--- /dev/null
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
+
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/digest.h>
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/ex_data.h>
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/nid.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
+#include <openssl/thread.h>
+
+#include "../bn/internal.h"
+#include "../delocate.h"
+#include "../../internal.h"
+#include "internal.h"
+
+
+DEFINE_STATIC_EX_DATA_CLASS(g_rsa_ex_data_class);
+
+RSA *RSA_new(void) { return RSA_new_method(NULL); }
+
+RSA *RSA_new_method(const ENGINE *engine) {
+ RSA *rsa = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(RSA));
+ if (rsa == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ OPENSSL_memset(rsa, 0, sizeof(RSA));
+
+ if (engine) {
+ rsa->meth = ENGINE_get_RSA_method(engine);
+ }
+
+ if (rsa->meth == NULL) {
+ rsa->meth = (RSA_METHOD *) RSA_default_method();
+ }
+ METHOD_ref(rsa->meth);
+
+ rsa->references = 1;
+ rsa->flags = rsa->meth->flags;
+ CRYPTO_MUTEX_init(&rsa->lock);
+ CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&rsa->ex_data);
+
+ if (rsa->meth->init && !rsa->meth->init(rsa)) {
+ CRYPTO_free_ex_data(g_rsa_ex_data_class_bss_get(), rsa, &rsa->ex_data);
+ CRYPTO_MUTEX_cleanup(&rsa->lock);
+ METHOD_unref(rsa->meth);
+ OPENSSL_free(rsa);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return rsa;
+}
+
+void RSA_free(RSA *rsa) {
+ unsigned u;
+
+ if (rsa == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (!CRYPTO_refcount_dec_and_test_zero(&rsa->references)) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (rsa->meth->finish) {
+ rsa->meth->finish(rsa);
+ }
+ METHOD_unref(rsa->meth);
+
+ CRYPTO_free_ex_data(g_rsa_ex_data_class_bss_get(), rsa, &rsa->ex_data);
+
+ BN_free(rsa->n);
+ BN_free(rsa->e);
+ BN_free(rsa->d);
+ BN_free(rsa->p);
+ BN_free(rsa->q);
+ BN_free(rsa->dmp1);
+ BN_free(rsa->dmq1);
+ BN_free(rsa->iqmp);
+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->mont_n);
+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->mont_p);
+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->mont_q);
+ BN_free(rsa->d_fixed);
+ BN_free(rsa->dmp1_fixed);
+ BN_free(rsa->dmq1_fixed);
+ BN_free(rsa->inv_small_mod_large_mont);
+ for (u = 0; u < rsa->num_blindings; u++) {
+ BN_BLINDING_free(rsa->blindings[u]);
+ }
+ OPENSSL_free(rsa->blindings);
+ OPENSSL_free(rsa->blindings_inuse);
+ CRYPTO_MUTEX_cleanup(&rsa->lock);
+ OPENSSL_free(rsa);
+}
+
+int RSA_up_ref(RSA *rsa) {
+ CRYPTO_refcount_inc(&rsa->references);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+unsigned RSA_bits(const RSA *rsa) { return BN_num_bits(rsa->n); }
+
+void RSA_get0_key(const RSA *rsa, const BIGNUM **out_n, const BIGNUM **out_e,
+ const BIGNUM **out_d) {
+ if (out_n != NULL) {
+ *out_n = rsa->n;
+ }
+ if (out_e != NULL) {
+ *out_e = rsa->e;
+ }
+ if (out_d != NULL) {
+ *out_d = rsa->d;
+ }
+}
+
+void RSA_get0_factors(const RSA *rsa, const BIGNUM **out_p,
+ const BIGNUM **out_q) {
+ if (out_p != NULL) {
+ *out_p = rsa->p;
+ }
+ if (out_q != NULL) {
+ *out_q = rsa->q;
+ }
+}
+
+void RSA_get0_crt_params(const RSA *rsa, const BIGNUM **out_dmp1,
+ const BIGNUM **out_dmq1, const BIGNUM **out_iqmp) {
+ if (out_dmp1 != NULL) {
+ *out_dmp1 = rsa->dmp1;
+ }
+ if (out_dmq1 != NULL) {
+ *out_dmq1 = rsa->dmq1;
+ }
+ if (out_iqmp != NULL) {
