1 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
4 * This package is an SSL implementation written
5 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
6 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
9 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
10 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
11 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
12 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
13 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
16 * the code are not to be removed.
17 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
18 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
19 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
20 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
23 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
26 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
27 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
28 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
29 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
30 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
31 * must display the following acknowledgement:
32 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
33 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
34 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
35 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
36 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
37 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
38 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
41 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
43 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
44 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
45 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
46 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
47 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
48 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
49 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
52 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
53 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
54 * copied and put under another distribution licence
55 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
60 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
61 #include <openssl/buf.h>
62 #include <openssl/err.h>
63 #include <openssl/evp.h>
64 #include <openssl/mem.h>
65 #include <openssl/obj.h>
66 #include <openssl/thread.h>
67 #include <openssl/x509.h>
68 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
71 #include "../internal.h"
73 static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS g_ex_data_class =
74 CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS_INIT_WITH_APP_DATA;
76 /* CRL score values */
78 /* No unhandled critical extensions */
80 #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100
82 /* certificate is within CRL scope */
84 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080
88 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040
90 /* Issuer name matches certificate */
92 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020
94 /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
96 #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
98 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
100 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018
102 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
104 #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008
106 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
108 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004
110 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
112 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002
114 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e);
115 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
116 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
117 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
118 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
119 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
120 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
121 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
122 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
123 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
125 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
126 unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
127 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
128 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
129 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl,
130 int *pcrl_score, X509_CRL *base,
131 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
132 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer,
134 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
135 unsigned int *preasons);
136 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
137 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
138 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
139 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);
141 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
143 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
148 /* Return 1 is a certificate is self signed */
149 static int cert_self_signed(X509 *x)
151 X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
152 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS)
158 /* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */
160 static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
162 STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
165 /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */
166 certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x));
169 /* Look for exact match */
170 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
171 xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
172 if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x))
175 if (i < sk_X509_num(certs))
179 sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
183 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
185 X509 *x, *xtmp, *xtmp2, *chain_ss = NULL;
187 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
188 int depth, i, ok = 0;
189 int num, j, retry, trust;
190 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
191 STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL;
192 if (ctx->cert == NULL) {
193 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
194 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
197 if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
199 * This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We
200 * cannot do another one.
202 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
203 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
210 * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that
211 * the first entry is in place
213 ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null();
214 if (ctx->chain == NULL || !sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert)) {
215 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
216 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
219 X509_up_ref(ctx->cert);
220 ctx->last_untrusted = 1;
222 /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it.
223 * sktmp = ctx->untrusted ++ ctx->ctx->additional_untrusted */
224 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
225 && (sktmp = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) {
226 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
227 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
231 if (ctx->ctx->additional_untrusted != NULL) {
233 sktmp = sk_X509_new_null();
235 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
236 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
241 for (size_t k = 0; k < sk_X509_num(ctx->ctx->additional_untrusted);
243 if (!sk_X509_push(sktmp,
244 sk_X509_value(ctx->ctx->additional_untrusted,
246 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
247 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
253 num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
254 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
255 depth = param->depth;
258 /* If we have enough, we break */
260 break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
261 * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
262 * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code
265 /* If we are self signed, we break */
266 if (cert_self_signed(x))
269 * If asked see if we can find issuer in trusted store first
271 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) {
272 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
274 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP;
278 * If successful for now free up cert so it will be picked up
287 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
289 xtmp = find_issuer(ctx, sktmp, x);
291 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, xtmp)) {
292 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
293 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
298 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, xtmp);
299 ctx->last_untrusted++;
303 * reparse the full chain for the next one
311 /* Remember how many untrusted certs we have */
314 * at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted certificates.
315 * We now need to add at least one trusted one, if possible, otherwise we
321 * Examine last certificate in chain and see if it is self signed.
323 i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
324 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i - 1);
325 if (cert_self_signed(x)) {
326 /* we have a self signed certificate */
327 if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) {
329 * We have a single self signed certificate: see if we can
330 * find it in the store. We must have an exact match to avoid
331 * possible impersonation.
333 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
334 if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) {
335 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
336 ctx->current_cert = x;
337 ctx->error_depth = i - 1;
346 * We have a match: replace certificate with store
347 * version so we get any trust settings.
