--- /dev/null
+/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
+ * project 1999-2004.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1999 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
+
+#include <openssl/pkcs8.h>
+
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
+#include <openssl/cipher.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/nid.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+#include "../internal.h"
+
+
+// 1.2.840.113549.1.5.12
+static const uint8_t kPBKDF2[] = {0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7,
+ 0x0d, 0x01, 0x05, 0x0c};
+
+// 1.2.840.113549.1.5.13
+static const uint8_t kPBES2[] = {0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7,
+ 0x0d, 0x01, 0x05, 0x0d};
+
+// 1.2.840.113549.2.7
+static const uint8_t kHMACWithSHA1[] = {0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86,
+ 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x02, 0x07};
+
+static const struct {
+ uint8_t oid[9];
+ uint8_t oid_len;
+ int nid;
+ const EVP_CIPHER *(*cipher_func)(void);
+} kCipherOIDs[] = {
+ // 1.2.840.113549.3.2
+ {{0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x03, 0x02},
+ 8,
+ NID_rc2_cbc,
+ &EVP_rc2_cbc},
+ // 1.2.840.113549.3.7
+ {{0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x03, 0x07},
+ 8,
+ NID_des_ede3_cbc,
+ &EVP_des_ede3_cbc},
+ // 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.1.2
+ {{0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x01, 0x02},
+ 9,
+ NID_aes_128_cbc,
+ &EVP_aes_128_cbc},
+ // 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.1.22
+ {{0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x01, 0x16},
+ 9,
+ NID_aes_192_cbc,
+ &EVP_aes_192_cbc},
+ // 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.1.42
+ {{0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x01, 0x2a},
+ 9,
+ NID_aes_256_cbc,
+ &EVP_aes_256_cbc},
+};
+
+static const EVP_CIPHER *cbs_to_cipher(const CBS *cbs) {
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kCipherOIDs); i++) {
+ if (CBS_mem_equal(cbs, kCipherOIDs[i].oid, kCipherOIDs[i].oid_len)) {
+ return kCipherOIDs[i].cipher_func();
+ }
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static int add_cipher_oid(CBB *out, int nid) {
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kCipherOIDs); i++) {
+ if (kCipherOIDs[i].nid == nid) {
+ CBB child;
+ return CBB_add_asn1(out, &child, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT) &&
+ CBB_add_bytes(&child, kCipherOIDs[i].oid,
+ kCipherOIDs[i].oid_len) &&
+ CBB_flush(out);
+ }
+ }
+
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int pkcs5_pbe2_cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+ unsigned iterations, const char *pass,
+ size_t pass_len, const uint8_t *salt,
+ size_t salt_len, const uint8_t *iv,
+ size_t iv_len, int enc) {
+ if (iv_len != EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_ERROR_SETTING_CIPHER_PARAMS);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ uint8_t key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
+ int ret = PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC_SHA1(pass, pass_len, salt, salt_len, iterations,
+ EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher), key) &&
+ EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL /* engine */, key, iv, enc);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(key, EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int PKCS5_pbe2_encrypt_init(CBB *out, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+ const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, unsigned iterations,
+ const char *pass, size_t pass_len,
+ const uint8_t *salt, size_t salt_len) {
+ int cipher_nid = EVP_CIPHER_nid(cipher);
+ if (cipher_nid == NID_undef) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_CIPHER_HAS_NO_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ // Generate a random IV.
+ uint8_t iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+ if (!RAND_bytes(iv, EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher))) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ // See RFC 2898, appendix A.
+ CBB algorithm, oid, param, kdf, kdf_oid, kdf_param, salt_cbb, cipher_cbb,
+ iv_cbb;
+ if (!CBB_add_asn1(out, &algorithm, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+ !CBB_add_asn1(&algorithm, &oid, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(&oid, kPBES2, sizeof(kPBES2)) ||
+ !CBB_add_asn1(&algorithm, ¶m, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+ !CBB_add_asn1(¶m, &kdf, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+ !CBB_add_asn1(&kdf, &kdf_oid, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(&kdf_oid, kPBKDF2, sizeof(kPBKDF2)) ||
+ !CBB_add_asn1(&kdf, &kdf_param, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+ !CBB_add_asn1(&kdf_param, &salt_cbb, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(&salt_cbb, salt, salt_len) ||
+ !CBB_add_asn1_uint64(&kdf_param, iterations) ||
+ // Specify a key length for RC2.
