ ctx.get(), out2.data(), nonce.data(), nonce.size(), out.data(),
+ out.size(), out_tag.data(), 0, ad.data(), ad.size()))
+ << "Decrypted bad data with corrupted byte.";
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ });
+}
+
+TEST_P(PerAEADTest, CleanupAfterInitFailure) {
+ uint8_t key[EVP_AEAD_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
+ OPENSSL_memset(key, 0, sizeof(key));
+ const size_t key_len = EVP_AEAD_key_length(aead());
+ ASSERT_GE(sizeof(key), key_len);
+
+ EVP_AEAD_CTX ctx;
+ ASSERT_FALSE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_init(
+ &ctx, aead(), key, key_len,
+ 9999 /* a silly tag length to trigger an error */, NULL /* ENGINE */));
+ ERR_clear_error();
+
+ // Running a second, failed _init should not cause a memory leak.
+ ASSERT_FALSE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_init(
+ &ctx, aead(), key, key_len,
+ 9999 /* a silly tag length to trigger an error */, NULL /* ENGINE */));
+ ERR_clear_error();
+
+ // Calling _cleanup on an |EVP_AEAD_CTX| after a failed _init should be a
+ // no-op.
+ EVP_AEAD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+}
+
+TEST_P(PerAEADTest, TruncatedTags) {
+ if (!GetParam().truncated_tags) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ uint8_t key[EVP_AEAD_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
+ OPENSSL_memset(key, 0, sizeof(key));
+ const size_t key_len = EVP_AEAD_key_length(aead());
+ ASSERT_GE(sizeof(key), key_len);
+
+ uint8_t nonce[EVP_AEAD_MAX_NONCE_LENGTH];
+ OPENSSL_memset(nonce, 0, sizeof(nonce));
+ const size_t nonce_len = EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(aead());
+ ASSERT_GE(sizeof(nonce), nonce_len);
+
+ bssl::ScopedEVP_AEAD_CTX ctx;
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_init(ctx.get(), aead(), key, key_len,
+ 1 /* one byte tag */, NULL /* ENGINE */));
+
+ const uint8_t plaintext[1] = {'A'};
+
+ uint8_t ciphertext[128];
+ size_t ciphertext_len;
+ constexpr uint8_t kSentinel = 42;
+ OPENSSL_memset(ciphertext, kSentinel, sizeof(ciphertext));
+
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal(ctx.get(), ciphertext, &ciphertext_len,
+ sizeof(ciphertext), nonce, nonce_len, plaintext,
+ sizeof(plaintext), nullptr /* ad */, 0));
+
+ for (size_t i = ciphertext_len; i < sizeof(ciphertext); i++) {
+ // Sealing must not write past where it said it did.
+ EXPECT_EQ(kSentinel, ciphertext[i])
+ << "Sealing wrote off the end of the buffer.";
+ }
+
+ const size_t overhead_used = ciphertext_len - sizeof(plaintext);
+ const size_t expected_overhead =
+ 1 + EVP_AEAD_max_overhead(aead()) - EVP_AEAD_max_tag_len(aead());
+ EXPECT_EQ(overhead_used, expected_overhead)
+ << "AEAD is probably ignoring request to truncate tags.";
+
+ uint8_t plaintext2[sizeof(plaintext) + 16];
+ OPENSSL_memset(plaintext2, kSentinel, sizeof(plaintext2));
+
+ size_t plaintext2_len;
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_open(
+ ctx.get(), plaintext2, &plaintext2_len, sizeof(plaintext2), nonce,
+ nonce_len, ciphertext, ciphertext_len, nullptr /* ad */, 0))
+ << "Opening with truncated tag didn't work.";
+
+ for (size_t i = plaintext2_len; i < sizeof(plaintext2); i++) {
+ // Likewise, opening should also stay within bounds.
