1 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
4 * This package is an SSL implementation written
5 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
6 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
9 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
10 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
11 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
12 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
13 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
16 * the code are not to be removed.
17 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
18 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
19 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
20 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
23 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
26 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
27 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
28 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
29 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
30 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
31 * must display the following acknowledgement:
32 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
33 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
34 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
35 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
36 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
37 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
38 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
41 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
43 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
44 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
45 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
46 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
47 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
48 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
49 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
52 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
53 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
54 * copied and put under another distribution licence
55 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 /* ====================================================================
58 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
61 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
64 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
65 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
68 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
69 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
72 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
73 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
74 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
75 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
78 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
79 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
80 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
83 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
84 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
89 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
92 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
93 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
94 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
95 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
96 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
97 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
98 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
99 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
100 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
101 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
102 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
103 * ====================================================================
105 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
106 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
107 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
108 /* ====================================================================
109 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
110 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
111 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */
113 #include <openssl/ssl.h>
119 #include <openssl/rand.h>
121 #include "../crypto/internal.h"
122 #include "internal.h"
127 SSL_HANDSHAKE::SSL_HANDSHAKE(SSL *ssl_arg)
129 scts_requested(false),
130 needs_psk_binder(false),
131 received_hello_retry_request(false),
132 sent_hello_retry_request(false),
133 received_custom_extension(false),
134 handshake_finalized(false),
135 accept_psk_mode(false),
137 certificate_status_expected(false),
138 ocsp_stapling_requested(false),
139 should_ack_sni(false),
140 in_false_start(false),
141 in_early_data(false),
142 early_data_offered(false),
143 can_early_read(false),
144 can_early_write(false),
145 next_proto_neg_seen(false),
146 ticket_expected(false),
147 extended_master_secret(false),
148 pending_private_key_op(false),
149 grease_seeded(false) {
152 SSL_HANDSHAKE::~SSL_HANDSHAKE() {
153 ssl->ctx->x509_method->hs_flush_cached_ca_names(this);
156 UniquePtr<SSL_HANDSHAKE> ssl_handshake_new(SSL *ssl) {
157 UniquePtr<SSL_HANDSHAKE> hs = MakeUnique<SSL_HANDSHAKE>(ssl);
159 !hs->transcript.Init()) {
165 bool ssl_check_message_type(SSL *ssl, const SSLMessage &msg, int type) {
166 if (msg.type != type) {
167 ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
168 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
169 ERR_add_error_dataf("got type %d, wanted type %d", msg.type, type);
176 bool ssl_add_message_cbb(SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb) {
178 if (!ssl->method->finish_message(ssl, cbb, &msg) ||
179 !ssl->method->add_message(ssl, std::move(msg))) {
186 size_t ssl_max_handshake_message_len(const SSL *ssl) {
187 // kMaxMessageLen is the default maximum message size for handshakes which do
188 // not accept peer certificate chains.
189 static const size_t kMaxMessageLen = 16384;
191 if (SSL_in_init(ssl)) {
192 if ((!ssl->server || (ssl->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) &&
193 kMaxMessageLen < ssl->max_cert_list) {
194 return ssl->max_cert_list;
196 return kMaxMessageLen;
199 if (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
200 // In TLS 1.2 and below, the largest acceptable post-handshake message is
206 // The largest acceptable post-handshake message for a server is a
207 // KeyUpdate. We will never initiate post-handshake auth.
211 // Clients must accept NewSessionTicket, so allow the default size.
212 return kMaxMessageLen;
215 bool ssl_hash_message(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, const SSLMessage &msg) {
216 // V2ClientHello messages are pre-hashed.
217 if (msg.is_v2_hello) {
221 return hs->transcript.Update(msg.raw);
224 int ssl_parse_extensions(const CBS *cbs, uint8_t *out_alert,
225 const SSL_EXTENSION_TYPE *ext_types,
226 size_t num_ext_types, int ignore_unknown) {
228 for (size_t i = 0; i < num_ext_types; i++) {
229 *ext_types[i].out_present = 0;
230 CBS_init(ext_types[i].out_data, NULL, 0);
234 while (CBS_len(©) != 0) {
237 if (!CBS_get_u16(©, &type) ||
238 !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(©, &data)) {
239 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
240 *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
244 const SSL_EXTENSION_TYPE *ext_type = NULL;
245 for (size_t i = 0; i < num_ext_types; i++) {
246 if (type == ext_types[i].type) {
247 ext_type = &ext_types[i];
252 if (ext_type == NULL) {
253 if (ignore_unknown) {
256 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_EXTENSION);
257 *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
261 // Duplicate ext_types are forbidden.
