--- /dev/null
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE. */
+
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/buf.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
+#include <openssl/stack.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+#include "../crypto/internal.h"
+
+
+namespace bssl {
+
+// kCiphers is an array of all supported ciphers, sorted by id.
+static const SSL_CIPHER kCiphers[] = {
+ // The RSA ciphers
+ // Cipher 02
+ {
+ SSL3_TXT_RSA_NULL_SHA,
+ "TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA",
+ SSL3_CK_RSA_NULL_SHA,
+ SSL_kRSA,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_eNULL,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
+ },
+
+ // Cipher 0A
+ {
+ SSL3_TXT_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
+ "TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA",
+ SSL3_CK_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
+ SSL_kRSA,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_3DES,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
+ },
+
+
+ // New AES ciphersuites
+
+ // Cipher 2F
+ {
+ TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA,
+ "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA",
+ TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA,
+ SSL_kRSA,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_AES128,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
+ },
+
+ // Cipher 35
+ {
+ TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA,
+ "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA",
+ TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA,
+ SSL_kRSA,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_AES256,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
+ },
+
+
+ // TLS v1.2 ciphersuites
+
+ // Cipher 3C
+ {
+ TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
+ "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256",
+ TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
+ SSL_kRSA,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_AES128,
+ SSL_SHA256,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256,
+ },
+
+ // Cipher 3D
+ {
+ TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256,
+ "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256",
+ TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256,
+ SSL_kRSA,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_AES256,
+ SSL_SHA256,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256,
+ },
+
+ // PSK cipher suites.
+
+ // Cipher 8C
+ {
+ TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+ "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA",
+ TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kPSK,
+ SSL_aPSK,
+ SSL_AES128,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
+ },
+
+ // Cipher 8D
+ {
+ TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+ "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA",
+ TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kPSK,
+ SSL_aPSK,
+ SSL_AES256,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
+ },
+
+ // GCM ciphersuites from RFC5288
+
+ // Cipher 9C
+ {
+ TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+ "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256",
+ TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+ SSL_kRSA,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_AES128GCM,
+ SSL_AEAD,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256,
+ },
+
+ // Cipher 9D
+ {
+ TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+ "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384",
+ TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+ SSL_kRSA,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_AES256GCM,
+ SSL_AEAD,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384,
+ },
+
+ // TLS 1.3 suites.
+
+ // Cipher 1301
+ {
+ TLS1_TXT_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+ "TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256",
+ TLS1_CK_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+ SSL_kGENERIC,
+ SSL_aGENERIC,
+ SSL_AES128GCM,
+ SSL_AEAD,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256,
+ },
+
+ // Cipher 1302
+ {
+ TLS1_TXT_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+ "TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384",
+ TLS1_CK_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+ SSL_kGENERIC,
+ SSL_aGENERIC,
+ SSL_AES256GCM,
+ SSL_AEAD,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384,
+ },
+
+ // Cipher 1303
+ {
+ TLS1_TXT_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
+ "TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256",
+ TLS1_CK_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
+ SSL_kGENERIC,
+ SSL_aGENERIC,
+ SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305,
+ SSL_AEAD,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256,
+ },
+
+ // Cipher C009
+ {
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+ "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA",
+ TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kECDHE,
+ SSL_aECDSA,
+ SSL_AES128,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
+ },
+
+ // Cipher C00A
+ {
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+ "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA",
+ TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kECDHE,
+ SSL_aECDSA,
+ SSL_AES256,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
+ },
+
+ // Cipher C013
+ {
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+ "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA",
+ TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kECDHE,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_AES128,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
+ },
+
+ // Cipher C014
+ {
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+ "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA",
+ TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kECDHE,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_AES256,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
+ },
+
+
+ // HMAC based TLS v1.2 ciphersuites from RFC5289
+
+ // Cipher C023
+ {
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
+ "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256",
+ TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
+ SSL_kECDHE,
+ SSL_aECDSA,
+ SSL_AES128,
+ SSL_SHA256,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256,
+ },
+
+ // Cipher C024
+ {
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384,
+ "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384",
+ TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384,
+ SSL_kECDHE,
+ SSL_aECDSA,
+ SSL_AES256,
+ SSL_SHA384,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384,
+ },
+
+ // Cipher C027
+ {
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
+ "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256",
+ TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
+ SSL_kECDHE,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_AES128,
+ SSL_SHA256,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256,
+ },
+
+ // Cipher C028
+ {
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384,
+ "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384",
+ TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384,
+ SSL_kECDHE,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_AES256,
+ SSL_SHA384,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384,
+ },
+
+
+ // GCM based TLS v1.2 ciphersuites from RFC5289
+
+ // Cipher C02B
+ {
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+ "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256",
+ TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+ SSL_kECDHE,
+ SSL_aECDSA,
+ SSL_AES128GCM,
+ SSL_AEAD,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256,
+ },
+
+ // Cipher C02C
+ {
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+ "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384",
+ TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+ SSL_kECDHE,
+ SSL_aECDSA,
+ SSL_AES256GCM,
+ SSL_AEAD,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384,
+ },
+
+ // Cipher C02F
+ {
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+ "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256",
+ TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+ SSL_kECDHE,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_AES128GCM,
+ SSL_AEAD,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256,
+ },
+
+ // Cipher C030
+ {
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+ "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384",
+ TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+ SSL_kECDHE,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_AES256GCM,
+ SSL_AEAD,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384,
+ },
+
+ // ECDHE-PSK cipher suites.