351 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
352 ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
356 * extract and save self signed certificate for later use
358 chain_ss = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
359 ctx->last_untrusted--;
362 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
365 /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
367 /* If we have enough, we break */
370 /* If we are self signed, we break */
371 if (cert_self_signed(x))
373 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
376 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP;
382 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x)) {
384 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
385 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
392 /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
393 trust = check_trust(ctx);
395 /* If explicitly rejected error */
396 if (trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) {
401 * If it's not explicitly trusted then check if there is an alternative
402 * chain that could be used. We only do this if we haven't already
403 * checked via TRUSTED_FIRST and the user hasn't switched off alternate
407 if (trust != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
408 && !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST)
409 && !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS)) {
411 xtmp2 = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j - 1);
412 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, xtmp2);
415 /* Check if we found an alternate chain */
418 * Free up the found cert we'll add it again later
423 * Dump all the certs above this point - we've found an
427 xtmp = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
431 ctx->last_untrusted = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
440 * If not explicitly trusted then indicate error unless it's a single
441 * self signed certificate in which case we've indicated an error already
442 * and set bad_chain == 1
444 if (trust != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED && !bad_chain) {
445 if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss)) {
446 if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
447 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
449 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
450 ctx->current_cert = x;
453 sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, chain_ss);
455 ctx->last_untrusted = num;
456 ctx->current_cert = chain_ss;
457 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
461 ctx->error_depth = num - 1;
468 /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
469 ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
480 * Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters because
481 * they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
484 ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
488 int err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain,
490 if (err != X509_V_OK) {
492 ctx->current_cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, ctx->error_depth);
498 /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
499 if (ctx->verify != NULL)
500 ok = ctx->verify(ctx);
502 ok = internal_verify(ctx);
506 /* Check name constraints */
508 ok = check_name_constraints(ctx);
512 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
513 if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
514 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
519 if (chain_ss != NULL)
522 /* Safety net, error returns must set ctx->error */
523 if (ok <= 0 && ctx->error == X509_V_OK)
524 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
529 * Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
532 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
536 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
537 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
538 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
544 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
546 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
549 ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
550 if (ret == X509_V_OK)
552 /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
553 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
557 ctx->current_cert = x;
558 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
559 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
562 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
564 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
566 *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
568 X509_up_ref(*issuer);
575 * Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied
579 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
581 int i, ok = 0, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
583 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
584 int proxy_path_length = 0;
586 int allow_proxy_certs;
590 * must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values: -1: we accept both CA and non-CA
591 * certificates, to allow direct use of self-signed certificates (which
592 * are marked as CA). 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is
593 * currently not used, but the possibility is present for future
594 * extensions. 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used
595 * for all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
599 /* CRL path validation */
601 allow_proxy_certs = 0;
602 purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
605 ! !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
606 purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
609 /* Check all untrusted certificates */
610 for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++) {
612 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
613 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
614 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
615 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
616 ctx->error_depth = i;
617 ctx->current_cert = x;
622 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) {
623 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
624 ctx->error_depth = i;
625 ctx->current_cert = x;
630 ret = X509_check_ca(x);
631 switch (must_be_ca) {
633 if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
634 && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0)) {
636 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
643 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
649 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
652 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
658 ctx->error_depth = i;
659 ctx->current_cert = x;
664 if (ctx->param->purpose > 0) {
665 ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0);
667 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
669 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
670 ctx->error_depth = i;
671 ctx->current_cert = x;
677 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
678 if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
679 && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
680 && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1))) {
681 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
682 ctx->error_depth = i;
683 ctx->current_cert = x;
688 /* Increment path length if not self issued */
689 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
692 * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate
693 * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate. If not,
694 * the next certificate must be a CA certificate.
