--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project
+ * 2004.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2004 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/obj.h>
+#include <openssl/stack.h>
+#include <openssl/thread.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+
+#include "pcy_int.h"
+#include "../internal.h"
+
+/*
+ * Enable this to print out the complete policy tree at various point during
+ * evaluation.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * #define OPENSSL_POLICY_DEBUG
+ */
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_POLICY_DEBUG
+
+static void expected_print(BIO *err, X509_POLICY_LEVEL *lev,
+ X509_POLICY_NODE *node, int indent)
+{
+ if ((lev->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP)
+ || !(node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAP_MASK))
+ BIO_puts(err, " Not Mapped\n");
+ else {
+ int i;
+ STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *pset = node->data->expected_policy_set;
+ ASN1_OBJECT *oid;
+ BIO_puts(err, " Expected: ");
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(pset); i++) {
+ oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(pset, i);
+ if (i)
+ BIO_puts(err, ", ");
+ i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(err, oid);
+ }
+ BIO_puts(err, "\n");
+ }
+}
+
+static void tree_print(char *str, X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
+ X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr)
+{
+ X509_POLICY_LEVEL *plev;
+ X509_POLICY_NODE *node;
+ int i;
+ BIO *err;
+ err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+ if (!curr)
+ curr = tree->levels + tree->nlevel;
+ else
+ curr++;
+ BIO_printf(err, "Level print after %s\n", str);
+ BIO_printf(err, "Printing Up to Level %ld\n", curr - tree->levels);
+ for (plev = tree->levels; plev != curr; plev++) {
+ BIO_printf(err, "Level %ld, flags = %x\n",
+ plev - tree->levels, plev->flags);
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(plev->nodes); i++) {
+ node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(plev->nodes, i);
+ X509_POLICY_NODE_print(err, node, 2);
+ expected_print(err, plev, node, 2);
+ BIO_printf(err, " Flags: %x\n", node->data->flags);
+ }
+ if (plev->anyPolicy)
+ X509_POLICY_NODE_print(err, plev->anyPolicy, 2);
+ }
+
+ BIO_free(err);
+
+}
+#else
+
+# define tree_print(a,b,c) /* */
+
+#endif
+
+/*-
+ * Initialize policy tree. Return values:
+ * 0 Some internal error occurred.
+ * -1 Inconsistent or invalid extensions in certificates.
+ * 1 Tree initialized OK.
+ * 2 Policy tree is empty.
+ * 5 Tree OK and requireExplicitPolicy true.
+ * 6 Tree empty and requireExplicitPolicy true.
+ */
+
+static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
+ unsigned int flags)
+{
+ X509_POLICY_TREE *tree;
+ X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level;
+ const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache;
+ X509_POLICY_DATA *data = NULL;
+ X509 *x;
+ int ret = 1;
+ int i, n;
+ int explicit_policy;
+ int any_skip;
+ int map_skip;
+ *ptree = NULL;
+ n = sk_X509_num(certs);
+
+#if 0
+ /* Disable policy mapping for now... */
+ flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP;
+#endif
+
+ if (flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY)
+ explicit_policy = 0;
+ else
+ explicit_policy = n + 1;
+
+ if (flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY)
+ any_skip = 0;
+ else
+ any_skip = n + 1;
+
+ if (flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP)
+ map_skip = 0;
+ else
+ map_skip = n + 1;
+
+ /* Can't do anything with just a trust anchor */
+ if (n == 1)
+ return 1;
+ /*
+ * First setup policy cache in all certificates apart from the trust
+ * anchor. Note any bad cache results on the way. Also can calculate
+ * explicit_policy value at this point.
+ */
+ for (i = n - 2; i >= 0; i--) {
+ x = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
+ X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1);
+ cache = policy_cache_set(x);
+ /* If cache NULL something bad happened: return immediately */
+ if (cache == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ /*
+ * If inconsistent extensions keep a note of it but continue
+ */
+ if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY)
+ ret = -1;
+ /*
+ * Otherwise if we have no data (hence no CertificatePolicies) and
+ * haven't already set an inconsistent code note it.