262 if (*ext_type->out_present) {
263 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DUPLICATE_EXTENSION);
264 *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
268 *ext_type->out_present = 1;
269 *ext_type->out_data = data;
275 static void set_crypto_buffer(CRYPTO_BUFFER **dest, CRYPTO_BUFFER *src) {
276 // TODO(davidben): Remove this helper once |SSL_SESSION| can use |UniquePtr|
277 // and |UniquePtr| has up_ref helpers.
278 CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(*dest);
280 if (src != nullptr) {
281 CRYPTO_BUFFER_up_ref(src);
285 enum ssl_verify_result_t ssl_verify_peer_cert(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
286 SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
287 const SSL_SESSION *prev_session = ssl->s3->established_session.get();
288 if (prev_session != NULL) {
289 // If renegotiating, the server must not change the server certificate. See
290 // https://mitls.org/pages/attacks/3SHAKE. We never resume on renegotiation,
291 // so this check is sufficient to ensure the reported peer certificate never
292 // changes on renegotiation.
293 assert(!ssl->server);
294 if (sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(prev_session->certs) !=
295 sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(hs->new_session->certs)) {
296 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SERVER_CERT_CHANGED);
297 ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
298 return ssl_verify_invalid;
301 for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(hs->new_session->certs); i++) {
302 const CRYPTO_BUFFER *old_cert =
303 sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(prev_session->certs, i);
304 const CRYPTO_BUFFER *new_cert =
305 sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(hs->new_session->certs, i);
306 if (CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(old_cert) != CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(new_cert) ||
307 OPENSSL_memcmp(CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(old_cert),
308 CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(new_cert),
309 CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(old_cert)) != 0) {
310 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SERVER_CERT_CHANGED);
311 ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
312 return ssl_verify_invalid;
316 // The certificate is identical, so we may skip re-verifying the
317 // certificate. Since we only authenticated the previous one, copy other
318 // authentication from the established session and ignore what was newly
320 set_crypto_buffer(&hs->new_session->ocsp_response,
321 prev_session->ocsp_response);
322 set_crypto_buffer(&hs->new_session->signed_cert_timestamp_list,
323 prev_session->signed_cert_timestamp_list);
324 hs->new_session->verify_result = prev_session->verify_result;
325 return ssl_verify_ok;
328 uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN;
329 enum ssl_verify_result_t ret;
330 if (ssl->custom_verify_callback != nullptr) {
331 ret = ssl->custom_verify_callback(ssl, &alert);
334 hs->new_session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
336 case ssl_verify_invalid:
337 // If |SSL_VERIFY_NONE|, the error is non-fatal, but we keep the result.
338 if (ssl->verify_mode == SSL_VERIFY_NONE) {
342 hs->new_session->verify_result = X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION;
344 case ssl_verify_retry:
348 ret = ssl->ctx->x509_method->session_verify_cert_chain(
349 hs->new_session.get(), ssl, &alert)
351 : ssl_verify_invalid;
354 if (ret == ssl_verify_invalid) {
355 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
356 ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
362 uint16_t ssl_get_grease_value(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
363 enum ssl_grease_index_t index) {
364 // Draw entropy for all GREASE values at once. This avoids calling
365 // |RAND_bytes| repeatedly and makes the values consistent within a
366 // connection. The latter is so the second ClientHello matches after
367 // HelloRetryRequest and so supported_groups and key_shares are consistent.
368 if (!hs->grease_seeded) {
369 RAND_bytes(hs->grease_seed, sizeof(hs->grease_seed));
370 hs->grease_seeded = true;
373 // This generates a random value of the form 0xωaωa, for all 0 ≤ ω < 16.
374 uint16_t ret = hs->grease_seed[index];
375 ret = (ret & 0xf0) | 0x0a;
380 enum ssl_hs_wait_t ssl_get_finished(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
381 SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
383 if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
384 return ssl_hs_read_message;
387 if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, msg, SSL3_MT_FINISHED)) {
391 // Snapshot the finished hash before incorporating the new message.
392 uint8_t finished[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
394 if (!hs->transcript.GetFinishedMAC(finished, &finished_len,
395 SSL_get_session(ssl), !ssl->server) ||
396 !ssl_hash_message(hs, msg)) {
400 int finished_ok = CBS_mem_equal(&msg.body, finished, finished_len);
401 #if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
405 ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR);
406 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
410 // Copy the Finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks.