696 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
697 if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen) {
698 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
699 ctx->error_depth = i;
700 ctx->current_cert = x;
715 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
719 /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
720 for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
721 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
722 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
723 if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
726 * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain
727 * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed
728 * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them
731 for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) {
732 NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
734 rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
738 case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
743 ctx->error_depth = i;
744 ctx->current_cert = x;
745 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
755 static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode)
757 ctx->error = errcode;
758 ctx->current_cert = ctx->cert;
759 ctx->error_depth = 0;
760 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
763 static int check_hosts(X509 *x, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id)
766 size_t n = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(id->hosts);
769 if (id->peername != NULL) {
770 OPENSSL_free(id->peername);
773 for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
774 name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(id->hosts, i);
775 if (X509_check_host(x, name, strlen(name), id->hostflags,
782 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
784 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param;
785 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id = vpm->id;
788 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL))
791 if (id->hosts && check_hosts(x, id) <= 0) {
792 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH))
795 if (id->email && X509_check_email(x, id->email, id->emaillen, 0) <= 0) {
796 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH))
799 if (id->ip && X509_check_ip(x, id->ip, id->iplen, 0) <= 0) {
800 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH))
806 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
811 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
813 /* Check all trusted certificates in chain */
814 for (i = ctx->last_untrusted; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
815 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
816 ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
817 /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */
818 if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
819 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
821 * If explicitly rejected notify callback and reject if not
824 if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) {
825 ctx->error_depth = i;
826 ctx->current_cert = x;
827 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
830 return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
834 * If we accept partial chains and have at least one trusted certificate
837 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
839 if (ctx->last_untrusted < (int)sk_X509_num(ctx->chain))
840 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
841 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, 0);
842 mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x);
844 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx);
846 ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
847 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
852 * If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow
853 * standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
855 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
858 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
861 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
863 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
864 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
866 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
871 for (i = 0; i <= last; i++) {
872 ctx->error_depth = i;
873 ok = check_cert(ctx);
880 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
882 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
885 unsigned int last_reasons;
886 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
887 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
888 ctx->current_cert = x;
889 ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
890 ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
891 ctx->current_reasons = 0;
892 while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) {
893 last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
894 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
896 ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
898 ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
900 * If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback
903 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
904 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
907 ctx->current_crl = crl;
908 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
913 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
916 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
922 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
924 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
934 * If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by another iteration,
937 if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons) {
938 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
939 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
947 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
952 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
954 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
959 ctx->current_crl = crl;
960 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
961 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
965 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
969 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
970 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
977 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
978 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
982 if (X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl)) {
983 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
988 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
989 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
992 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
993 if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA)) {
996 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
997 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1003 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
1008 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
1009 X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
1010 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
1012 int crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
1014 unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
1015 X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
1016 X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
1017 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
1019 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
1020 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
1021 reasons = *preasons;
1022 crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
1023 if (crl_score < best_score || crl_score == 0)
1025 /* If current CRL is equivalent use it if it is newer */
1026 if (crl_score == best_score && best_crl != NULL) {
1028 if (ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(best_crl),
1029 X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl)) == 0)
1032 * ASN1_TIME_diff never returns inconsistent signs for |day|
1035 if (day <= 0 && sec <= 0)
1039 best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
1040 best_score = crl_score;
1041 best_reasons = reasons;
1046 X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
1048 *pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
1049 *pscore = best_score;
1050 *preasons = best_reasons;
1051 X509_CRL_up_ref(best_crl);
1053 X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
1056 get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
1059 if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
1066 * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
1067 * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
1070 static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
1072 ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
1074 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1);
1076 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
1077 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
1079 exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
1083 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1);
1087 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
1089 extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
1099 if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
1105 /* See if a base and delta are compatible */
1107 static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
1109 /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
1110 if (!delta->base_crl_number)
1112 /* Base must have a CRL number */
1113 if (!base->crl_number)
1115 /* Issuer names must match */
1116 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
1118 /* AKID and IDP must match */
1119 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
1121 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
1123 /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
1124 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1126 /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1127 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1133 * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or
1134 * retrieve a chain of deltas...
1137 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
1138 X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
1142 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
1144 if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
1146 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
1147 delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
1148 if (check_delta_base(delta, base)) {
1149 if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
1150 *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
1151 X509_CRL_up_ref(delta);
1160 * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate
1161 * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not
1162 * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is
1163 * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL
1164 * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
1167 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
1168 unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1172 unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
1174 /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
1176 /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
1177 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
1179 /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
1180 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) {
1181 if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
1183 } else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) {
1184 /* If no new reasons reject */
1185 if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1188 /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
1189 else if (crl->base_crl_number)
1191 /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
1192 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) {
1193 if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
1196 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
1198 if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
1199 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
1202 if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
1203 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
1205 /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
1206 crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
1208 /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
1210 if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
1213 /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
1215 if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) {
1216 /* If no new reasons reject */
1217 if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1219 tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
1220 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
1223 *preasons = tmp_reasons;
1229 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
1230 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score)
1232 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
1233 X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1234 int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
1237 if ((size_t)cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
1240 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1242 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1243 if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) {
1244 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
1245 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1250 for (cidx++; cidx < (int)sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) {
1251 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1252 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1254 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1255 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
1256 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1261 /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
1263 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
1267 * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of
1268 * untrusted certificates.