+ */
+ else if ((ret == 1) && !cache->data)
+ ret = 2;
+ if (explicit_policy > 0) {
+ if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
+ explicit_policy--;
+ if ((cache->explicit_skip != -1)
+ && (cache->explicit_skip < explicit_policy))
+ explicit_policy = cache->explicit_skip;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ret != 1) {
+ if (ret == 2 && !explicit_policy)
+ return 6;
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /* If we get this far initialize the tree */
+
+ tree = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_POLICY_TREE));
+
+ if (!tree)
+ return 0;
+
+ tree->flags = 0;
+ tree->levels = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_POLICY_LEVEL) * n);
+ tree->nlevel = 0;
+ tree->extra_data = NULL;
+ tree->auth_policies = NULL;
+ tree->user_policies = NULL;
+
+ if (!tree->levels) {
+ OPENSSL_free(tree);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ OPENSSL_memset(tree->levels, 0, n * sizeof(X509_POLICY_LEVEL));
+
+ tree->nlevel = n;
+
+ level = tree->levels;
+
+ /* Root data: initialize to anyPolicy */
+
+ data = policy_data_new(NULL, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_any_policy), 0);
+
+ if (!data || !level_add_node(level, data, NULL, tree))
+ goto bad_tree;
+
+ for (i = n - 2; i >= 0; i--) {
+ level++;
+ x = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
+ cache = policy_cache_set(x);
+ X509_up_ref(x);
+ level->cert = x;
+
+ if (!cache->anyPolicy)
+ level->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY;
+
+ /* Determine inhibit any and inhibit map flags */
+ if (any_skip == 0) {
+ /*
+ * Any matching allowed if certificate is self issued and not the
+ * last in the chain.
+ */
+ if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) || (i == 0))
+ level->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY;
+ } else {
+ if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
+ any_skip--;
+ if ((cache->any_skip >= 0)
+ && (cache->any_skip < any_skip))
+ any_skip = cache->any_skip;
+ }
+
+ if (map_skip == 0)
+ level->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP;
+ else {
+ if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
+ map_skip--;
+ if ((cache->map_skip >= 0)
+ && (cache->map_skip < map_skip))
+ map_skip = cache->map_skip;
+ }
+
+ }
+
+ *ptree = tree;
+
+ if (explicit_policy)
+ return 1;
+ else
+ return 5;
+
+ bad_tree:
+
+ X509_policy_tree_free(tree);
+
+ return 0;
+
+}
+
+static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
+ X509_POLICY_DATA *data)
+{
+ X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1;
+ X509_POLICY_NODE *node;
+ int matched = 0;
+ size_t i;
+ /* Iterate through all in nodes linking matches */
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(last->nodes); i++) {
+ node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(last->nodes, i);
+ if (policy_node_match(last, node, data->valid_policy)) {
+ if (!level_add_node(curr, data, node, NULL))
+ return 0;
+ matched = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!matched && last->anyPolicy) {
+ if (!level_add_node(curr, data, last->anyPolicy, NULL))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This corresponds to RFC3280 6.1.3(d)(1): link any data from
+ * CertificatePolicies onto matching parent or anyPolicy if no match.
+ */
+
+static int tree_link_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
+ const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache)
+{
+ size_t i;
+ X509_POLICY_DATA *data;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_num(cache->data); i++) {
+ data = sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_value(cache->data, i);
+ /*
+ * If a node is mapped any it doesn't have a corresponding
+ * CertificatePolicies entry. However such an identical node would
+ * be created if anyPolicy matching is enabled because there would be
+ * no match with the parent valid_policy_set. So we create link
+ * because then it will have the mapping flags right and we can prune
+ * it later.
+ */
+#if 0
+ if ((data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAPPED_ANY)
+ && !(curr->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY))
+ continue;
+#endif
+ /* Look for matching nodes in previous level */
+ if (!tree_link_matching_nodes(curr, data))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This corresponds to RFC3280 6.1.3(d)(2): Create new data for any unmatched
+ * policies in the parent and link to anyPolicy.