411 if (ssl->version != SSL3_VERSION) {
412 if (finished_len > sizeof(ssl->s3->previous_client_finished) ||
413 finished_len > sizeof(ssl->s3->previous_server_finished)) {
414 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
419 OPENSSL_memcpy(ssl->s3->previous_client_finished, finished, finished_len);
420 ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len = finished_len;
422 OPENSSL_memcpy(ssl->s3->previous_server_finished, finished, finished_len);
423 ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len = finished_len;
427 ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
431 bool ssl_send_finished(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
432 SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
433 const SSL_SESSION *session = SSL_get_session(ssl);
435 uint8_t finished[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
437 if (!hs->transcript.GetFinishedMAC(finished, &finished_len, session,
442 // Log the master secret, if logging is enabled.
443 if (!ssl_log_secret(ssl, "CLIENT_RANDOM",
445 session->master_key_length)) {
449 // Copy the Finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks.
450 if (ssl->version != SSL3_VERSION) {
451 if (finished_len > sizeof(ssl->s3->previous_client_finished) ||
452 finished_len > sizeof(ssl->s3->previous_server_finished)) {
453 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
458 OPENSSL_memcpy(ssl->s3->previous_server_finished, finished, finished_len);
459 ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len = finished_len;
461 OPENSSL_memcpy(ssl->s3->previous_client_finished, finished, finished_len);
462 ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len = finished_len;
468 if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body, SSL3_MT_FINISHED) ||
469 !CBB_add_bytes(&body, finished, finished_len) ||
470 !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get())) {
471 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
478 bool ssl_output_cert_chain(SSL *ssl) {
481 if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) ||
482 !ssl_add_cert_chain(ssl, &body) ||
483 !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get())) {
484 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
491 int ssl_run_handshake(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, bool *out_early_return) {
492 SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
494 // Resolve the operation the handshake was waiting on.
497 ERR_restore_state(hs->error.get());
501 int ret = ssl->method->flush_flight(ssl);
508 case ssl_hs_read_server_hello:
509 case ssl_hs_read_message:
510 case ssl_hs_read_change_cipher_spec: {
511 uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
513 ssl_open_record_t ret;
514 if (hs->wait == ssl_hs_read_change_cipher_spec) {
515 ret = ssl_open_change_cipher_spec(ssl, &consumed, &alert,
516 ssl->s3->read_buffer.span());
518 ret = ssl_open_handshake(ssl, &consumed, &alert,
519 ssl->s3->read_buffer.span());
521 if (ret == ssl_open_record_error &&
522 hs->wait == ssl_hs_read_server_hello) {
523 uint32_t err = ERR_peek_error();
524 if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_SSL &&
525 ERR_GET_REASON(err) == SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE) {
526 // Add a dedicated error code to the queue for a handshake_failure
527 // alert in response to ClientHello. This matches NSS's client
528 // behavior and gives a better error on a (probable) failure to
529 // negotiate initial parameters. Note: this error code comes after
532 // See https://crbug.com/446505.
533 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE_ON_CLIENT_HELLO);
537 int bio_ret = ssl_handle_open_record(ssl, &retry, ret, consumed, alert);
544 ssl->s3->read_buffer.DiscardConsumed();
548 case ssl_hs_read_end_of_early_data: {
549 if (ssl->s3->hs->can_early_read) {
550 // While we are processing early data, the handshake returns early.
551 *out_early_return = true;
554 hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
558 case ssl_hs_certificate_selection_pending:
559 ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_CERTIFICATE_SELECTION_PENDING;
560 hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
564 ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_HANDOFF;
565 hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
568 case ssl_hs_x509_lookup:
569 ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
570 hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
573 case ssl_hs_channel_id_lookup:
574 ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_CHANNEL_ID_LOOKUP;
575 hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
578 case ssl_hs_private_key_operation:
579 ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_OPERATION;
580 hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
583 case ssl_hs_pending_session:
584 ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_PENDING_SESSION;
585 hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
588 case ssl_hs_pending_ticket:
589 ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_PENDING_TICKET;
590 hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
593 case ssl_hs_certificate_verify:
594 ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
595 hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
598 case ssl_hs_early_data_rejected:
599 ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED;
600 // Cause |SSL_write| to start failing immediately.
601 hs->can_early_write = false;
604 case ssl_hs_early_return:
605 *out_early_return = true;
606 hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
613 // Run the state machine again.
614 hs->wait = ssl->do_handshake(hs);
615 if (hs->wait == ssl_hs_error) {
616 hs->error.reset(ERR_save_state());
619 if (hs->wait == ssl_hs_ok) {
620 // The handshake has completed.
621 *out_early_return = false;
625 // Otherwise, loop to the beginning and resolve what was blocking the