1270 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) {
1271 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
1272 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1274 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1275 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1276 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
1281 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->ctx->additional_untrusted); i++) {
1282 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->ctx->additional_untrusted, i);
1283 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1285 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1286 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1287 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
1294 * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
1295 * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
1296 * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will
1297 * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice.
1300 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1302 X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
1304 /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
1307 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted))
1310 crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
1311 /* Copy verify params across */
1312 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
1314 crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
1315 crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1317 /* Verify CRL issuer */
1318 ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
1323 /* Check chain is acceptable */
1325 ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
1327 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
1332 * RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and
1333 * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could
1334 * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised to do so. RFC5280 is more
1335 * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor,
1336 * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the
1340 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1341 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
1342 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
1344 X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
1345 cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
1346 crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
1347 if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
1353 * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases. 1.
1354 * Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types. 2. One full, one
1355 * relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES. 3. Both are full names and
1356 * compare two GENERAL_NAMES. 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
1359 static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
1361 X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
1362 GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
1363 GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
1370 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
1374 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
1379 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1381 gens = b->name.fullname;
1382 } else if (b->type == 1) {
1385 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1386 gens = a->name.fullname;
1390 /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
1392 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) {
1393 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
1394 if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1396 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
1402 /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
1404 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) {
1405 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
1406 for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) {
1407 genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
1408 if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
1417 static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
1420 X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1421 /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
1423 return ! !(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
1424 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) {
1425 GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
1426 if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1428 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
1434 /* Check CRLDP and IDP */
1436 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
1437 unsigned int *preasons)
1440 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
1442 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) {
1443 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
1446 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
1449 *preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
1450 for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) {
1451 DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
1452 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) {
1453 if (!crl->idp || idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) {
1454 *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
1459 if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint)
1460 && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
1466 * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try
1467 * to find a delta CRL too
1470 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1471 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
1474 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1476 unsigned int reasons;
1477 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
1478 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
1479 X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
1480 reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
1481 ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl,
1482 &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
1487 /* Lookup CRLs from store */
1489 skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
1491 /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
1495 get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
1497 sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
1501 /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
1503 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
1504 ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
1505 ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
1514 /* Check CRL validity */
1515 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
1517 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1518 EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
1519 int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
1520 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
1521 chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
1522 /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
1523 if (ctx->current_issuer)
1524 issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
1527 * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next
1528 * certificate in chain.
1530 else if (cnum < chnum)
1531 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
1533 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
1534 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
1535 if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer)) {
1536 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
1537 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1545 * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done
1547 if (!crl->base_crl_number) {
1548 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
1549 if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
1550 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN)) {
1551 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
1552 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1557 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)) {
1558 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
1559 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1564 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH)) {
1565 if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0) {
1566 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR;
1567 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1573 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) {
1574 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
1575 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1582 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME)) {
1583 ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
1588 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
1589 ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
1592 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1593 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1598 rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags);
1599 if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
1601 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1605 /* Verify CRL signature */
1606 if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0) {
1607 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1608 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1618 EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
1622 /* Check certificate against CRL */
1623 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1628 * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled
1629 * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate
1630 * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extension can
1631 * change the meaning of CRL entries.
1633 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
1634 && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
1635 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
1636 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1641 * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL If found make sure reason
1642 * is not removeFromCRL.
1644 if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) {
1645 if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
1647 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
1648 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1656 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1661 ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
1662 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
1664 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1665 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
1668 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
1671 * Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback.
1675 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
1676 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
1677 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
1679 ctx->current_cert = x;
1680 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
1681 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1687 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1688 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
1689 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1692 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) {
1693 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1695 * Verification errors need to be "sticky", a callback may have allowed
1696 * an SSL handshake to continue despite an error, and we must then
1697 * remain in an error state. Therefore, we MUST NOT clear earlier
1698 * verification errors by setting the error to X509_V_OK.