+ */
+
+static int tree_add_unmatched(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
+ const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache,
+ const ASN1_OBJECT *id,
+ X509_POLICY_NODE *node, X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
+{
+ X509_POLICY_DATA *data;
+ if (id == NULL)
+ id = node->data->valid_policy;
+ /*
+ * Create a new node with qualifiers from anyPolicy and id from unmatched
+ * node.
+ */
+ data = policy_data_new(NULL, id, node_critical(node));
+
+ if (data == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ /* Curr may not have anyPolicy */
+ data->qualifier_set = cache->anyPolicy->qualifier_set;
+ data->flags |= POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS;
+ if (!level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree)) {
+ policy_data_free(data);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int tree_link_unmatched(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
+ const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache,
+ X509_POLICY_NODE *node, X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
+{
+ const X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1;
+ size_t i;
+
+ if ((last->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP)
+ || !(node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAPPED)) {
+ /* If no policy mapping: matched if one child present */
+ if (node->nchild)
+ return 1;
+ if (!tree_add_unmatched(curr, cache, NULL, node, tree))
+ return 0;
+ /* Add it */
+ } else {
+ /* If mapping: matched if one child per expected policy set */
+ STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *expset = node->data->expected_policy_set;
+ if ((size_t)node->nchild == sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(expset))
+ return 1;
+ /* Locate unmatched nodes */
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(expset); i++) {
+ ASN1_OBJECT *oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(expset, i);
+ if (level_find_node(curr, node, oid))
+ continue;
+ if (!tree_add_unmatched(curr, cache, oid, node, tree))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+
+}
+
+static int tree_link_any(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
+ const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache,
+ X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
+{
+ size_t i;
+ /*
+ * X509_POLICY_DATA *data;
+ */
+ X509_POLICY_NODE *node;
+ X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(last->nodes); i++) {
+ node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(last->nodes, i);
+
+ if (!tree_link_unmatched(curr, cache, node, tree))
+ return 0;
+
+#if 0
+
+ /*
+ * Skip any node with any children: we only want unmathced nodes.
+ * Note: need something better for policy mapping because each node
+ * may have multiple children
+ */
+ if (node->nchild)
+ continue;
+
+ /*
+ * Create a new node with qualifiers from anyPolicy and id from
+ * unmatched node.
+ */
+ data = policy_data_new(NULL, node->data->valid_policy,
+ node_critical(node));
+
+ if (data == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ /* Curr may not have anyPolicy */
+ data->qualifier_set = cache->anyPolicy->qualifier_set;
+ data->flags |= POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS;
+ if (!level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree)) {
+ policy_data_free(data);
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ }
+ /* Finally add link to anyPolicy */
+ if (last->anyPolicy) {
+ if (!level_add_node(curr, cache->anyPolicy, last->anyPolicy, NULL))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Prune the tree: delete any child mapped child data on the current level
+ * then proceed up the tree deleting any data with no children. If we ever
+ * have no data on a level we can halt because the tree will be empty.
+ */
+
+static int tree_prune(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree, X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr)
+{
+ STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *nodes;
+ X509_POLICY_NODE *node;
+ int i;
+ nodes = curr->nodes;
+ if (curr->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP) {
+ for (i = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(nodes) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+ node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(nodes, i);
+ /* Delete any mapped data: see RFC3280 XXXX */
+ if (node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAP_MASK) {
+ node->parent->nchild--;
+ OPENSSL_free(node);
+ (void)sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_delete(nodes, i);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (;;) {
+ --curr;
+ nodes = curr->nodes;
+ for (i = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(nodes) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+ node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(nodes, i);
+ if (node->nchild == 0) {
+ node->parent->nchild--;
+ OPENSSL_free(node);
+ (void)sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_delete(nodes, i);
+ }
+ }
+ if (curr->anyPolicy && !curr->anyPolicy->nchild) {
+ if (curr->anyPolicy->parent)
+ curr->anyPolicy->parent->nchild--;
+ OPENSSL_free(curr->anyPolicy);
+ curr->anyPolicy = NULL;
+ }
+ if (curr == tree->levels) {
+ /* If we zapped anyPolicy at top then tree is empty */
+ if (!curr->anyPolicy)
+ return 2;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+}
+
+static int tree_add_auth_node(STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) **pnodes,
+ X509_POLICY_NODE *pcy)
+{
+ if (!*pnodes) {
+ *pnodes = policy_node_cmp_new();
+ if (!*pnodes)
+ return 0;
+ } else if (sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_find(*pnodes, NULL, pcy))
+ return 1;
+
+ if (!sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_push(*pnodes, pcy))
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+
+}
+
+/*
+ * Calculate the authority set based on policy tree. The 'pnodes' parameter
+ * is used as a store for the set of policy nodes used to calculate the user
+ * set. If the authority set is not anyPolicy then pnodes will just point to
+ * the authority set. If however the authority set is anyPolicy then the set
+ * of valid policies (other than anyPolicy) is store in pnodes. The return
+ * value of '2' is used in this case to indicate that pnodes should be freed.