+
+ // Cipher C035
+ {
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+ "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA",
+ TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kECDHE,
+ SSL_aPSK,
+ SSL_AES128,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
+ },
+
+ // Cipher C036
+ {
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+ "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA",
+ TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kECDHE,
+ SSL_aPSK,
+ SSL_AES256,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
+ },
+
+ // ChaCha20-Poly1305 cipher suites.
+
+ // Cipher CCA8
+ {
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
+ "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256",
+ TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
+ SSL_kECDHE,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305,
+ SSL_AEAD,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256,
+ },
+
+ // Cipher CCA9
+ {
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
+ "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256",
+ TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
+ SSL_kECDHE,
+ SSL_aECDSA,
+ SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305,
+ SSL_AEAD,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256,
+ },
+
+ // Cipher CCAB
+ {
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
+ "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256",
+ TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
+ SSL_kECDHE,
+ SSL_aPSK,
+ SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305,
+ SSL_AEAD,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256,
+ },
+
+};
+
+static const size_t kCiphersLen = OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kCiphers);
+
+#define CIPHER_ADD 1
+#define CIPHER_KILL 2
+#define CIPHER_DEL 3
+#define CIPHER_ORD 4
+#define CIPHER_SPECIAL 5
+
+typedef struct cipher_order_st {
+ const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
+ bool active;
+ bool in_group;
+ struct cipher_order_st *next, *prev;
+} CIPHER_ORDER;
+
+typedef struct cipher_alias_st {
+ // name is the name of the cipher alias.
+ const char *name;
+
+ // The following fields are bitmasks for the corresponding fields on
+ // |SSL_CIPHER|. A cipher matches a cipher alias iff, for each bitmask, the
+ // bit corresponding to the cipher's value is set to 1. If any bitmask is
+ // all zeroes, the alias matches nothing. Use |~0u| for the default value.
+ uint32_t algorithm_mkey;
+ uint32_t algorithm_auth;
+ uint32_t algorithm_enc;
+ uint32_t algorithm_mac;
+
+ // min_version, if non-zero, matches all ciphers which were added in that
+ // particular protocol version.
+ uint16_t min_version;
+} CIPHER_ALIAS;
+
+static const CIPHER_ALIAS kCipherAliases[] = {
+ // "ALL" doesn't include eNULL. It must be explicitly enabled.
+ {"ALL", ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
+
+ // The "COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT" rule is omitted. It matches nothing.
+
+ // key exchange aliases
+ // (some of those using only a single bit here combine
+ // multiple key exchange algs according to the RFCs.
+ {"kRSA", SSL_kRSA, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
+
+ {"kECDHE", SSL_kECDHE, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
+ {"kEECDH", SSL_kECDHE, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
+ {"ECDH", SSL_kECDHE, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
+
+ {"kPSK", SSL_kPSK, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
+
+ // server authentication aliases
+ {"aRSA", ~0u, SSL_aRSA, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
+ {"aECDSA", ~0u, SSL_aECDSA, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
+ {"ECDSA", ~0u, SSL_aECDSA, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
+ {"aPSK", ~0u, SSL_aPSK, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
+
+ // aliases combining key exchange and server authentication
+ {"ECDHE", SSL_kECDHE, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
+ {"EECDH", SSL_kECDHE, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
+ {"RSA", SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
+ {"PSK", SSL_kPSK, SSL_aPSK, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
+
+ // symmetric encryption aliases
+ {"3DES", ~0u, ~0u, SSL_3DES, ~0u, 0},
+ {"AES128", ~0u, ~0u, SSL_AES128 | SSL_AES128GCM, ~0u, 0},
+ {"AES256", ~0u, ~0u, SSL_AES256 | SSL_AES256GCM, ~0u, 0},
+ {"AES", ~0u, ~0u, SSL_AES, ~0u, 0},
+ {"AESGCM", ~0u, ~0u, SSL_AES128GCM | SSL_AES256GCM, ~0u, 0},
+ {"CHACHA20", ~0u, ~0u, SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305, ~0u, 0},
+
+ // MAC aliases
+ {"SHA1", ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, SSL_SHA1, 0},
+ {"SHA", ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, SSL_SHA1, 0},
+ {"SHA256", ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, SSL_SHA256, 0},
+ {"SHA384", ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, SSL_SHA384, 0},
+
+ // Legacy protocol minimum version aliases. "TLSv1" is intentionally the
+ // same as "SSLv3".
+ {"SSLv3", ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, SSL3_VERSION},
+ {"TLSv1", ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, SSL3_VERSION},
+ {"TLSv1.2", ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, TLS1_2_VERSION},
+
+ // Legacy strength classes.