+ EXPECT_EQ(kSentinel, plaintext2[i])
+ << "Opening wrote off the end of the buffer.";
+ }
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(plaintext), Bytes(plaintext2, plaintext2_len));
+}
+
+TEST_P(PerAEADTest, AliasedBuffers) {
+ if (GetParam().limited_implementation) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ const size_t key_len = EVP_AEAD_key_length(aead());
+ const size_t nonce_len = EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(aead());
+ const size_t max_overhead = EVP_AEAD_max_overhead(aead());
+
+ std::vector<uint8_t> key(key_len, 'a');
+ bssl::ScopedEVP_AEAD_CTX ctx;
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_init(ctx.get(), aead(), key.data(), key_len,
+ EVP_AEAD_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH, nullptr));
+
+ static const uint8_t kPlaintext[260] =
+ "testing123456testing123456testing123456testing123456testing123456testing"
+ "123456testing123456testing123456testing123456testing123456testing123456t"
+ "esting123456testing123456testing123456testing123456testing123456testing1"
+ "23456testing123456testing123456testing12345";
+ const std::vector<size_t> offsets = {
+ 0, 1, 2, 8, 15, 16, 17, 31, 32, 33, 63,
+ 64, 65, 95, 96, 97, 127, 128, 129, 255, 256, 257,
+ };
+
+ std::vector<uint8_t> nonce(nonce_len, 'b');
+ std::vector<uint8_t> valid_encryption(sizeof(kPlaintext) + max_overhead);
+ size_t valid_encryption_len;
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal(
+ ctx.get(), valid_encryption.data(), &valid_encryption_len,
+ sizeof(kPlaintext) + max_overhead, nonce.data(), nonce_len, kPlaintext,
+ sizeof(kPlaintext), nullptr, 0))
+ << "EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal failed with disjoint buffers.";
+
+ // Test with out != in which we expect to fail.
+ std::vector<uint8_t> buffer(2 + valid_encryption_len);
+ uint8_t *in = buffer.data() + 1;
+ uint8_t *out1 = buffer.data();
+ uint8_t *out2 = buffer.data() + 2;
+
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(in, kPlaintext, sizeof(kPlaintext));
+ size_t out_len;
+ EXPECT_FALSE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal(
+ ctx.get(), out1 /* in - 1 */, &out_len, sizeof(kPlaintext) + max_overhead,
+ nonce.data(), nonce_len, in, sizeof(kPlaintext), nullptr, 0));
+ EXPECT_FALSE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal(
+ ctx.get(), out2 /* in + 1 */, &out_len, sizeof(kPlaintext) + max_overhead,
+ nonce.data(), nonce_len, in, sizeof(kPlaintext), nullptr, 0));
+ ERR_clear_error();
+
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(in, valid_encryption.data(), valid_encryption_len);
+ EXPECT_FALSE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_open(ctx.get(), out1 /* in - 1 */, &out_len,
+ valid_encryption_len, nonce.data(), nonce_len,
+ in, valid_encryption_len, nullptr, 0));
+ EXPECT_FALSE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_open(ctx.get(), out2 /* in + 1 */, &out_len,
+ valid_encryption_len, nonce.data(), nonce_len,
+ in, valid_encryption_len, nullptr, 0));
+ ERR_clear_error();
+
+ // Test with out == in, which we expect to work.
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(in, kPlaintext, sizeof(kPlaintext));
+
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal(ctx.get(), in, &out_len,
+ sizeof(kPlaintext) + max_overhead, nonce.data(),
+ nonce_len, in, sizeof(kPlaintext), nullptr, 0));
+ EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(valid_encryption.data(), valid_encryption_len),
+ Bytes(in, out_len));
+
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(in, valid_encryption.data(), valid_encryption_len);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_open(ctx.get(), in, &out_len, valid_encryption_len,
+ nonce.data(), nonce_len, in,
+ valid_encryption_len, nullptr, 0));
+ EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(kPlaintext), Bytes(in, out_len));
+}
+
+TEST_P(PerAEADTest, UnalignedInput) {
+ alignas(64) uint8_t key[EVP_AEAD_MAX_KEY_LENGTH + 1];
+ alignas(64) uint8_t nonce[EVP_AEAD_MAX_NONCE_LENGTH + 1];
+ alignas(64) uint8_t plaintext[32 + 1];
+ alignas(64) uint8_t ad[32 + 1];
+ OPENSSL_memset(key, 'K', sizeof(key));
+ OPENSSL_memset(nonce, 'N', sizeof(nonce));
+ OPENSSL_memset(plaintext, 'P', sizeof(plaintext));
+ OPENSSL_memset(ad, 'A', sizeof(ad));
+ const size_t key_len = EVP_AEAD_key_length(aead());
+ ASSERT_GE(sizeof(key) - 1, key_len);
+ const size_t nonce_len = EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(aead());
+ ASSERT_GE(sizeof(nonce) - 1, nonce_len);
+ const size_t ad_len =
+ GetParam().ad_len != 0 ? GetParam().ad_len : sizeof(ad) - 1;
+ ASSERT_GE(sizeof(ad) - 1, ad_len);
+
+ // Encrypt some input.
