--- /dev/null
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */
+
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/buf.h>
+#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <openssl/nid.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
+
+#include "../crypto/internal.h"
+#include "internal.h"
+
+
+namespace bssl {
+
+static bool add_record_to_flight(SSL *ssl, uint8_t type,
+ Span<const uint8_t> in) {
+ // We'll never add a flight while in the process of writing it out.
+ assert(ssl->s3->pending_flight_offset == 0);
+
+ if (ssl->s3->pending_flight == nullptr) {
+ ssl->s3->pending_flight.reset(BUF_MEM_new());
+ if (ssl->s3->pending_flight == nullptr) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+
+ size_t max_out = in.size() + SSL_max_seal_overhead(ssl);
+ size_t new_cap = ssl->s3->pending_flight->length + max_out;
+ if (max_out < in.size() || new_cap < max_out) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ size_t len;
+ if (!BUF_MEM_reserve(ssl->s3->pending_flight.get(), new_cap) ||
+ !tls_seal_record(ssl,
+ (uint8_t *)ssl->s3->pending_flight->data +
+ ssl->s3->pending_flight->length,
+ &len, max_out, type, in.data(), in.size())) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ ssl->s3->pending_flight->length += len;
+ return true;
+}
+
+bool ssl3_init_message(SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb, CBB *body, uint8_t type) {
+ // Pick a modest size hint to save most of the |realloc| calls.
+ if (!CBB_init(cbb, 64) ||
+ !CBB_add_u8(cbb, type) ||
+ !CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(cbb, body)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ CBB_cleanup(cbb);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+bool ssl3_finish_message(SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb, Array<uint8_t> *out_msg) {
+ return CBBFinishArray(cbb, out_msg);
+}
+
+bool ssl3_add_message(SSL *ssl, Array<uint8_t> msg) {
+ // Add the message to the current flight, splitting into several records if
+ // needed.
+ Span<const uint8_t> rest = msg;
+ do {
+ Span<const uint8_t> chunk = rest.subspan(0, ssl->max_send_fragment);
+ rest = rest.subspan(chunk.size());
+
+ if (!add_record_to_flight(ssl, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, chunk)) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ } while (!rest.empty());
+
+ ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 1 /* write */, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, msg);
+ // TODO(svaldez): Move this up a layer to fix abstraction for SSLTranscript on
+ // hs.
+ if (ssl->s3->hs != NULL &&
+ !ssl->s3->hs->transcript.Update(msg)) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ return true;
+}
+
+bool ssl3_add_change_cipher_spec(SSL *ssl) {
+ static const uint8_t kChangeCipherSpec[1] = {SSL3_MT_CCS};
+
+ if (!add_record_to_flight(ssl, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
+ kChangeCipherSpec)) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 1 /* write */, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
+ kChangeCipherSpec);
+ return true;
+}
+
+bool ssl3_add_alert(SSL *ssl, uint8_t level, uint8_t desc) {
+ uint8_t alert[2] = {level, desc};
+ if (!add_record_to_flight(ssl, SSL3_RT_ALERT, alert)) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 1 /* write */, SSL3_RT_ALERT, alert);
+ ssl_do_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT, ((int)level << 8) | desc);
+ return true;
+}
+
+int ssl3_flush_flight(SSL *ssl) {
+ if (ssl->s3->pending_flight == nullptr) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl->s3->write_shutdown != ssl_shutdown_none) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ static_assert(INT_MAX <= 0xffffffff, "int is larger than 32 bits");
+ if (ssl->s3->pending_flight->length > INT_MAX) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ // If there is pending data in the write buffer, it must be flushed out before
+ // any new data in pending_flight.
+ if (!ssl->s3->write_buffer.empty()) {
+ int ret = ssl_write_buffer_flush(ssl);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Write the pending flight.
+ while (ssl->s3->pending_flight_offset < ssl->s3->pending_flight->length) {
+ int ret = BIO_write(
+ ssl->wbio,
+ ssl->s3->pending_flight->data + ssl->s3->pending_flight_offset,
+ ssl->s3->pending_flight->length - ssl->s3->pending_flight_offset);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ ssl->s3->pending_flight_offset += ret;
+ }
+
+ if (BIO_flush(ssl->wbio) <= 0) {
+ ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ ssl->s3->pending_flight.reset();
+ ssl->s3->pending_flight_offset = 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static ssl_open_record_t read_v2_client_hello(SSL *ssl, size_t *out_consumed,
+ Span<const uint8_t> in) {
+ *out_consumed = 0;
+ assert(in.size() >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
+ // Determine the length of the V2ClientHello.
+ size_t msg_length = ((in[0] & 0x7f) << 8) | in[1];
+ if (msg_length > (1024 * 4)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE);
+ return ssl_open_record_error;
+ }
+ if (msg_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - 2) {
+ // Reject lengths that are too short early. We have already read
+ // |SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH| bytes, so we should not attempt to process an
+ // (invalid) V2ClientHello which would be shorter than that.