+ {"HIGH", ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
+ {"FIPS", ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
+};
+
+static const size_t kCipherAliasesLen = OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kCipherAliases);
+
+static int ssl_cipher_id_cmp(const void *in_a, const void *in_b) {
+ const SSL_CIPHER *a = reinterpret_cast<const SSL_CIPHER *>(in_a);
+ const SSL_CIPHER *b = reinterpret_cast<const SSL_CIPHER *>(in_b);
+
+ if (a->id > b->id) {
+ return 1;
+ } else if (a->id < b->id) {
+ return -1;
+ } else {
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+
+bool ssl_cipher_get_evp_aead(const EVP_AEAD **out_aead,
+ size_t *out_mac_secret_len,
+ size_t *out_fixed_iv_len, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher,
+ uint16_t version, int is_dtls) {
+ *out_aead = NULL;
+ *out_mac_secret_len = 0;
+ *out_fixed_iv_len = 0;
+
+ const int is_tls12 = version == TLS1_2_VERSION && !is_dtls;
+
+ if (cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD) {
+ if (cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES128GCM) {
+ *out_aead =
+ is_tls12 ? EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm_tls12() : EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm();
+ *out_fixed_iv_len = 4;
+ } else if (cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES256GCM) {
+ *out_aead =
+ is_tls12 ? EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm_tls12() : EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm();
+ *out_fixed_iv_len = 4;
+ } else if (cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305) {
+ *out_aead = EVP_aead_chacha20_poly1305();
+ *out_fixed_iv_len = 12;
+ } else {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ // In TLS 1.3, the iv_len is equal to the AEAD nonce length whereas the code
+ // above computes the TLS 1.2 construction.
+ if (version >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+ *out_fixed_iv_len = EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(*out_aead);
+ }
+ } else if (cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_SHA1) {
+ if (cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eNULL) {
+ if (version == SSL3_VERSION) {
+ *out_aead = EVP_aead_null_sha1_ssl3();
+ } else {
+ *out_aead = EVP_aead_null_sha1_tls();
+ }
+ } else if (cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_3DES) {
+ if (version == SSL3_VERSION) {
+ *out_aead = EVP_aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_ssl3();
+ *out_fixed_iv_len = 8;
+ } else if (version == TLS1_VERSION) {
+ *out_aead = EVP_aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv();
+ *out_fixed_iv_len = 8;
+ } else {
+ *out_aead = EVP_aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls();
+ }
+ } else if (cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES128) {
+ if (version == SSL3_VERSION) {
+ *out_aead = EVP_aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_ssl3();
+ *out_fixed_iv_len = 16;
+ } else if (version == TLS1_VERSION) {
+ *out_aead = EVP_aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv();
+ *out_fixed_iv_len = 16;
+ } else {
+ *out_aead = EVP_aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls();
+ }
+ } else if (cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES256) {
+ if (version == SSL3_VERSION) {
+ *out_aead = EVP_aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_ssl3();
+ *out_fixed_iv_len = 16;
+ } else if (version == TLS1_VERSION) {
+ *out_aead = EVP_aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv();
+ *out_fixed_iv_len = 16;
+ } else {
+ *out_aead = EVP_aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls();
+ }
+ } else {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ *out_mac_secret_len = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+ } else if (cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_SHA256) {
+ if (cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES128) {
+ *out_aead = EVP_aead_aes_128_cbc_sha256_tls();
+ } else if (cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES256) {
+ *out_aead = EVP_aead_aes_256_cbc_sha256_tls();
+ } else {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ *out_mac_secret_len = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+ } else if (cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_SHA384) {
+ if (cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_AES256) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ *out_aead = EVP_aead_aes_256_cbc_sha384_tls();
+ *out_mac_secret_len = SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+ } else {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+const EVP_MD *ssl_get_handshake_digest(uint16_t version,
+ const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+ switch (cipher->algorithm_prf) {
+ case SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT:
+ return version >= TLS1_2_VERSION ? EVP_sha256() : EVP_md5_sha1();
+ case SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256:
+ return EVP_sha256();
+ case SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384:
+ return EVP_sha384();
+ default:
+ assert(0);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+static bool is_cipher_list_separator(char c, int is_strict) {
+ if (c == ':') {
+ return true;
+ }
+ return !is_strict && (c == ' ' || c == ';' || c == ',');
+}
+
+// rule_equals returns whether the NUL-terminated string |rule| is equal to the
+// |buf_len| bytes at |buf|.
+static bool rule_equals(const char *rule, const char *buf, size_t buf_len) {
+ // |strncmp| alone only checks that |buf| is a prefix of |rule|.
+ return strncmp(rule, buf, buf_len) == 0 && rule[buf_len] == '\0';
+}
+
+static void ll_append_tail(CIPHER_ORDER **head, CIPHER_ORDER *curr,
+ CIPHER_ORDER **tail) {
+ if (curr == *tail) {
+ return;
+ }
+ if (curr == *head) {
+ *head = curr->next;
+ }
+ if (curr->prev != NULL) {
+ curr->prev->next = curr->next;
+ }
+ if (curr->next != NULL) {
+ curr->next->prev = curr->prev;
+ }
+ (*tail)->next = curr;
+ curr->prev = *tail;
+ curr->next = NULL;
+ *tail = curr;
+}
+
+static void ll_append_head(CIPHER_ORDER **head, CIPHER_ORDER *curr,
+ CIPHER_ORDER **tail) {
+ if (curr == *head) {
+ return;
+ }
+ if (curr == *tail) {
+ *tail = curr->prev;
+ }
+ if (curr->next != NULL) {
+ curr->next->prev = curr->prev;
+ }
+ if (curr->prev != NULL) {
+ curr->prev->next = curr->next;
+ }
+ (*head)->prev = curr;
+ curr->next = *head;
+ curr->prev = NULL;
+ *head = curr;
+}
+
+static void ssl_cipher_collect_ciphers(CIPHER_ORDER *co_list,
+ CIPHER_ORDER **head_p,
+ CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p) {
+ size_t co_list_num = 0;
+ for (const SSL_CIPHER &cipher : kCiphers) {
+ // TLS 1.3 ciphers do not participate in this mechanism.