+ */
+
+static int tree_calculate_authority_set(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
+ STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) **pnodes)
+{
+ X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr;
+ X509_POLICY_NODE *node, *anyptr;
+ STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) **addnodes;
+ int i;
+ size_t j;
+ curr = tree->levels + tree->nlevel - 1;
+
+ /* If last level contains anyPolicy set is anyPolicy */
+ if (curr->anyPolicy) {
+ if (!tree_add_auth_node(&tree->auth_policies, curr->anyPolicy))
+ return 0;
+ addnodes = pnodes;
+ } else
+ /* Add policies to authority set */
+ addnodes = &tree->auth_policies;
+
+ curr = tree->levels;
+ for (i = 1; i < tree->nlevel; i++) {
+ /*
+ * If no anyPolicy node on this this level it can't appear on lower
+ * levels so end search.
+ */
+ if (!(anyptr = curr->anyPolicy))
+ break;
+ curr++;
+ for (j = 0; j < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(curr->nodes); j++) {
+ node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(curr->nodes, j);
+ if ((node->parent == anyptr)
+ && !tree_add_auth_node(addnodes, node))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (addnodes == pnodes)
+ return 2;
+
+ *pnodes = tree->auth_policies;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int tree_calculate_user_set(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
+ STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *policy_oids,
+ STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *auth_nodes)
+{
+ size_t i;
+ X509_POLICY_NODE *node;
+ ASN1_OBJECT *oid;
+
+ X509_POLICY_NODE *anyPolicy;
+ X509_POLICY_DATA *extra;
+
+ /*
+ * Check if anyPolicy present in authority constrained policy set: this
+ * will happen if it is a leaf node.
+ */
+
+ if (sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(policy_oids) <= 0)
+ return 1;
+
+ anyPolicy = tree->levels[tree->nlevel - 1].anyPolicy;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(policy_oids); i++) {
+ oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(policy_oids, i);
+ if (OBJ_obj2nid(oid) == NID_any_policy) {
+ tree->flags |= POLICY_FLAG_ANY_POLICY;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(policy_oids); i++) {
+ oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(policy_oids, i);
+ node = tree_find_sk(auth_nodes, oid);
+ if (!node) {
+ if (!anyPolicy)
+ continue;
+ /*
+ * Create a new node with policy ID from user set and qualifiers
+ * from anyPolicy.