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ return ssl_open_record_error;
+ }
+
+ // Ask for the remainder of the V2ClientHello.
+ if (in.size() < 2 + msg_length) {
+ *out_consumed = 2 + msg_length;
+ return ssl_open_record_partial;
+ }
+
+ CBS v2_client_hello = CBS(ssl->s3->read_buffer.span().subspan(2, msg_length));
+ // The V2ClientHello without the length is incorporated into the handshake
+ // hash. This is only ever called at the start of the handshake, so hs is
+ // guaranteed to be non-NULL.
+ if (!ssl->s3->hs->transcript.Update(v2_client_hello)) {
+ return ssl_open_record_error;
+ }
+
+ ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 0 /* read */, 0 /* V2ClientHello */,
+ v2_client_hello);
+
+ uint8_t msg_type;
+ uint16_t version, cipher_spec_length, session_id_length, challenge_length;
+ CBS cipher_specs, session_id, challenge;
+ if (!CBS_get_u8(&v2_client_hello, &msg_type) ||
+ !CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &version) ||
+ !CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &cipher_spec_length) ||
+ !CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &session_id_length) ||
+ !CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &challenge_length) ||
+ !CBS_get_bytes(&v2_client_hello, &cipher_specs, cipher_spec_length) ||
+ !CBS_get_bytes(&v2_client_hello, &session_id, session_id_length) ||
+ !CBS_get_bytes(&v2_client_hello, &challenge, challenge_length) ||
+ CBS_len(&v2_client_hello) != 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return ssl_open_record_error;
+ }
+
+ // msg_type has already been checked.
+ assert(msg_type == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO);
+
+ // The client_random is the V2ClientHello challenge. Truncate or left-pad with
+ // zeros as needed.
+ size_t rand_len = CBS_len(&challenge);
+ if (rand_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) {
+ rand_len = SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+ }
+ uint8_t random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE];
+ OPENSSL_memset(random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(random + (SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - rand_len), CBS_data(&challenge),
+ rand_len);
+
+ // Write out an equivalent SSLv3 ClientHello.
+ size_t max_v3_client_hello = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2 /* version */ +
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1 /* session ID length */ +
+ 2 /* cipher list length */ +
+ CBS_len(&cipher_specs) / 3 * 2 +
+ 1 /* compression length */ + 1 /* compression */;
+ ScopedCBB client_hello;
+ CBB hello_body, cipher_suites;
+ if (!BUF_MEM_reserve(ssl->s3->hs_buf.get(), max_v3_client_hello) ||
+ !CBB_init_fixed(client_hello.get(), (uint8_t *)ssl->s3->hs_buf->data,
+ ssl->s3->hs_buf->max) ||
+ !CBB_add_u8(client_hello.get(), SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) ||
+ !CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(client_hello.get(), &hello_body) ||
+ !CBB_add_u16(&hello_body, version) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(&hello_body, random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
+ // No session id.
+ !CBB_add_u8(&hello_body, 0) ||
+ !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&hello_body, &cipher_suites)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return ssl_open_record_error;
+ }
+
+ // Copy the cipher suites.
+ while (CBS_len(&cipher_specs) > 0) {
+ uint32_t cipher_spec;
+ if (!CBS_get_u24(&cipher_specs, &cipher_spec)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return ssl_open_record_error;
+ }
+
+ // Skip SSLv2 ciphers.
+ if ((cipher_spec & 0xff0000) != 0) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (!CBB_add_u16(&cipher_suites, cipher_spec)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return ssl_open_record_error;
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Add the null compression scheme and finish.
+ if (!CBB_add_u8(&hello_body, 1) ||
+ !CBB_add_u8(&hello_body, 0) ||
+ !CBB_finish(client_hello.get(), NULL, &ssl->s3->hs_buf->length)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return ssl_open_record_error;
+ }
+
+ *out_consumed = 2 + msg_length;
+ ssl->s3->is_v2_hello = true;
+ return ssl_open_record_success;
+}
+
+static bool parse_message(const SSL *ssl, SSLMessage *out,
+ size_t *out_bytes_needed) {
+ if (!ssl->s3->hs_buf) {
+ *out_bytes_needed = 4;
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ CBS cbs;
+ uint32_t len;
+ CBS_init(&cbs, reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>(ssl->s3->hs_buf->data),
+ ssl->s3->hs_buf->length);
+ if (!CBS_get_u8(&cbs, &out->type) ||
+ !CBS_get_u24(&cbs, &len)) {
+ *out_bytes_needed = 4;
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (!CBS_get_bytes(&cbs, &out->body, len)) {
+ *out_bytes_needed = 4 + len;
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ CBS_init(&out->raw, reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>(ssl->s3->hs_buf->data),
+ 4 + len);
+ out->is_v2_hello = ssl->s3->is_v2_hello;
+ return true;
+}
+
+bool ssl3_get_message(SSL *ssl, SSLMessage *out) {
+ size_t unused;
+ if (!parse_message(ssl, out, &unused)) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ if (!ssl->s3->has_message) {
+ if (!out->is_v2_hello) {
+ ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 0 /* read */, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, out->raw);
+ }
+ ssl->s3->has_message = true;
+ }
+ return true;
+}
+
+bool tls_can_accept_handshake_data(const SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert) {
+ // If there is a complete message, the caller must have consumed it first.