+ if (cipher.algorithm_mkey != SSL_kGENERIC) {
+ co_list[co_list_num].cipher = &cipher;
+ co_list[co_list_num].next = NULL;
+ co_list[co_list_num].prev = NULL;
+ co_list[co_list_num].active = false;
+ co_list[co_list_num].in_group = false;
+ co_list_num++;
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Prepare linked list from list entries.
+ if (co_list_num > 0) {
+ co_list[0].prev = NULL;
+
+ if (co_list_num > 1) {
+ co_list[0].next = &co_list[1];
+
+ for (size_t i = 1; i < co_list_num - 1; i++) {
+ co_list[i].prev = &co_list[i - 1];
+ co_list[i].next = &co_list[i + 1];
+ }
+
+ co_list[co_list_num - 1].prev = &co_list[co_list_num - 2];
+ }
+
+ co_list[co_list_num - 1].next = NULL;
+
+ *head_p = &co_list[0];
+ *tail_p = &co_list[co_list_num - 1];
+ }
+}
+
+// ssl_cipher_apply_rule applies the rule type |rule| to ciphers matching its
+// parameters in the linked list from |*head_p| to |*tail_p|. It writes the new
+// head and tail of the list to |*head_p| and |*tail_p|, respectively.
+//
+// - If |cipher_id| is non-zero, only that cipher is selected.
+// - Otherwise, if |strength_bits| is non-negative, it selects ciphers
+// of that strength.
+// - Otherwise, it selects ciphers that match each bitmasks in |alg_*| and
+// |min_version|.
+static void ssl_cipher_apply_rule(
+ uint32_t cipher_id, uint32_t alg_mkey, uint32_t alg_auth,
+ uint32_t alg_enc, uint32_t alg_mac, uint16_t min_version, int rule,
+ int strength_bits, bool in_group, CIPHER_ORDER **head_p,
+ CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p) {
+ CIPHER_ORDER *head, *tail, *curr, *next, *last;
+ const SSL_CIPHER *cp;
+ bool reverse = false;
+
+ if (cipher_id == 0 && strength_bits == -1 && min_version == 0 &&
+ (alg_mkey == 0 || alg_auth == 0 || alg_enc == 0 || alg_mac == 0)) {
+ // The rule matches nothing, so bail early.
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (rule == CIPHER_DEL) {
+ // needed to maintain sorting between currently deleted ciphers
+ reverse = true;
+ }
+
+ head = *head_p;
+ tail = *tail_p;
+
+ if (reverse) {
+ next = tail;
+ last = head;
+ } else {
+ next = head;
+ last = tail;
+ }
+
+ curr = NULL;
+ for (;;) {
+ if (curr == last) {
+ break;
+ }
+
+ curr = next;
+ if (curr == NULL) {
+ break;
+ }
+
+ next = reverse ? curr->prev : curr->next;
+ cp = curr->cipher;
+
+ // Selection criteria is either a specific cipher, the value of
+ // |strength_bits|, or the algorithms used.
+ if (cipher_id != 0) {
+ if (cipher_id != cp->id) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ } else if (strength_bits >= 0) {
+ if (strength_bits != SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(cp, NULL)) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (!(alg_mkey & cp->algorithm_mkey) ||
+ !(alg_auth & cp->algorithm_auth) ||
+ !(alg_enc & cp->algorithm_enc) ||
+ !(alg_mac & cp->algorithm_mac) ||
+ (min_version != 0 && SSL_CIPHER_get_min_version(cp) != min_version) ||
+ // The NULL cipher must be selected explicitly.
+ cp->algorithm_enc == SSL_eNULL) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+
+ // add the cipher if it has not been added yet.
+ if (rule == CIPHER_ADD) {
+ // reverse == false
+ if (!curr->active) {
+ ll_append_tail(&head, curr, &tail);
+ curr->active = true;
+ curr->in_group = in_group;
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Move the added cipher to this location
+ else if (rule == CIPHER_ORD) {
+ // reverse == false
+ if (curr->active) {
+ ll_append_tail(&head, curr, &tail);
+ curr->in_group = false;
+ }
+ } else if (rule == CIPHER_DEL) {
+ // reverse == true
+ if (curr->active) {
+ // most recently deleted ciphersuites get best positions
+ // for any future CIPHER_ADD (note that the CIPHER_DEL loop
+ // works in reverse to maintain the order)
+ ll_append_head(&head, curr, &tail);
+ curr->active = false;
+ curr->in_group = false;
+ }
+ } else if (rule == CIPHER_KILL) {
+ // reverse == false
+ if (head == curr) {
+ head = curr->next;
+ } else {
+ curr->prev->next = curr->next;
+ }
+
+ if (tail == curr) {
+ tail = curr->prev;
+ }
+ curr->active = false;
+ if (curr->next != NULL) {
+ curr->next->prev = curr->prev;
+ }
+ if (curr->prev != NULL) {
+ curr->prev->next = curr->next;
+ }
+ curr->next = NULL;
+ curr->prev = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ *head_p = head;
+ *tail_p = tail;
+}
+
+static bool ssl_cipher_strength_sort(CIPHER_ORDER **head_p,
+ CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p) {
+ // This routine sorts the ciphers with descending strength. The sorting must
+ // keep the pre-sorted sequence, so we apply the normal sorting routine as
+ // '+' movement to the end of the list.