+ (cipher_nid == NID_rc2_cbc &&
+ !CBB_add_asn1_uint64(&kdf_param, EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher))) ||
+ // Omit the PRF. We use the default hmacWithSHA1.
+ !CBB_add_asn1(¶m, &cipher_cbb, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+ !add_cipher_oid(&cipher_cbb, cipher_nid) ||
+ // RFC 2898 says RC2-CBC and RC5-CBC-Pad use a SEQUENCE with version and
+ // IV, but OpenSSL always uses an OCTET STRING IV, so we do the same.
+ !CBB_add_asn1(&cipher_cbb, &iv_cbb, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(&iv_cbb, iv, EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher)) ||
+ !CBB_flush(out)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return pkcs5_pbe2_cipher_init(ctx, cipher, iterations, pass, pass_len, salt,
+ salt_len, iv, EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher),
+ 1 /* encrypt */);
+}
+
+int PKCS5_pbe2_decrypt_init(const struct pbe_suite *suite, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+ const char *pass, size_t pass_len, CBS *param) {
+ CBS pbe_param, kdf, kdf_obj, enc_scheme, enc_obj;
+ if (!CBS_get_asn1(param, &pbe_param, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+ CBS_len(param) != 0 ||
+ !CBS_get_asn1(&pbe_param, &kdf, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+ !CBS_get_asn1(&pbe_param, &enc_scheme, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+ CBS_len(&pbe_param) != 0 ||
+ !CBS_get_asn1(&kdf, &kdf_obj, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT) ||
+ !CBS_get_asn1(&enc_scheme, &enc_obj, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ // Only PBKDF2 is supported.
+ if (!CBS_mem_equal(&kdf_obj, kPBKDF2, sizeof(kPBKDF2))) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_DERIVATION_FUNCTION);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ // See if we recognise the encryption algorithm.
+ const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = cbs_to_cipher(&enc_obj);
+ if (cipher == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ // Parse the KDF parameters. See RFC 8018, appendix A.2.
+ CBS pbkdf2_params, salt;
+ uint64_t iterations;
+ if (!CBS_get_asn1(&kdf, &pbkdf2_params, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+ CBS_len(&kdf) != 0 ||
+ !CBS_get_asn1(&pbkdf2_params, &salt, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
+ !CBS_get_asn1_uint64(&pbkdf2_params, &iterations)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (iterations == 0 || iterations > UINT_MAX) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_ITERATION_COUNT);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ // The optional keyLength parameter, if present, must match the key length of
+ // the cipher.
+ if (CBS_peek_asn1_tag(&pbkdf2_params, CBS_ASN1_INTEGER)) {
+ uint64_t key_len;
+ if (!CBS_get_asn1_uint64(&pbkdf2_params, &key_len)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (key_len != EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEYLENGTH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (CBS_len(&pbkdf2_params) != 0) {
+ CBS alg_id, prf;
+ if (!CBS_get_asn1(&pbkdf2_params, &alg_id, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+ !CBS_get_asn1(&alg_id, &prf, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT) ||
+ CBS_len(&pbkdf2_params) != 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ // We only support hmacWithSHA1. It is the DEFAULT, so DER requires it be
+ // omitted, but we match OpenSSL in tolerating it being present.
+ if (!CBS_mem_equal(&prf, kHMACWithSHA1, sizeof(kHMACWithSHA1))) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_UNSUPPORTED_PRF);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ // hmacWithSHA1 has a NULL parameter.
+ CBS null;
+ if (!CBS_get_asn1(&alg_id, &null, CBS_ASN1_NULL) ||
+ CBS_len(&null) != 0 ||
+ CBS_len(&alg_id) != 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Parse the encryption scheme parameters. Note OpenSSL does not match the
+ // specification. Per RFC 2898, this should depend on the encryption scheme.
+ // In particular, RC2-CBC uses a SEQUENCE with version and IV. We align with
+ // OpenSSL.
+ CBS iv;
+ if (!CBS_get_asn1(&enc_scheme, &iv, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
+ CBS_len(&enc_scheme) != 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_UNSUPPORTED_PRF);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return pkcs5_pbe2_cipher_init(ctx, cipher, (unsigned)iterations, pass,
+ pass_len, CBS_data(&salt), CBS_len(&salt),
+ CBS_data(&iv), CBS_len(&iv), 0 /* decrypt */);
+}