+ SSLMessage msg;
+ size_t bytes_needed;
+ if (parse_message(ssl, &msg, &bytes_needed)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ // Enforce the limit so the peer cannot force us to buffer 16MB.
+ if (bytes_needed > 4 + ssl_max_handshake_message_len(ssl)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+bool tls_has_unprocessed_handshake_data(const SSL *ssl) {
+ size_t msg_len = 0;
+ if (ssl->s3->has_message) {
+ SSLMessage msg;
+ size_t unused;
+ if (parse_message(ssl, &msg, &unused)) {
+ msg_len = CBS_len(&msg.raw);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return ssl->s3->hs_buf && ssl->s3->hs_buf->length > msg_len;
+}
+
+ssl_open_record_t ssl3_open_handshake(SSL *ssl, size_t *out_consumed,
+ uint8_t *out_alert, Span<uint8_t> in) {
+ *out_consumed = 0;
+ // Re-create the handshake buffer if needed.
+ if (!ssl->s3->hs_buf) {
+ ssl->s3->hs_buf.reset(BUF_MEM_new());
+ if (!ssl->s3->hs_buf) {
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return ssl_open_record_error;
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Bypass the record layer for the first message to handle V2ClientHello.
+ if (ssl->server && !ssl->s3->v2_hello_done) {
+ // Ask for the first 5 bytes, the size of the TLS record header. This is
+ // sufficient to detect a V2ClientHello and ensures that we never read
+ // beyond the first record.
+ if (in.size() < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
+ *out_consumed = SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ return ssl_open_record_partial;
+ }
+
+ // Some dedicated error codes for protocol mixups should the application
+ // wish to interpret them differently. (These do not overlap with
+ // ClientHello or V2ClientHello.)
+ const char *str = reinterpret_cast<const char*>(in.data());
+ if (strncmp("GET ", str, 4) == 0 ||
+ strncmp("POST ", str, 5) == 0 ||
+ strncmp("HEAD ", str, 5) == 0 ||
+ strncmp("PUT ", str, 4) == 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST);
+ *out_alert = 0;
+ return ssl_open_record_error;
+ }
+ if (strncmp("CONNE", str, 5) == 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST);
+ *out_alert = 0;
+ return ssl_open_record_error;
+ }
+
+ // Check for a V2ClientHello.
+ if ((in[0] & 0x80) != 0 && in[2] == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO &&
+ in[3] == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) {
+ auto ret = read_v2_client_hello(ssl, out_consumed, in);
+ if (ret == ssl_open_record_error) {
+ *out_alert = 0;
+ } else if (ret == ssl_open_record_success) {
+ ssl->s3->v2_hello_done = true;
+ }
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ ssl->s3->v2_hello_done = true;
+ }
+
+ uint8_t type;
+ Span<uint8_t> body;
+ auto ret = tls_open_record(ssl, &type, &body, out_consumed, out_alert, in);
+ if (ret != ssl_open_record_success) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ // WatchGuard's TLS 1.3 interference bug is very distinctive: they drop the
+ // ServerHello and send the remaining encrypted application data records
+ // as-is. This manifests as an application data record when we expect
+ // handshake. Report a dedicated error code for this case.
+ if (!ssl->server && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
+ ssl->s3->aead_read_ctx->is_null_cipher()) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_APPLICATION_DATA_INSTEAD_OF_HANDSHAKE);
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ return ssl_open_record_error;
+ }
+
+ if (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ return ssl_open_record_error;
+ }
+
+ // Append the entire handshake record to the buffer.
+ if (!BUF_MEM_append(ssl->s3->hs_buf.get(), body.data(), body.size())) {
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return ssl_open_record_error;
+ }
+
+ return ssl_open_record_success;
+}
+
+void ssl3_next_message(SSL *ssl) {
+ SSLMessage msg;
+ if (!ssl3_get_message(ssl, &msg) ||
+ !ssl->s3->hs_buf ||
+ ssl->s3->hs_buf->length < CBS_len(&msg.raw)) {
+ assert(0);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ OPENSSL_memmove(ssl->s3->hs_buf->data,
+ ssl->s3->hs_buf->data + CBS_len(&msg.raw),
+ ssl->s3->hs_buf->length - CBS_len(&msg.raw));
+ ssl->s3->hs_buf->length -= CBS_len(&msg.raw);
+ ssl->s3->is_v2_hello = false;
+ ssl->s3->has_message = false;
+
+ // Post-handshake messages are rare, so release the buffer after every
+ // message. During the handshake, |on_handshake_complete| will release it.
+ if (!SSL_in_init(ssl) && ssl->s3->hs_buf->length == 0) {
+ ssl->s3->hs_buf.reset();
+ }
+}
+
+} // namespace bssl
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