+ int max_strength_bits = 0;
+ CIPHER_ORDER *curr = *head_p;
+ while (curr != NULL) {
+ if (curr->active &&
+ SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(curr->cipher, NULL) > max_strength_bits) {
+ max_strength_bits = SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(curr->cipher, NULL);
+ }
+ curr = curr->next;
+ }
+
+ Array<int> number_uses;
+ if (!number_uses.Init(max_strength_bits + 1)) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ OPENSSL_memset(number_uses.data(), 0, (max_strength_bits + 1) * sizeof(int));
+
+ // Now find the strength_bits values actually used.
+ curr = *head_p;
+ while (curr != NULL) {
+ if (curr->active) {
+ number_uses[SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(curr->cipher, NULL)]++;
+ }
+ curr = curr->next;
+ }
+
+ // Go through the list of used strength_bits values in descending order.
+ for (int i = max_strength_bits; i >= 0; i--) {
+ if (number_uses[i] > 0) {
+ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, i, false, head_p,
+ tail_p);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+static bool ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(const char *rule_str,
+ CIPHER_ORDER **head_p,
+ CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p, bool strict) {
+ uint32_t alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac;
+ uint16_t min_version;
+ const char *l, *buf;
+ int rule;
+ bool multi, skip_rule, in_group = false, has_group = false;
+ size_t j, buf_len;
+ uint32_t cipher_id;
+ char ch;
+
+ l = rule_str;
+ for (;;) {
+ ch = *l;
+
+ if (ch == '\0') {
+ break; // done
+ }
+
+ if (in_group) {
+ if (ch == ']') {
+ if (*tail_p) {
+ (*tail_p)->in_group = false;
+ }
+ in_group = false;
+ l++;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (ch == '|') {
+ rule = CIPHER_ADD;
+ l++;
+ continue;
+ } else if (!(ch >= 'a' && ch <= 'z') && !(ch >= 'A' && ch <= 'Z') &&
+ !(ch >= '0' && ch <= '9')) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_OPERATOR_IN_GROUP);
+ return false;
+ } else {
+ rule = CIPHER_ADD;
+ }
+ } else if (ch == '-') {
+ rule = CIPHER_DEL;
+ l++;
+ } else if (ch == '+') {
+ rule = CIPHER_ORD;
+ l++;
+ } else if (ch == '!') {
+ rule = CIPHER_KILL;
+ l++;
+ } else if (ch == '@') {
+ rule = CIPHER_SPECIAL;
+ l++;
+ } else if (ch == '[') {
+ assert(!in_group);
+ in_group = true;
+ has_group = true;
+ l++;
+ continue;
+ } else {
+ rule = CIPHER_ADD;
+ }
+
+ // If preference groups are enabled, the only legal operator is +.
+ // Otherwise the in_group bits will get mixed up.
+ if (has_group && rule != CIPHER_ADD) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_MIXED_SPECIAL_OPERATOR_WITH_GROUPS);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (is_cipher_list_separator(ch, strict)) {
+ l++;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ multi = false;
+ cipher_id = 0;
+ alg_mkey = ~0u;
+ alg_auth = ~0u;
+ alg_enc = ~0u;
+ alg_mac = ~0u;
+ min_version = 0;
+ skip_rule = false;
+
+ for (;;) {
+ ch = *l;
+ buf = l;
+ buf_len = 0;
+ while ((ch >= 'A' && ch <= 'Z') || (ch >= '0' && ch <= '9') ||
+ (ch >= 'a' && ch <= 'z') || ch == '-' || ch == '.' || ch == '_') {
+ ch = *(++l);
+ buf_len++;
+ }
+
+ if (buf_len == 0) {
+ // We hit something we cannot deal with, it is no command or separator
+ // nor alphanumeric, so we call this an error.
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (rule == CIPHER_SPECIAL) {
+ break;
+ }
+
+ // Look for a matching exact cipher. These aren't allowed in multipart
+ // rules.
+ if (!multi && ch != '+') {
+ for (j = 0; j < kCiphersLen; j++) {
+ const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = &kCiphers[j];
+ if (rule_equals(cipher->name, buf, buf_len) ||
+ rule_equals(cipher->standard_name, buf, buf_len)) {
+ cipher_id = cipher->id;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (cipher_id == 0) {
+ // If not an exact cipher, look for a matching cipher alias.
+ for (j = 0; j < kCipherAliasesLen; j++) {
+ if (rule_equals(kCipherAliases[j].name, buf, buf_len)) {
+ alg_mkey &= kCipherAliases[j].algorithm_mkey;
+ alg_auth &= kCipherAliases[j].algorithm_auth;
+ alg_enc &= kCipherAliases[j].algorithm_enc;
+ alg_mac &= kCipherAliases[j].algorithm_mac;
+
+ if (min_version != 0 &&
+ min_version != kCipherAliases[j].min_version) {
+ skip_rule = true;
+ } else {
+ min_version = kCipherAliases[j].min_version;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (j == kCipherAliasesLen) {
+ skip_rule = true;
+ if (strict) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND);
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Check for a multipart rule.
+ if (ch != '+') {
+ break;
+ }
+ l++;
+ multi = true;
+ }
+
+ // Ok, we have the rule, now apply it.