+ *out_iqmp = rsa->iqmp;
+ }
+}
+
+int RSA_set0_key(RSA *rsa, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *d) {
+ if ((rsa->n == NULL && n == NULL) ||
+ (rsa->e == NULL && e == NULL)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (n != NULL) {
+ BN_free(rsa->n);
+ rsa->n = n;
+ }
+ if (e != NULL) {
+ BN_free(rsa->e);
+ rsa->e = e;
+ }
+ if (d != NULL) {
+ BN_free(rsa->d);
+ rsa->d = d;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int RSA_set0_factors(RSA *rsa, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q) {
+ if ((rsa->p == NULL && p == NULL) ||
+ (rsa->q == NULL && q == NULL)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (p != NULL) {
+ BN_free(rsa->p);
+ rsa->p = p;
+ }
+ if (q != NULL) {
+ BN_free(rsa->q);
+ rsa->q = q;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int RSA_set0_crt_params(RSA *rsa, BIGNUM *dmp1, BIGNUM *dmq1, BIGNUM *iqmp) {
+ if ((rsa->dmp1 == NULL && dmp1 == NULL) ||
+ (rsa->dmq1 == NULL && dmq1 == NULL) ||
+ (rsa->iqmp == NULL && iqmp == NULL)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (dmp1 != NULL) {
+ BN_free(rsa->dmp1);
+ rsa->dmp1 = dmp1;
+ }
+ if (dmq1 != NULL) {
+ BN_free(rsa->dmq1);
+ rsa->dmq1 = dmq1;
+ }
+ if (iqmp != NULL) {
+ BN_free(rsa->iqmp);
+ rsa->iqmp = iqmp;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int RSA_public_encrypt(size_t flen, const uint8_t *from, uint8_t *to, RSA *rsa,
+ int padding) {
+ size_t out_len;
+
+ if (!RSA_encrypt(rsa, &out_len, to, RSA_size(rsa), from, flen, padding)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (out_len > INT_MAX) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return out_len;
+}
+
+int RSA_sign_raw(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out,
+ const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, int padding) {
+ if (rsa->meth->sign_raw) {
+ return rsa->meth->sign_raw(rsa, out_len, out, max_out, in, in_len, padding);
+ }
+
+ return rsa_default_sign_raw(rsa, out_len, out, max_out, in, in_len, padding);
+}
+
+int RSA_private_encrypt(size_t flen, const uint8_t *from, uint8_t *to, RSA *rsa,
+ int padding) {
+ size_t out_len;
+
+ if (!RSA_sign_raw(rsa, &out_len, to, RSA_size(rsa), from, flen, padding)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (out_len > INT_MAX) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return out_len;
+}
+
+int RSA_decrypt(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out,
+ const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, int padding) {
+ if (rsa->meth->decrypt) {
+ return rsa->meth->decrypt(rsa, out_len, out, max_out, in, in_len, padding);
+ }
+
+ return rsa_default_decrypt(rsa, out_len, out, max_out, in, in_len, padding);
+}
+
+int RSA_private_decrypt(size_t flen, const uint8_t *from, uint8_t *to, RSA *rsa,
+ int padding) {
+ size_t out_len;
+
+ if (!RSA_decrypt(rsa, &out_len, to, RSA_size(rsa), from, flen, padding)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (out_len > INT_MAX) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return out_len;
+}
+
+int RSA_public_decrypt(size_t flen, const uint8_t *from, uint8_t *to, RSA *rsa,
+ int padding) {
+ size_t out_len;
+
+ if (!RSA_verify_raw(rsa, &out_len, to, RSA_size(rsa), from, flen, padding)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (out_len > INT_MAX) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return out_len;