1700 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
1707 static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1712 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
1713 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
1717 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
1719 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
1720 ctx->current_cert = x;
1721 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1726 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
1727 ctx->current_cert = x;
1728 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1732 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
1734 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
1735 ctx->current_cert = x;
1736 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1741 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
1742 ctx->current_cert = x;
1743 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1750 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1754 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1755 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
1757 cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1759 n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
1760 ctx->error_depth = n - 1;
1762 xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1764 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
1767 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
1772 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
1773 ctx->current_cert = xi;
1778 ctx->error_depth = n;
1779 xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1783 /* ctx->error=0; not needed */
1785 ctx->error_depth = n;
1788 * Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
1789 * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes
1792 if (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE)) {
1793 if ((pkey = X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) {
1794 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1795 ctx->current_cert = xi;
1796 ok = (*cb) (0, ctx);
1799 } else if (X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0) {
1800 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1801 ctx->current_cert = xs;
1802 ok = (*cb) (0, ctx);
1804 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1808 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1813 ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
1817 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
1818 ctx->current_issuer = xi;
1819 ctx->current_cert = xs;
1820 ok = (*cb) (1, ctx);
1827 xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1835 int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
1837 return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
1840 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
1845 char buff1[24], buff2[24], *p;
1846 int i, j, remaining;
1849 remaining = ctm->length;
1850 str = (char *)ctm->data;
1852 * Note that the following (historical) code allows much more slack in
1853 * the time format than RFC5280. In RFC5280, the representation is fixed:
1854 * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ
1856 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) {
1857 /* YYMMDDHHMM[SS]Z or YYMMDDHHMM[SS](+-)hhmm */
1858 int min_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
1859 int max_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSS+hhmm") - 1;
1860 if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length)
1862 OPENSSL_memcpy(p, str, 10);
1868 * YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.fff]]Z or YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.f[f[f]]]](+-)hhmm
1870 int min_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
1871 int max_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSS.fff+hhmm") - 1;
1872 if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length)
1874 OPENSSL_memcpy(p, str, 12);
1880 if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+')) {
1891 * Skip any (up to three) fractional seconds... TODO(emilia): in
1892 * RFC5280, fractional seconds are forbidden. Can we just kill them
1895 if (remaining && *str == '.') {
1898 for (i = 0; i < 3 && remaining; i++, str++, remaining--) {
1899 if (*str < '0' || *str > '9')
1908 /* We now need either a terminating 'Z' or an offset. */
1917 if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
1920 * Historical behaviour: the (+-)hhmm offset is forbidden in RFC5280.
1924 if (str[1] < '0' || str[1] > '9' || str[2] < '0' || str[2] > '9' ||
1925 str[3] < '0' || str[3] > '9' || str[4] < '0' || str[4] > '9')
1927 offset = ((str[1] - '0') * 10 + (str[2] - '0')) * 60;
1928 offset += (str[3] - '0') * 10 + (str[4] - '0');
1932 atm.type = ctm->type;
1934 atm.length = sizeof(buff2);
1935 atm.data = (unsigned char *)buff2;
1937 if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset * 60, cmp_time) == NULL)
1940 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) {
1941 i = (buff1[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff1[1] - '0');
1943 i += 100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
1944 j = (buff2[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff2[1] - '0');
1953 i = strcmp(buff1, buff2);
1954 if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
1960 ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
1962 return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
1965 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1967 return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
1970 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s,
1971 int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1980 if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING)) {
1981 if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1982 return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1983 if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
1984 return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1986 return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1989 /* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */
1991 X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer,
1992 EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags)
1994 X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
1997 STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revs = NULL;
1998 /* CRLs can't be delta already */
1999 if (base->base_crl_number || newer->base_crl_number) {
2000 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA);
2003 /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */
2004 if (!base->crl_number || !newer->crl_number) {
2005 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER);
2008 /* Issuer names must match */
2009 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) {
2010 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH);
2013 /* AKID and IDP must match */
2014 if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_authority_key_identifier)) {
2015 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH);
2018 if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) {
2019 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH);
2022 /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
2023 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer->crl_number, base->crl_number) <= 0) {
2024 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER);
2027 /* CRLs must verify */
2028 if (skey && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 ||
2029 X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0)) {
2030 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE);
2033 /* Create new CRL */
2034 crl = X509_CRL_new();
2035 if (!crl || !X509_CRL_set_version(crl, 1))
2037 /* Set issuer name */
2038 if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)))
2041 if (!X509_CRL_set_lastUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(newer)))
2043 if (!X509_CRL_set_nextUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(newer)))
2046 /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */
2048 if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_delta_crl, base->crl_number, 1, 0))
2052 * Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set CRL
2053 * number to correct value too.