+ if (rule == CIPHER_SPECIAL) {
+ if (buf_len != 8 || strncmp(buf, "STRENGTH", 8) != 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND);
+ return false;
+ }
+ if (!ssl_cipher_strength_sort(head_p, tail_p)) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ // We do not support any "multi" options together with "@", so throw away
+ // the rest of the command, if any left, until end or ':' is found.
+ while (*l != '\0' && !is_cipher_list_separator(*l, strict)) {
+ l++;
+ }
+ } else if (!skip_rule) {
+ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(cipher_id, alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac,
+ min_version, rule, -1, in_group, head_p, tail_p);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (in_group) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+bool ssl_create_cipher_list(
+ struct ssl_cipher_preference_list_st **out_cipher_list,
+ const char *rule_str, bool strict) {
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipherstack = NULL;
+ CIPHER_ORDER *co_list = NULL, *head = NULL, *tail = NULL, *curr;
+ uint8_t *in_group_flags = NULL;
+ unsigned int num_in_group_flags = 0;
+ struct ssl_cipher_preference_list_st *pref_list = NULL;
+
+ // Return with error if nothing to do.
+ if (rule_str == NULL || out_cipher_list == NULL) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ // Now we have to collect the available ciphers from the compiled in ciphers.
+ // We cannot get more than the number compiled in, so it is used for
+ // allocation.
+ co_list = (CIPHER_ORDER *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CIPHER_ORDER) * kCiphersLen);
+ if (co_list == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ ssl_cipher_collect_ciphers(co_list, &head, &tail);
+
+ // Now arrange all ciphers by preference:
+ // TODO(davidben): Compute this order once and copy it.
+
+ // Everything else being equal, prefer ECDHE_ECDSA and ECDHE_RSA over other
+ // key exchange mechanisms
+ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aECDSA, ~0u, ~0u, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1,
+ false, &head, &tail);
+ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kECDHE, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, false,
+ &head, &tail);
+ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0, CIPHER_DEL, -1, false, &head,
+ &tail);
+
+ // Order the bulk ciphers. First the preferred AEAD ciphers. We prefer
+ // CHACHA20 unless there is hardware support for fast and constant-time
+ // AES_GCM. Of the two CHACHA20 variants, the new one is preferred over the
+ // old one.
+ if (EVP_has_aes_hardware()) {
+ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, ~0u, ~0u, SSL_AES128GCM, ~0u, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1,
+ false, &head, &tail);
+ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, ~0u, ~0u, SSL_AES256GCM, ~0u, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1,
+ false, &head, &tail);
+ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, ~0u, ~0u, SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305, ~0u, 0, CIPHER_ADD,
+ -1, false, &head, &tail);
+ } else {
+ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, ~0u, ~0u, SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305, ~0u, 0, CIPHER_ADD,
+ -1, false, &head, &tail);
+ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, ~0u, ~0u, SSL_AES128GCM, ~0u, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1,
+ false, &head, &tail);
+ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, ~0u, ~0u, SSL_AES256GCM, ~0u, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1,
+ false, &head, &tail);
+ }
+
+ // Then the legacy non-AEAD ciphers: AES_128_CBC, AES_256_CBC,
+ // 3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA.
+ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, ~0u, ~0u, SSL_AES128, ~0u, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, false,
+ &head, &tail);
+ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, ~0u, ~0u, SSL_AES256, ~0u, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, false,
+ &head, &tail);
+ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, ~0u, ~0u, SSL_3DES, ~0u, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, false,
+ &head, &tail);
+
+ // Temporarily enable everything else for sorting
+ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, false, &head,
+ &tail);
+
+ // Move ciphers without forward secrecy to the end.
+ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kPSK), ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0, CIPHER_ORD,
+ -1, false, &head, &tail);
+
+ // Now disable everything (maintaining the ordering!)
+ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0, CIPHER_DEL, -1, false, &head,
+ &tail);
+
+ // If the rule_string begins with DEFAULT, apply the default rule before
+ // using the (possibly available) additional rules.
+ const char *rule_p = rule_str;
+ if (strncmp(rule_str, "DEFAULT", 7) == 0) {
+ if (!ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST, &head, &tail,
+ strict)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ rule_p += 7;
+ if (*rule_p == ':') {
+ rule_p++;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (*rule_p != '\0' &&
+ !ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(rule_p, &head, &tail, strict)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ // Allocate new "cipherstack" for the result, return with error
+ // if we cannot get one.
+ cipherstack = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null();
+ if (cipherstack == NULL) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ in_group_flags = (uint8_t *)OPENSSL_malloc(kCiphersLen);
+ if (!in_group_flags) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ // The cipher selection for the list is done. The ciphers are added
+ // to the resulting precedence to the STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER).
+ for (curr = head; curr != NULL; curr = curr->next) {
+ if (curr->active) {
+ if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(cipherstack, curr->cipher)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ in_group_flags[num_in_group_flags++] = curr->in_group;
+ }
+ }
+ OPENSSL_free(co_list); // Not needed any longer
+ co_list = NULL;
+
+ pref_list = (ssl_cipher_preference_list_st *)OPENSSL_malloc(
+ sizeof(struct ssl_cipher_preference_list_st));
+ if (!pref_list) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ pref_list->ciphers = cipherstack;
+ pref_list->in_group_flags = NULL;
+ if (num_in_group_flags) {
+ pref_list->in_group_flags = (uint8_t *)OPENSSL_malloc(num_in_group_flags);
+ if (!pref_list->in_group_flags) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(pref_list->in_group_flags, in_group_flags,
+ num_in_group_flags);
+ }
+ OPENSSL_free(in_group_flags);
+ in_group_flags = NULL;
+ if (*out_cipher_list != NULL) {
+ ssl_cipher_preference_list_free(*out_cipher_list);
+ }
+ *out_cipher_list = pref_list;
+ pref_list = NULL;
+
+ // Configuring an empty cipher list is an error but still updates the
+ // output.