+}
+
+unsigned RSA_size(const RSA *rsa) {
+ if (rsa->meth->size) {
+ return rsa->meth->size(rsa);
+ }
+
+ return rsa_default_size(rsa);
+}
+
+int RSA_is_opaque(const RSA *rsa) {
+ return rsa->meth && (rsa->meth->flags & RSA_FLAG_OPAQUE);
+}
+
+int RSA_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_unused *unused,
+ CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_unused, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) {
+ int index;
+ if (!CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(g_rsa_ex_data_class_bss_get(), &index, argl,
+ argp, free_func)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return index;
+}
+
+int RSA_set_ex_data(RSA *rsa, int idx, void *arg) {
+ return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&rsa->ex_data, idx, arg);
+}
+
+void *RSA_get_ex_data(const RSA *rsa, int idx) {
+ return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&rsa->ex_data, idx);
+}
+
+// SSL_SIG_LENGTH is the size of an SSL/TLS (prior to TLS 1.2) signature: it's
+// the length of an MD5 and SHA1 hash.
+static const unsigned SSL_SIG_LENGTH = 36;
+
+// pkcs1_sig_prefix contains the ASN.1, DER encoded prefix for a hash that is
+// to be signed with PKCS#1.
+struct pkcs1_sig_prefix {
+ // nid identifies the hash function.
+ int nid;
+ // hash_len is the expected length of the hash function.
+ uint8_t hash_len;
+ // len is the number of bytes of |bytes| which are valid.
+ uint8_t len;
+ // bytes contains the DER bytes.
+ uint8_t bytes[19];
+};
+
+// kPKCS1SigPrefixes contains the ASN.1 prefixes for PKCS#1 signatures with
+// different hash functions.
+static const struct pkcs1_sig_prefix kPKCS1SigPrefixes[] = {
+ {
+ NID_md5,
+ MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+ 18,
+ {0x30, 0x20, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d,
+ 0x02, 0x05, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x10},
+ },
+ {
+ NID_sha1,
+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+ 15,
+ {0x30, 0x21, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x05, 0x2b, 0x0e, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1a, 0x05,
+ 0x00, 0x04, 0x14},
+ },
+ {
+ NID_sha224,
+ SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+ 19,
+ {0x30, 0x2d, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03,
+ 0x04, 0x02, 0x04, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x1c},
+ },
+ {
+ NID_sha256,
+ SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+ 19,
+ {0x30, 0x31, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03,
+ 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x20},
+ },
+ {
+ NID_sha384,
+ SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+ 19,
+ {0x30, 0x41, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03,
+ 0x04, 0x02, 0x02, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x30},
+ },
+ {
+ NID_sha512,
+ SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+ 19,
+ {0x30, 0x51, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03,
+ 0x04, 0x02, 0x03, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x40},
+ },
+ {
+ NID_undef, 0, 0, {0},
+ },
+};
+
+int RSA_add_pkcs1_prefix(uint8_t **out_msg, size_t *out_msg_len,
+ int *is_alloced, int hash_nid, const uint8_t *msg,
+ size_t msg_len) {
+ unsigned i;
+
+ if (hash_nid == NID_md5_sha1) {
+ // Special case: SSL signature, just check the length.