2056 for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++) {
2057 X509_EXTENSION *ext;
2058 ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i);
2059 if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl, ext, -1))
2063 /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */
2065 revs = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer);
2067 for (j = 0; j < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); j++) {
2068 X509_REVOKED *rvn, *rvtmp;
2069 rvn = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs, j);
2071 * Add only if not also in base. TODO: need something cleverer here
2072 * for some more complex CRLs covering multiple CAs.
2074 if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base, &rvtmp, rvn->serialNumber)) {
2075 rvtmp = X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn);
2078 if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, rvtmp)) {
2079 X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp);
2084 /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */
2086 if (skey && md && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md))
2092 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2098 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp,
2099 CRYPTO_EX_unused * unused,
2100 CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_unused,
2101 CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
2104 * This function is (usually) called only once, by
2105 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c).
2108 if (!CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(&g_ex_data_class, &index, argl, argp,
2115 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
2117 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data);
2120 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
2122 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx);
2125 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2130 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
2135 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2137 return ctx->error_depth;
2140 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2142 return ctx->current_cert;
2145 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2150 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2154 return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain);
2157 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2159 return ctx->current_issuer;
2162 X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2164 return ctx->current_crl;
2167 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2172 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
2177 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2179 ctx->untrusted = sk;
2182 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2184 return ctx->untrusted;
2187 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
2192 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
2194 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
2197 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
2199 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
2203 * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values.
2204 * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and
2205 * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't
2206 * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then
2207 * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL
2208 * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the
2209 * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL
2213 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
2214 int purpose, int trust)
2217 /* If purpose not set use default */
2219 purpose = def_purpose;
2220 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
2223 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
2225 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2228 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2229 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) {
2230 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
2232 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2235 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2237 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
2239 trust = ptmp->trust;
2242 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
2244 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
2249 if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose)
2250 ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
2251 if (trust && !ctx->param->trust)
2252 ctx->param->trust = trust;
2256 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
2258 X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
2259 ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
2261 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2264 X509_STORE_CTX_zero(ctx);
2268 void X509_STORE_CTX_zero(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2270 OPENSSL_memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
2273 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2278 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
2282 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
2283 STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2287 X509_STORE_CTX_zero(ctx);
2290 ctx->untrusted = chain;
2292 CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data);
2294 ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
2299 * Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults.
2303 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
2305 ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT | X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
2308 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2309 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
2314 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
2315 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
2320 if (store && store->check_issued)
2321 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
2323 ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
2325 if (store && store->get_issuer)
2326 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
2328 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
2330 if (store && store->verify_cb)
2331 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2333 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
2335 if (store && store->verify)
2336 ctx->verify = store->verify;
2338 ctx->verify = internal_verify;
2340 if (store && store->check_revocation)
2341 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
2343 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
2345 if (store && store->get_crl)
2346 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
2348 ctx->get_crl = NULL;
2350 if (store && store->check_crl)
2351 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
2353 ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
2355 if (store && store->cert_crl)
2356 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
2358 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
2360 if (store && store->lookup_certs)
2361 ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
2363 ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs;
2365 if (store && store->lookup_crls)
2366 ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
2368 ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls;
2370 ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
2375 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, ctx, &ctx->ex_data);
2376 if (ctx->param != NULL) {
2377 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2380 OPENSSL_memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
2381 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2386 * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This
2387 * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
2390 void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2392 ctx->other_ctx = sk;
2393 ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
2396 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2398 /* We need to be idempotent because, unfortunately, |X509_STORE_CTX_free|
2399 * also calls this function. */
2400 if (ctx->cleanup != NULL) {
2402 ctx->cleanup = NULL;
2404 if (ctx->param != NULL) {
2405 if (ctx->parent == NULL)
2406 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2409 if (ctx->tree != NULL) {
2410 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
2413 if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
2414 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free);
2417 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
2418 OPENSSL_memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
2421 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2423 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
2426 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
2428 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
2431 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags,
2434 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
2437 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
2438 int (*verify_cb) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
2440 ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb;
2443 X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2448 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2450 return ctx->explicit_policy;
2453 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
2455 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
2456 param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
2459 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
2462 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2467 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
2470 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2474 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)
2476 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)