+ bssl::ScopedEVP_AEAD_CTX ctx;
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_init_with_direction(
+ ctx.get(), aead(), key + 1, key_len, EVP_AEAD_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH,
+ evp_aead_seal));
+ alignas(64) uint8_t ciphertext[sizeof(plaintext) + EVP_AEAD_MAX_OVERHEAD];
+ size_t ciphertext_len;
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal(ctx.get(), ciphertext + 1, &ciphertext_len,
+ sizeof(ciphertext) - 1, nonce + 1, nonce_len,
+ plaintext + 1, sizeof(plaintext) - 1, ad + 1,
+ ad_len));
+
+ // It must successfully decrypt.
+ alignas(64) uint8_t out[sizeof(ciphertext)];
+ ctx.Reset();
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_init_with_direction(
+ ctx.get(), aead(), key + 1, key_len, EVP_AEAD_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH,
+ evp_aead_open));
+ size_t out_len;
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_open(ctx.get(), out + 1, &out_len, sizeof(out) - 1,
+ nonce + 1, nonce_len, ciphertext + 1,
+ ciphertext_len, ad + 1, ad_len));
+ EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(plaintext + 1, sizeof(plaintext) - 1),
+ Bytes(out + 1, out_len));
+}
+
+TEST_P(PerAEADTest, Overflow) {
+ alignas(64) uint8_t key[EVP_AEAD_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
+ OPENSSL_memset(key, 'K', sizeof(key));
+
+ bssl::ScopedEVP_AEAD_CTX ctx;
+ const size_t max_tag_len = EVP_AEAD_max_tag_len(aead());
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_init_with_direction(ctx.get(), aead(), key,
+ EVP_AEAD_key_length(aead()),
+ max_tag_len, evp_aead_seal));
+
+ uint8_t plaintext[1] = {0};
+ uint8_t ciphertext[1024] = {0};
+ size_t ciphertext_len;
+ // The AEAD must not overflow when calculating the ciphertext length.
+ ASSERT_FALSE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal(
+ ctx.get(), ciphertext, &ciphertext_len, sizeof(ciphertext), nullptr, 0,
+ plaintext, std::numeric_limits<size_t>::max() - max_tag_len + 1, nullptr,
+ 0));
+ ERR_clear_error();
+
+ // (Can't test the scatter interface because it'll attempt to zero the output
+ // buffer on error and the primary output buffer is implicitly the same size
+ // as the input.)
+}
+
+// Test that EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm and EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm reject empty nonces.
+// AES-GCM is not defined for those.
+TEST(AEADTest, AESGCMEmptyNonce) {
+ static const uint8_t kZeros[32] = {0};
+
+ // Test AES-128-GCM.