+ if (msg_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ *out_msg = (uint8_t*) msg;
+ *out_msg_len = SSL_SIG_LENGTH;
+ *is_alloced = 0;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; kPKCS1SigPrefixes[i].nid != NID_undef; i++) {
+ const struct pkcs1_sig_prefix *sig_prefix = &kPKCS1SigPrefixes[i];
+ if (sig_prefix->nid != hash_nid) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (msg_len != sig_prefix->hash_len) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ const uint8_t* prefix = sig_prefix->bytes;
+ unsigned prefix_len = sig_prefix->len;
+ unsigned signed_msg_len;
+ uint8_t *signed_msg;
+
+ signed_msg_len = prefix_len + msg_len;
+ if (signed_msg_len < prefix_len) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_TOO_LONG);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ signed_msg = OPENSSL_malloc(signed_msg_len);
+ if (!signed_msg) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(signed_msg, prefix, prefix_len);
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(signed_msg + prefix_len, msg, msg_len);
+
+ *out_msg = signed_msg;
+ *out_msg_len = signed_msg_len;
+ *is_alloced = 1;
+
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int RSA_sign(int hash_nid, const uint8_t *in, unsigned in_len, uint8_t *out,
+ unsigned *out_len, RSA *rsa) {
+ const unsigned rsa_size = RSA_size(rsa);
+ int ret = 0;
+ uint8_t *signed_msg = NULL;
+ size_t signed_msg_len = 0;
+ int signed_msg_is_alloced = 0;
+ size_t size_t_out_len;
+
+ if (rsa->meth->sign) {
+ return rsa->meth->sign(hash_nid, in, in_len, out, out_len, rsa);
+ }
+
+ if (!RSA_add_pkcs1_prefix(&signed_msg, &signed_msg_len,
+ &signed_msg_is_alloced, hash_nid, in, in_len) ||
+ !RSA_sign_raw(rsa, &size_t_out_len, out, rsa_size, signed_msg,
+ signed_msg_len, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ *out_len = size_t_out_len;
+ ret = 1;
+
+err:
+ if (signed_msg_is_alloced) {
+ OPENSSL_free(signed_msg);
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int RSA_sign_pss_mgf1(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out,
+ const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, const EVP_MD *md,
+ const EVP_MD *mgf1_md, int salt_len) {
+ if (in_len != EVP_MD_size(md)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ size_t padded_len = RSA_size(rsa);
+ uint8_t *padded = OPENSSL_malloc(padded_len);
+ if (padded == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ int ret =
+ RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa, padded, in, md, mgf1_md, salt_len) &&
+ RSA_sign_raw(rsa, out_len, out, max_out, padded, padded_len,
+ RSA_NO_PADDING);
+ OPENSSL_free(padded);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int RSA_verify(int hash_nid, const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len,
+ const uint8_t *sig, size_t sig_len, RSA *rsa) {
+ if (rsa->n == NULL || rsa->e == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ const size_t rsa_size = RSA_size(rsa);
+ uint8_t *buf = NULL;
+ int ret = 0;
+ uint8_t *signed_msg = NULL;
+ size_t signed_msg_len = 0, len;
+ int signed_msg_is_alloced = 0;
+
+ if (hash_nid == NID_md5_sha1 && msg_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ buf = OPENSSL_malloc(rsa_size);
+ if (!buf) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!RSA_verify_raw(rsa, &len, buf, rsa_size, sig, sig_len,
+ RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (!RSA_add_pkcs1_prefix(&signed_msg, &signed_msg_len,
+ &signed_msg_is_alloced, hash_nid, msg, msg_len)) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ // Check that no other information follows the hash value (FIPS 186-4 Section
+ // 5.5) and it matches the expected hash.