+ */
+ extra = policy_data_new(NULL, oid, node_critical(anyPolicy));
+ if (!extra)
+ return 0;
+ extra->qualifier_set = anyPolicy->data->qualifier_set;
+ extra->flags = POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS
+ | POLICY_DATA_FLAG_EXTRA_NODE;
+ node = level_add_node(NULL, extra, anyPolicy->parent, tree);
+ }
+ if (!tree->user_policies) {
+ tree->user_policies = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_new_null();
+ if (!tree->user_policies)
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (!sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_push(tree->user_policies, node))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+
+}
+
+static int tree_evaluate(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
+{
+ int ret, i;
+ X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr = tree->levels + 1;
+ const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache;
+
+ for (i = 1; i < tree->nlevel; i++, curr++) {
+ cache = policy_cache_set(curr->cert);
+ if (!tree_link_nodes(curr, cache))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!(curr->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY)
+ && !tree_link_any(curr, cache, tree))
+ return 0;
+ tree_print("before tree_prune()", tree, curr);
+ ret = tree_prune(tree, curr);
+ if (ret != 1)
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+
+}
+
+static void exnode_free(X509_POLICY_NODE *node)
+{
+ if (node->data && (node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_EXTRA_NODE))
+ OPENSSL_free(node);
+}
+
+void X509_policy_tree_free(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
+{
+ X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr;
+ int i;
+
+ if (!tree)
+ return;
+
+ sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_free(tree->auth_policies);
+ sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_pop_free(tree->user_policies, exnode_free);
+
+ for (i = 0, curr = tree->levels; i < tree->nlevel; i++, curr++) {
+ if (curr->cert)
+ X509_free(curr->cert);
+ if (curr->nodes)
+ sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_pop_free(curr->nodes, policy_node_free);
+ if (curr->anyPolicy)
+ policy_node_free(curr->anyPolicy);
+ }
+
+ if (tree->extra_data)
+ sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_pop_free(tree->extra_data, policy_data_free);
+
+ OPENSSL_free(tree->levels);
+ OPENSSL_free(tree);
+
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Application policy checking function.
+ * Return codes:
+ * 0 Internal Error.
+ * 1 Successful.
+ * -1 One or more certificates contain invalid or inconsistent extensions
+ * -2 User constrained policy set empty and requireExplicit true.
+ */
+
+int X509_policy_check(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, int *pexplicit_policy,
+ STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
+ STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *policy_oids, unsigned int flags)
+{
+ int ret;
+ int calc_ret;
+ X509_POLICY_TREE *tree = NULL;
+ STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *nodes, *auth_nodes = NULL;
+ *ptree = NULL;
+
+ *pexplicit_policy = 0;
+ ret = tree_init(&tree, certs, flags);
+
+ switch (ret) {
+
+ /* Tree empty requireExplicit False: OK */
+ case 2:
+ return 1;
+
+ /* Some internal error */
+ case -1:
+ return -1;
+
+ /* Some internal error */
+ case 0:
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Tree empty requireExplicit True: Error */
+
+ case 6:
+ *pexplicit_policy = 1;
+ return -2;
+
+ /* Tree OK requireExplicit True: OK and continue */
+ case 5:
+ *pexplicit_policy = 1;
+ break;
+
+ /* Tree OK: continue */
+
+ case 1:
+ if (!tree)
+ /*
+ * tree_init() returns success and a null tree
+ * if it's just looking at a trust anchor.
+ * I'm not sure that returning success here is
+ * correct, but I'm sure that reporting this
+ * as an internal error which our caller
+ * interprets as a malloc failure is wrong.
+ */
+ return 1;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (!tree)
+ goto error;
+ ret = tree_evaluate(tree);
+
+ tree_print("tree_evaluate()", tree, NULL);
+
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto error;
+
+ /* Return value 2 means tree empty */
+ if (ret == 2) {
+ X509_policy_tree_free(tree);
+ if (*pexplicit_policy)
+ return -2;
+ else
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ /* Tree is not empty: continue */
+
+ calc_ret = tree_calculate_authority_set(tree, &auth_nodes);
+
+ if (!calc_ret)
+ goto error;
+
+ ret = tree_calculate_user_set(tree, policy_oids, auth_nodes);
+
+ if (calc_ret == 2)
+ sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_free(auth_nodes);
+
+ if (!ret)
+ goto error;
+
+
+ if (tree)
+ *ptree = tree;
+
+ if (*pexplicit_policy) {
+ nodes = X509_policy_tree_get0_user_policies(tree);
+ if (sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(nodes) <= 0)
+ return -2;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+
+ error:
+
+ X509_policy_tree_free(tree);
+
+ return 0;
+
+}
git://repos.xcallymotion.com / motion2.git / blobdiff