+ if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num((*out_cipher_list)->ciphers) == 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+
+err:
+ OPENSSL_free(co_list);
+ OPENSSL_free(in_group_flags);
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipherstack);
+ if (pref_list) {
+ OPENSSL_free(pref_list->in_group_flags);
+ }
+ OPENSSL_free(pref_list);
+ return false;
+}
+
+uint16_t ssl_cipher_get_value(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+ uint32_t id = cipher->id;
+ // All ciphers are SSLv3.
+ assert((id & 0xff000000) == 0x03000000);
+ return id & 0xffff;
+}
+
+uint32_t ssl_cipher_auth_mask_for_key(const EVP_PKEY *key) {
+ switch (EVP_PKEY_id(key)) {
+ case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
+ return SSL_aRSA;
+ case EVP_PKEY_EC:
+ case EVP_PKEY_ED25519:
+ // Ed25519 keys in TLS 1.2 repurpose the ECDSA ciphers.
+ return SSL_aECDSA;
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+
+bool ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+ return (cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aCERT) != 0;
+}
+
+bool ssl_cipher_requires_server_key_exchange(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+ // Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchanges require a ServerKeyExchange. It is
+ // optional or omitted in all others.
+ return (cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kECDHE) != 0;
+}
+
+size_t ssl_cipher_get_record_split_len(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+ size_t block_size;
+ switch (cipher->algorithm_enc) {
+ case SSL_3DES:
+ block_size = 8;
+ break;
+ case SSL_AES128:
+ case SSL_AES256:
+ block_size = 16;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ // All supported TLS 1.0 ciphers use SHA-1.
+ assert(cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_SHA1);
+ size_t ret = 1 + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+ ret += block_size - (ret % block_size);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+} // namespace bssl
+
+using namespace bssl;
+
+const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_cipher_by_value(uint16_t value) {
+ SSL_CIPHER c;
+
+ c.id = 0x03000000L | value;
+ return reinterpret_cast<const SSL_CIPHER *>(bsearch(
+ &c, kCiphers, kCiphersLen, sizeof(SSL_CIPHER), ssl_cipher_id_cmp));
+}
+
+uint32_t SSL_CIPHER_get_id(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) { return cipher->id; }
+
+int SSL_CIPHER_is_aead(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+ return (cipher->algorithm_mac & SSL_AEAD) != 0;
+}
+
+int SSL_CIPHER_get_cipher_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+ switch (cipher->algorithm_enc) {
+ case SSL_eNULL:
+ return NID_undef;
+ case SSL_3DES:
+ return NID_des_ede3_cbc;
+ case SSL_AES128:
+ return NID_aes_128_cbc;
+ case SSL_AES256:
+ return NID_aes_256_cbc;
+ case SSL_AES128GCM:
+ return NID_aes_128_gcm;
+ case SSL_AES256GCM:
+ return NID_aes_256_gcm;
+ case SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305:
+ return NID_chacha20_poly1305;
+ }
+ assert(0);
+ return NID_undef;
+}
+
+int SSL_CIPHER_get_digest_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+ switch (cipher->algorithm_mac) {
+ case SSL_AEAD:
+ return NID_undef;
+ case SSL_SHA1:
+ return NID_sha1;
+ case SSL_SHA256:
+ return NID_sha256;
+ case SSL_SHA384:
+ return NID_sha384;
+ }
+ assert(0);
+ return NID_undef;
+}
+
+int SSL_CIPHER_get_kx_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+ switch (cipher->algorithm_mkey) {
+ case SSL_kRSA:
+ return NID_kx_rsa;
+ case SSL_kECDHE:
+ return NID_kx_ecdhe;
+ case SSL_kPSK:
+ return NID_kx_psk;
+ case SSL_kGENERIC:
+ return NID_kx_any;
+ }
+ assert(0);
+ return NID_undef;
+}
+
+int SSL_CIPHER_get_auth_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+ switch (cipher->algorithm_auth) {
+ case SSL_aRSA:
+ return NID_auth_rsa;
+ case SSL_aECDSA:
+ return NID_auth_ecdsa;
+ case SSL_aPSK:
+ return NID_auth_psk;
+ case SSL_aGENERIC:
+ return NID_auth_any;
+ }
+ assert(0);
+ return NID_undef;
+}
+
+int SSL_CIPHER_get_prf_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+ switch (cipher->algorithm_prf) {
+ case SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT:
+ return NID_md5_sha1;
+ case SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256:
+ return NID_sha256;
+ case SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384:
+ return NID_sha384;
+ }
+ assert(0);
+ return NID_undef;
+}
+
+int SSL_CIPHER_is_block_cipher(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+ return (cipher->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL) == 0 &&
+ cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD;
+}
+
+uint16_t SSL_CIPHER_get_min_version(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+ if (cipher->algorithm_mkey == SSL_kGENERIC ||
+ cipher->algorithm_auth == SSL_aGENERIC) {
+ return TLS1_3_VERSION;
+ }
+
+ if (cipher->algorithm_prf != SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT) {
+ // Cipher suites before TLS 1.2 use the default PRF, while all those added
+ // afterwards specify a particular hash.