+ if (len != signed_msg_len || OPENSSL_memcmp(buf, signed_msg, len) != 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ret = 1;
+
+out:
+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
+ if (signed_msg_is_alloced) {
+ OPENSSL_free(signed_msg);
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int RSA_verify_pss_mgf1(RSA *rsa, const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len,
+ const EVP_MD *md, const EVP_MD *mgf1_md, int salt_len,
+ const uint8_t *sig, size_t sig_len) {
+ if (msg_len != EVP_MD_size(md)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ size_t em_len = RSA_size(rsa);
+ uint8_t *em = OPENSSL_malloc(em_len);
+ if (em == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ int ret = 0;
+ if (!RSA_verify_raw(rsa, &em_len, em, em_len, sig, sig_len, RSA_NO_PADDING)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (em_len != RSA_size(rsa)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ret = RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa, msg, md, mgf1_md, em, salt_len);
+
+err:
+ OPENSSL_free(em);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int check_mod_inverse(int *out_ok, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *ainv,
+ const BIGNUM *m, int check_reduced, BN_CTX *ctx) {
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ BIGNUM *tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ int ret = tmp != NULL &&
+ bn_mul_consttime(tmp, a, ainv, ctx) &&
+ bn_div_consttime(NULL, tmp, tmp, m, ctx);
+ if (ret) {
+ *out_ok = BN_is_one(tmp);
+ if (check_reduced && (BN_is_negative(ainv) || BN_cmp(ainv, m) >= 0)) {
+ *out_ok = 0;
+ }
+ }
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int RSA_check_key(const RSA *key) {
+ BIGNUM n, pm1, qm1, lcm, dmp1, dmq1, iqmp_times_q;
+ BN_CTX *ctx;
+ int ok = 0, has_crt_values;
+
+ if (RSA_is_opaque(key)) {
+ // Opaque keys can't be checked.
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if ((key->p != NULL) != (key->q != NULL)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_ONLY_ONE_OF_P_Q_GIVEN);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!key->n || !key->e) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!key->d || !key->p) {
+ // For a public key, or without p and q, there's nothing that can be
+ // checked.
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ BN_init(&n);
+ BN_init(&pm1);
+ BN_init(&qm1);
+ BN_init(&lcm);
+ BN_init(&dmp1);
+ BN_init(&dmq1);
+ BN_init(&iqmp_times_q);
+
+ int d_ok;
+ if (!bn_mul_consttime(&n, key->p, key->q, ctx) ||
+ // lcm = lcm(p, q)
+ !bn_usub_consttime(&pm1, key->p, BN_value_one()) ||
+ !bn_usub_consttime(&qm1, key->q, BN_value_one()) ||
+ !bn_lcm_consttime(&lcm, &pm1, &qm1, ctx) ||
+ // Other implementations use the Euler totient rather than the Carmichael
+ // totient, so allow unreduced |key->d|.
+ !check_mod_inverse(&d_ok, key->e, key->d, &lcm,
+ 0 /* don't require reduced */, ctx)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_LIB_BN);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (BN_cmp(&n, key->n) != 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_N_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (!d_ok) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_D_E_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_1);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (BN_is_negative(key->d) || BN_cmp(key->d, key->n) >= 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_D_OUT_OF_RANGE);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ has_crt_values = key->dmp1 != NULL;
+ if (has_crt_values != (key->dmq1 != NULL) ||
+ has_crt_values != (key->iqmp != NULL)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_INCONSISTENT_SET_OF_CRT_VALUES);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (has_crt_values) {
+ int dmp1_ok, dmq1_ok, iqmp_ok;
+ if (!check_mod_inverse(&dmp1_ok, key->e, key->dmp1, &pm1,
+ 1 /* check reduced */, ctx) ||
+ !check_mod_inverse(&dmq1_ok, key->e, key->dmq1, &qm1,
+ 1 /* check reduced */, ctx) ||
+ !check_mod_inverse(&iqmp_ok, key->q, key->iqmp, key->p,
+ 1 /* check reduced */, ctx)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_LIB_BN);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (!dmp1_ok || !dmq1_ok || !iqmp_ok) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_CRT_VALUES_INCORRECT);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ok = 1;
+
+out:
+ BN_free(&n);
+ BN_free(&pm1);
+ BN_free(&qm1);
+ BN_free(&lcm);
+ BN_free(&dmp1);
+ BN_free(&dmq1);
+ BN_free(&iqmp_times_q);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+
+ return ok;
+}
+
+
+// This is the product of the 132 smallest odd primes, from 3 to 751.