+ uint8_t buf[16];
+ size_t len;
+ bssl::ScopedEVP_AEAD_CTX ctx;
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_init(ctx.get(), EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm(), kZeros, 16,
+ EVP_AEAD_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH, nullptr));
+
+ EXPECT_FALSE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal(ctx.get(), buf, &len, sizeof(buf),
+ nullptr /* nonce */, 0, nullptr /* in */, 0,
+ nullptr /* ad */, 0));
+ uint32_t err = ERR_get_error();
+ EXPECT_EQ(ERR_LIB_CIPHER, ERR_GET_LIB(err));
+ EXPECT_EQ(CIPHER_R_INVALID_NONCE_SIZE, ERR_GET_REASON(err));
+
+ EXPECT_FALSE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_open(ctx.get(), buf, &len, sizeof(buf),
+ nullptr /* nonce */, 0, kZeros /* in */,
+ sizeof(kZeros), nullptr /* ad */, 0));
+ err = ERR_get_error();
+ EXPECT_EQ(ERR_LIB_CIPHER, ERR_GET_LIB(err));
+ EXPECT_EQ(CIPHER_R_INVALID_NONCE_SIZE, ERR_GET_REASON(err));
+
+ // Test AES-256-GCM.
+ ctx.Reset();
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_init(ctx.get(), EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm(), kZeros, 32,
+ EVP_AEAD_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH, nullptr));
+
+ EXPECT_FALSE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal(ctx.get(), buf, &len, sizeof(buf),
+ nullptr /* nonce */, 0, nullptr /* in */, 0,
+ nullptr /* ad */, 0));
+ err = ERR_get_error();
+ EXPECT_EQ(ERR_LIB_CIPHER, ERR_GET_LIB(err));
+ EXPECT_EQ(CIPHER_R_INVALID_NONCE_SIZE, ERR_GET_REASON(err));
+
+ EXPECT_FALSE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_open(ctx.get(), buf, &len, sizeof(buf),
+ nullptr /* nonce */, 0, kZeros /* in */,
+ sizeof(kZeros), nullptr /* ad */, 0));
+ err = ERR_get_error();
+ EXPECT_EQ(ERR_LIB_CIPHER, ERR_GET_LIB(err));
+ EXPECT_EQ(CIPHER_R_INVALID_NONCE_SIZE, ERR_GET_REASON(err));
+}
+
+TEST(AEADTest, AESCCMLargeAD) {
+ static const std::vector<uint8_t> kKey(16, 'A');
+ static const std::vector<uint8_t> kNonce(13, 'N');
+ static const std::vector<uint8_t> kAD(65536, 'D');
+ static const std::vector<uint8_t> kPlaintext = {
+ 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
+ 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f};
+ static const std::vector<uint8_t> kCiphertext = {
+ 0xa2, 0x12, 0x3f, 0x0b, 0x07, 0xd5, 0x02, 0xff,
+ 0xa9, 0xcd, 0xa0, 0xf3, 0x69, 0x1c, 0x49, 0x0c};
+ static const std::vector<uint8_t> kTag = {0x4a, 0x31, 0x82, 0x96};
+
+ // Test AES-128-CCM-Bluetooth.
+ bssl::ScopedEVP_AEAD_CTX ctx;
+ ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_init(ctx.get(), EVP_aead_aes_128_ccm_bluetooth(),
+ kKey.data(), kKey.size(),
+ EVP_AEAD_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH, nullptr));
+
+ std::vector<uint8_t> out(kCiphertext.size() + kTag.size());
+ size_t out_len;
+ EXPECT_TRUE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal(ctx.get(), out.data(), &out_len, out.size(),
+ kNonce.data(), kNonce.size(), kPlaintext.data(),
+ kPlaintext.size(), kAD.data(), kAD.size()));
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(out_len, kCiphertext.size() + kTag.size());
+ EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(kCiphertext), Bytes(out.data(), kCiphertext.size()));
+ EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(kTag), Bytes(out.data() + kCiphertext.size(), kTag.size()));
+
+ EXPECT_TRUE(EVP_AEAD_CTX_open(ctx.get(), out.data(), &out_len, out.size(),
+ kNonce.data(), kNonce.size(), out.data(),
+ out.size(), kAD.data(), kAD.size()));
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(out_len, kPlaintext.size());
+ EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(kPlaintext), Bytes(out.data(), kPlaintext.size()));
+}
git://repos.xcallymotion.com / motion2.git / blobdiff