+ return TLS1_2_VERSION;
+ }
+ return SSL3_VERSION;
+}
+
+uint16_t SSL_CIPHER_get_max_version(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+ if (cipher->algorithm_mkey == SSL_kGENERIC ||
+ cipher->algorithm_auth == SSL_aGENERIC) {
+ return TLS1_3_VERSION;
+ }
+ return TLS1_2_VERSION;
+}
+
+// return the actual cipher being used
+const char *SSL_CIPHER_get_name(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+ if (cipher != NULL) {
+ return cipher->name;
+ }
+
+ return "(NONE)";
+}
+
+const char *SSL_CIPHER_standard_name(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+ return cipher->standard_name;
+}
+
+const char *SSL_CIPHER_get_kx_name(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+ if (cipher == NULL) {
+ return "";
+ }
+
+ switch (cipher->algorithm_mkey) {
+ case SSL_kRSA:
+ return "RSA";
+
+ case SSL_kECDHE:
+ switch (cipher->algorithm_auth) {
+ case SSL_aECDSA:
+ return "ECDHE_ECDSA";
+ case SSL_aRSA:
+ return "ECDHE_RSA";
+ case SSL_aPSK:
+ return "ECDHE_PSK";
+ default:
+ assert(0);
+ return "UNKNOWN";
+ }
+
+ case SSL_kPSK:
+ assert(cipher->algorithm_auth == SSL_aPSK);
+ return "PSK";
+
+ case SSL_kGENERIC:
+ assert(cipher->algorithm_auth == SSL_aGENERIC);
+ return "GENERIC";
+
+ default:
+ assert(0);
+ return "UNKNOWN";
+ }
+}
+
+char *SSL_CIPHER_get_rfc_name(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+ if (cipher == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return OPENSSL_strdup(SSL_CIPHER_standard_name(cipher));
+}
+
+int SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, int *out_alg_bits) {
+ if (cipher == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ int alg_bits, strength_bits;
+ switch (cipher->algorithm_enc) {
+ case SSL_AES128:
+ case SSL_AES128GCM:
+ alg_bits = 128;
+ strength_bits = 128;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_AES256:
+ case SSL_AES256GCM:
+ case SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305:
+ alg_bits = 256;
+ strength_bits = 256;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_3DES:
+ alg_bits = 168;
+ strength_bits = 112;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_eNULL:
+ alg_bits = 0;
+ strength_bits = 0;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ assert(0);
+ alg_bits = 0;
+ strength_bits = 0;
+ }
+
+ if (out_alg_bits != NULL) {
+ *out_alg_bits = alg_bits;
+ }
+ return strength_bits;
+}
+
+const char *SSL_CIPHER_description(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, char *buf,
+ int len) {
+ const char *kx, *au, *enc, *mac;
+ uint32_t alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac;
+
+ alg_mkey = cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+ alg_auth = cipher->algorithm_auth;
+ alg_enc = cipher->algorithm_enc;
+ alg_mac = cipher->algorithm_mac;
+
+ switch (alg_mkey) {
+ case SSL_kRSA:
+ kx = "RSA";
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_kECDHE:
+ kx = "ECDH";
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_kPSK:
+ kx = "PSK";
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_kGENERIC:
+ kx = "GENERIC";
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ kx = "unknown";
+ }
+
+ switch (alg_auth) {
+ case SSL_aRSA:
+ au = "RSA";
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_aECDSA:
+ au = "ECDSA";
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_aPSK:
+ au = "PSK";
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_aGENERIC:
+ au = "GENERIC";
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ au = "unknown";
+ break;
+ }
+
+ switch (alg_enc) {
+ case SSL_3DES:
+ enc = "3DES(168)";
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_AES128:
+ enc = "AES(128)";
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_AES256:
+ enc = "AES(256)";
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_AES128GCM:
+ enc = "AESGCM(128)";
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_AES256GCM:
+ enc = "AESGCM(256)";
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305:
+ enc = "ChaCha20-Poly1305";
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_eNULL:
+ enc="None";
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ enc = "unknown";
+ break;
+ }
+
+ switch (alg_mac) {
+ case SSL_SHA1:
+ mac = "SHA1";
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_SHA256:
+ mac = "SHA256";
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_SHA384:
+ mac = "SHA384";
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_AEAD:
+ mac = "AEAD";
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ mac = "unknown";
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (buf == NULL) {
+ len = 128;
+ buf = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(len);
+ if (buf == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ } else if (len < 128) {
+ return "Buffer too small";
+ }
+
+ BIO_snprintf(buf, len, "%-23s Kx=%-8s Au=%-4s Enc=%-9s Mac=%-4s\n",
+ cipher->name, kx, au, enc, mac);
+ return buf;
+}
+
+const char *SSL_CIPHER_get_version(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+ return "TLSv1/SSLv3";
+}
+
+STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(void) { return NULL; }
+
+int SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(int id, COMP_METHOD *cm) { return 1; }
+
+const char *SSL_COMP_get_name(const COMP_METHOD *comp) { return NULL; }
+
+const char *SSL_COMP_get0_name(const SSL_COMP *comp) { return comp->name; }
+
+int SSL_COMP_get_id(const SSL_COMP *comp) { return comp->id; }
+
+void SSL_COMP_free_compression_methods(void) {}
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