+static const BN_ULONG kSmallFactorsLimbs[] = {
+ TOBN(0xc4309333, 0x3ef4e3e1), TOBN(0x71161eb6, 0xcd2d655f),
+ TOBN(0x95e2238c, 0x0bf94862), TOBN(0x3eb233d3, 0x24f7912b),
+ TOBN(0x6b55514b, 0xbf26c483), TOBN(0x0a84d817, 0x5a144871),
+ TOBN(0x77d12fee, 0x9b82210a), TOBN(0xdb5b93c2, 0x97f050b3),
+ TOBN(0x4acad6b9, 0x4d6c026b), TOBN(0xeb7751f3, 0x54aec893),
+ TOBN(0xdba53368, 0x36bc85c4), TOBN(0xd85a1b28, 0x7f5ec78e),
+ TOBN(0x2eb072d8, 0x6b322244), TOBN(0xbba51112, 0x5e2b3aea),
+ TOBN(0x36ed1a6c, 0x0e2486bf), TOBN(0x5f270460, 0xec0c5727),
+ 0x000017b1
+};
+
+DEFINE_LOCAL_DATA(BIGNUM, g_small_factors) {
+ out->d = (BN_ULONG *) kSmallFactorsLimbs;
+ out->width = OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kSmallFactorsLimbs);
+ out->dmax = out->width;
+ out->neg = 0;
+ out->flags = BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA;
+}
+
+int RSA_check_fips(RSA *key) {
+ if (RSA_is_opaque(key)) {
+ // Opaque keys can't be checked.
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_PUBLIC_KEY_VALIDATION_FAILED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!RSA_check_key(key)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ BIGNUM small_gcd;
+ BN_init(&small_gcd);
+
+ int ret = 1;
+
+ // Perform partial public key validation of RSA keys (SP 800-89 5.3.3).
+ enum bn_primality_result_t primality_result;
+ if (BN_num_bits(key->e) <= 16 ||
+ BN_num_bits(key->e) > 256 ||
+ !BN_is_odd(key->n) ||
+ !BN_is_odd(key->e) ||
+ !BN_gcd(&small_gcd, key->n, g_small_factors(), ctx) ||
+ !BN_is_one(&small_gcd) ||
+ !BN_enhanced_miller_rabin_primality_test(&primality_result, key->n,
+ BN_prime_checks, ctx, NULL) ||
+ primality_result != bn_non_prime_power_composite) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_PUBLIC_KEY_VALIDATION_FAILED);
+ ret = 0;
+ }
+
+ BN_free(&small_gcd);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+
+ if (!ret || key->d == NULL || key->p == NULL) {
+ // On a failure or on only a public key, there's nothing else can be
+ // checked.
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ // FIPS pairwise consistency test (FIPS 140-2 4.9.2). Per FIPS 140-2 IG,
+ // section 9.9, it is not known whether |rsa| will be used for signing or
+ // encryption, so either pair-wise consistency self-test is acceptable. We
+ // perform a signing test.
+ uint8_t data[32] = {0};
+ unsigned sig_len = RSA_size(key);
+ uint8_t *sig = OPENSSL_malloc(sig_len);
+ if (sig == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!RSA_sign(NID_sha256, data, sizeof(data), sig, &sig_len, key)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ ret = 0;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+#if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS_BREAK_RSA_PWCT)
+ data[0] = ~data[0];
+#endif
+ if (!RSA_verify(NID_sha256, data, sizeof(data), sig, sig_len, key)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ ret = 0;
+ }
+
+cleanup:
+ OPENSSL_free(sig);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int RSA_private_transform(RSA *rsa, uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *in,
+ size_t len) {
+ if (rsa->meth->private_transform) {
+ return rsa->meth->private_transform(rsa, out, in, len);
+ }
+
+ return rsa_default_private_transform(rsa, out, in, len);
+}
+
+int RSA_flags(const RSA *rsa) { return rsa->flags; }
+
+int RSA_blinding_on(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx) {
+ return 1;
+}
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